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The Continuing Expansive Pressure
to Hold Employers Strictly Liable
for Supervisory Sexual Extortion:
An Alternative Approach Based
on Reasonableness
Heather S. Murr*
Supervisory sexual extortion claims, where a supervisor extorts sex from a
subordinate by threatening discharge or some other job detriment, do not fit
neatly into the current employer liability framework for supervisory sexual
harassment under Title VII. Prior to 1998, employers were strictly liable for
such claims as they constituted quid pro quo sexual harassment. Since 1998,
employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment has hinged upon the
employer's official decision-making processes. An employer is strictly liable for
supervisory sexual harassment only when the supervisor takes a tangible action,
such as termination, that implicates the employer's official decision-making
processes. In all other instances of supervisory sexual harassment, the employer
may be vicariously liable but may defeat liability, or reduce damages, by
asserting and proving a two-prong affirmative defense that considers the
reasonableness of both the employer's and the subordinate's actions. In the
supervisory sexual extortion context, certain courts have taken a realist effectsbased approach and have imposed strict liability for these classic quid pro quo
claims based on the supervisor's abuse of official power in extorting sex. Other
courts have taken a formalist approach and have concluded that, because the
supervisor did not take the threatened official action, the employer's official
decision-making processes were not implicated. Consequently, such courts have
imposed vicarious but not strict liability. These same courts then apply the two* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. I would like to
thank Dean Daniel Rodriguez for his mentoring and guidance. I would also like to thank
Michael Liu, Christina Minghine, and Abby Taylor for research assistance and Lisa Kahle
for her invaluable research and cite-checking assistance. Thank you to Katharine Allen of
the U.c. Davis Law Review for her editorial assistance. All errors are mine. Finally, thank
you to Ryan for his unwavering support.
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prong affirmative defense and often deny liability on the grounds that the
employer acted reasonably because it took some, often minimal, steps to prevent
the supervisor's abusive conduct and the subordinate acted unreasonably
because she failed to avoid harm by not reporting but instead submitting to the
supervisor's abusive conduct.
This Article offers a normative framework for how the current employer
liability standards should be applied to sexual extortion claims. It analyzes the
realist-formalist dichotomy in the supervisory sexual extortion context and
concludes that the formalist approach is more consistent with the current
employer liability standards and related policy considerations. The Article then
explains how certain courts have incorrectly applied the second prong of the
affirmative defense and inappropriately denied liability by failing to consider the
avoidable consequences doctrine and related harm-avoidance principles upon
which the second prong is based. The Article concludes by offering a framework
for how these harm-avoidance principles apply in the supervisory sexual
extortion context specifically, and the supervisory sexual harassment context
more generally, such that employers are held liable for supervisory sexual
extortion and sexual harassment under circumstances where it is reasonable to
impose liability.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine a deaf-mute employee whose supervisor sexually harasses
her and uses his authority to coerce her into performing numerous acts
of oral sex on him. Her supervisor is the most senior manager at the
facility during her shift. He is also the only person in the facility with
whom she can communicate in sign language. The supervisor coerces
the employee's submission to his sexual demands by tying her continued
employment to her submission. Shortly before the harassment began,
the employee and her husband purchased a family home, relying on her
income to make the mortgage payments. Faced with the choice of either
enduring her supervisor's abusive conduct or the prospect of losing her
job and home if she reports his conduct or refuses his sexual demands,
she submits. After enduring her supervisor's abuse for approximately
six months, during which her home-life and marriage deteriorate, she
musters the courage to report her supervisor's conduct to her employer.!
Prior to 1998, a victim's employer was strictly liable for a supervisor's
sexual extortion under Title VII because the supervisor's conduct
constituted quid pro quo sexual harassment - "one of the most
pernicious and oppressive forms of sexual harassment that can occur in
the workplace.,,2 Unlike a hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim, which involves "bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment,,,3 a
supervisory sexual extortion claim represents a classic quid pro quo,
where the supervisor "explicitly or implicitly condition[s] a job, a job
benefit, or the absence of a job detriment, upon an employee's acceptance
of sexual conduct.,,4 In supervisory sexual extortion cases, power is the
fundamental prerequisite for a supervisor's ability to extort sex through
5
compelled submission to unwelcome sexual advances.
This same

1 These facts are essential1y those found in Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994).
See infra text accompanying note 55.
2 Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52
(2004) ("The most oppressive and invidious type of workplace sexual harassment is quid
pro quo sex. . .. Most workers subjected to sexual pressure in the workplace have little
means of defense - other than the law. For economic reasons, most workers cannot
simply abandon their employment - new jobs are hard to find"); Nichols, 42 F.3d at 510.
3
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. El1erth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998).
4
Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Nichols, 42 F.3d at 511).
5
See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76-77 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ("[Ilt is the authority vested in the supervisor by the employer that enables him
to commit the wrong: it is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed
with the employer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on
subordinates."); Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 504 (7th Cir. 1997) (en
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power enables the supervisor to carry out his threats if the subordinate
does not engage in the demanded sexual acts. The source of the
perpetrating supervisor's power is a general grant of authority from the
employer to make employment decisions, such as termination and
promotion, regarding employees under his control. Because this grant of
authority makes the supervisor's sexual extortion possible in the first
instance, federal courts traditionally held employers strictly liable for a
6
supervisor's quid pro quo harassment of a subordinate. That is no
longer the case.
The strict liability tide changed in 1998 when the Supreme Court
issued its opinions in two companion cases, Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
7
8
Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. While both cases addressed an
employer's vicarious liability for supervisory sexual harassment, only
Ellerth involved a quid pro quo claim, whereas Faragher involved a
hostile work environment claim.
In Ellerth, the Court acknowledged that the quid pro quo label had
become synonymous with strict liability, which in turn placed expansive
pressure on the label as plaintiffs sought to plead their claims as quid
9
pro quo. This expansive pressure highlighted the need for a "uniform
and predictable standard" for employer vicarious liability for quid pro
lO
quo claims. Similarly, the hostile work environment claim in Faragher
highlighted the need for a clear standard regarding the scope of an
employer's vicarious liability for such claims.
To resolve the employer vicarious liability issues presented in Ellerth
and Faragher, the Court relied on traditional agency principles and
adopted a formalist approach. Instead of imposing strict liability based
on the label affixed to the harassment claim involved or based on the
supervisor's unique ability to sexually harass subordinates, the Court's
formalist approach focused on the employer's official decision-making

banc) (per curiam) (Cudahy, J., concurring) ("Quid pro quo is always a creature of power. It
is the classic paradigm of powerful males forcing their will on vulnerable females."), affd
sub nom. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; see also Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual
Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1998) (placing "women's subordination at the
center of the sexual harassment analysis," and arguing that sexual harassment is
"phenomenon that serves to preserve male control and entrench masculine norms in the
workplace").
6
As discussed in Part I.B.2 infra, the relevant question was whether the alleged
conduct was within the quid pro quo definition, and definitions varied among the circuits.
7 524 U.s. 742 (1998).
8 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
9
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753.
10 [d. at 754.
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processes. Under this approach, the Court held that an employer is
strictly liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate,
regardless of whether the claim is labeled as quid pro quo or hostile
work environment, when the "supervisor's harassment culminates in a
tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable
reassignment. ,,12
In contrast, where severe or pervasive harassment exists, but where
the supervisor does not take a tangible employment action against the
subordinate, the Court in Ellerth and Faragher held that the employer is
vicariously liable but may assert and prove a two-prong affirmative
defense to liability or damages.13 The first prong of the affirmative
defense is based on negligence principles and requires the employer to
prove that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct
any sexually harassing behavior.,,14 The second prong of the affirmative
defense incorporates avoidable consequences principles associated with
mitigation of damages. IS This prong requires the employer to prove that
the "plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise.,,16
Since the Ellerth and Faragher opinions in 1998, federal courts have
grappled with the question of what constitutes a tangible employment
17
action. The Court provided some guidance when it explained that "[a]
tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision

11
See Martha Chamallas, Title VII's Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77
S. CAL. 1. REv. 307, 347-48 (2004). Professor Chamallas discussed the formalist and realist
approaches to employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment in the constructive
discharge context. ld. She explained that a formalist approach focuses on the employer's
"formal decisions and policies" and considers whether there has been any disparate
treatment on unlawful grounds regarding the employer's official "decisionmaking
process."
ld.
A realist approach "capture[s] more subtle or hidden forms of
discrimination" as it focuses on the "actual effects of employer behavior (whether formal or
informal) on employees and tak[es] into account the perspectives of the targets of behavior,
as well as those who represent the enterprise." ld. at 348.
12
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
13 See cases cited supra note 12.
14
See cases cited supra note 12.
15 See cases cited supra note 12.
\6
See cases cited supra note 12.
17
As discussed in Part V infra, the courts have had similar difficulties in correctly
applying the affirmative defense and, in particular, the second prong.
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causing a significant change in benefits."ls This list, however, was
merely illustrative and provided little guidance for more complex cases.
Given the Court's lack of guidance and the promise of strict liability
associated with tangible employment actions, the tangible employment
action label has experienced the same expansive pressure as the quid pro
19
quo label prior to Ellerth and Faragher.
Ellerth and Faragher left unresolved the question of whether the
tangible employment action standard encompasses either of the related
claims of constructive discharge and supervisory sexual extortion. In the
constructive discharge scenario, the subordinate resigns in response to
objectively intolerable working conditions created by the supervisor's
sexual harassment. In the supervisory sexual extortion scenario, the
subordinate submits to the supervisor's unwelcome sexual demands in
response to the supervisor's threats of tangible job detriment if the
subordinate refuses. Although the claims differ in certain respects, they
are largely analogous in the context of the tangible employment action
analysis because, in both cases, the subordinate responds to the
supervisor's sexual harassment by taking the action - quitting or
20
submitting - that brings about the resulting harm.
As might be
expected, federal courts have reached varying conclusions regarding
whether and under what circumstances a claim of either constructive
discharge or supervisory sexual extortion constitutes a tangible
21
employment action for which an employer is strictly liable.
In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,22 the Court determined that an
employer's strict liability for a constructive discharge resulting from
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742, 761 (1998).
See infra Part III.
20 See Chamallas, supra note 11, at 344 (analogizing constructive discharge cases to
forced submission cases because in both cases "the employer makes an illegal demand and
renders it impossible for the plaintiff to stay on the job on her own terms" and "in each
situation the employee capitulates by behaving the way the supervisor wants her to
behave"); see also infra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing how Third Circuit in
Suders analogized constructive discharge claims to sexual extortion claims).
21
For a discussion of the varied approaches taken by federal courts regarding
constructive discharge and whether it constitutes a tangible employment action, see
Chamallas, supra note 11, at 328-36. In her article, Professor Chamallas noted that some
courts took a "formalist approach," which focused on "characterization of the constructive
discharge claim that purports to fit all cases, regardless of the facts," while others took a
"realist approach" focused on the "actual effects" of the constructive discharge suffered by
the plaintiff. Id. at 328-34. Still, others took a "middle-ground" approach by "classifying
some, but not all constructive discharges as tangible employment actions." Id. The
formalist-realist dichotomy applies equally in the analogous supervisory sexual extortion
context. See infra Part III.
22 542 U.s. 129 (2004).
18

19
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supervisory sexual harassment turns on whether an "official act of the
23
enterprise" precipitated the plaintiff's resignation.
In reaching this
conclusion, the Court rejected a realist approach, which would impose
strict liability on employers for all constructive discharges resulting from
24
a supervisor's creation of objectively intolerable working conditions.
Rather, as in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court took a formalist approach
and held that, even when the constructive discharge is the result of
objectively intolerable working conditions brought about solely, and
perhaps intentionally, by supervisory sexual harassment, the
constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action only
when the plaintiff resigns in "reasonable response to an employersanctioned adverse action officially changing her employment status or
si tua tion.,,25
The Court, however, has not yet spoken directly regarding whether a
subordinate's submission to a supervisor's sexual demands constitutes a
26
tangible employment action for which an employer is strictly liable. In
the absence of guidance on this issue, federal courts have reached
27
conflicting conclusions. The Second and Ninth Circuits,28 the only two
Id. at 2355 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762).
24
Id. at 2355-56.
25
Id. at 2347.
26
See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 61 U. PIn. L. REV. 671, 681-83 (2000). Professor Grossman stated that it is
unclear following Ellerth whether submission cases constitute tangible employment action
cases for which employers are strictly liable. Id. She noted that the Equal Employment
23

Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") guidelines regarding tangible employment actions
do not address situations where an employee submits to a supervisor's sexual demands to
avoid the threatened harm. Id. Professor Grossman contended that "[i]t is, of course,
anomalous to refuse to recognize that submission to a supervisor's sexual extortion is itself
an alteration in the terms and conditions of employment. It also strains the holding in
Ellerth, contradicts the principles behind it, and undermines Title VII's goals of deterrence
and compensation." Id. at 732. But see Chamallas, supra note 11, at 344-46 (noting that after
Ellerth and Faragher, it is unclear how submission cases will be classified). Professor
Chamallas stated:
[The] difficulty in developing a compelling rationale to retain vicarious liability
in submission cases after Ellerth/Faragher is not surprising [as] [ilt flows from
the problem of carving out some types of sexual harassment and treating them
like disparate treatment cases, while relegating the rest of the sexual harassment
cases to the category of hostile environment, even though both types of cases
involve behavior on the part of a supervisor that is not qualitatively different in
terms of its severity or its structure.
Chamallas, supra note 11, at 344-46; see also infra text accompanying notes 328-32.
27
Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52
(2004); see infra Part III. A. 1 (discussing Second Circuit's opinion in lin).
Z8 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003); see infra Part III.A.1
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courts of appeals to publish opinions on the issue,29 answered the
question in the affirmative. Two district courts in the Eleventh Circuit
30
concluded otherwise.
As in the constructive discharge context, the conflicting conclusions
tum on whether the reviewing court employed a formalist or realist
approach to supervisory sexual extortion. The Second and Ninth Circuit
adopted a realist approach focused on the supervisor's use of official
power and the actual effects of supervisory sexual extortion. 3! In doing
so, both courts concluded that a subordinate suffers a tangible
employment action when her supervisor coerces her into performing
32
unwanted sex acts through threats of discharge. In contrast, the district
courts in the Eleventh Circuit adopted a formalist approach to resolve
the supervisory sexual extortion question. These courts focused on the
employer's official decision-making processes. Under this formalist
approach, these courts concluded that supervisory sexual extortion
claims do not constitute tangible employment actions because, in the
absence of the requisite official action by the employer, such claims are
simply aggravated hostile work environment claims to which the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense applies. 33
Based on the often egregious facts presented in supervisory sexual
extortion cases, the realist approach taken by the Second and Ninth
Circuits seems just. This is particularly true considering that, in the
absence of a tangible employment action, the only alternative available
to a sexual extortion victim following Ellerth and Faragher is to
demonstrate an actionable hostile work environment and hope that the
employer is unable to satisfy both prongs of the affirmative defense.
(discussing Ninth Circuit's opinion in Holly D.).
29
In its unpublished opinion in Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 00-1787, 2001 WL
427785, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 12,2001); the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion
from the Second and Ninth Circuits. See infra text accompanying note 208. For additional
cases discussing, but not resolving the question of whether supervisory sexual extortion
constitutes a tangible employment action, see infra text accompanying notes 187, 208.
JO Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (M.D. Fla. 2004); Sarnedi v.
Miami-Dade County, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2002); see infra Part I1I.A.2
(discussing district court's opinion in Speaks).
31
Chamallas, supra note 11, at 345 (noting Second Circuit's realist approach to
submission cases) ..
32
Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1162; Tin, 310 F.3d at 99.
33
Speaks, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1226; Samedi, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1219 (holding without
analYSis that plaintiff did not allege tangible employment action based on her allegations
that she submitted to unwelcome sexual intercourse and other sex acts with her superiors
because they threatened her with termination if she did not do so, and concluding that
such facts constitute severe hostile environment claim to which Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense applies).
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Given the documented pro-employer trend in granting summary
judgment on the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, and the courts'
rather cursory and often incorrect analysis of the two prongs, it is highly
unlikely that an employer will fail in its efforts to successfully assert the
34
affirmative defense. In light of this trend, it is understandable why
harassment victims are pleading, and certain courts are construing,
supervisory sexual extortion cases as tangible employment actions in an
effort to hold employers strictly liable for such conduct.
Notwithstanding the appeal of holding employers strictly liable for
supervisory sexual extortion, imposing strict liability in such cases does
not comport with the Court's formalist tangible employment action
approach in Ellerth and Faragher. This formalist approach and the related
policy considerations in the analogous constructive discharge context
further bolster this conclusion.
The purpose of this Article is two-fold. First, the Article explains why
imposing strict liability in supervisory sexual extortion cases is
inconsistent with both the Court's jurisprudence regarding tangible
employment actions in Ellerth, Faragher, and Suders, as well as
congressional intent regarding Title VII's goals of preventing and
deterring harassment.
Second, the Article proposes a normative
framework to govern the application of the second prong of the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in the context of sexual extortion
cases. Under the proposed framework, employers will be liable for
supervisory sexual extortion specifically, and supervisory sexual
harassment more generally, under circumstances where it was not
unreasonable for the employee to submit to the supervisor's abusive
conduct.
Part I of this Article details the historical progression of the law
regarding supervisory sexual harassment and the development of
standards for vicarious employer liability in quid pro quo cases. It also
explains the pressure placed on courts to expand the definition of "quid
pro quo" in an effort to hold employers strictly liable for supervisory
sexual harassment. Part II then discusses the paradigm shift from strict
liability in quid pro quo sexual harassment cases to the new formalist
approach under Ellerth and Faragher, which distinguishes between
tangible employment action cases, for which an employer is strictly
liable, and all other cases, to which negligence and avoidable
consequences principles apply. Part III addresses the lower courts'

34
See infra Part V (discussing courts' application of second prong of affirmative
defense).
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application of Ellerth and Faragher to supervisory sexual extortion claims.
It also discusses the Court's June 2004 opinion in Suders, in which the
Court applied Ellerth and Faragher to constructive discharge claims
resulting from supervisory sexual harassment. Part III then explains
how Suders provides guidance in the analogous supervisory sexual
extortion context. Part IV applies the tangible employment action
analysis to supervisory sexual extortion cases and explains how the
realist approach misinterprets and misapplies the tangible employment
action standard.
Part V proposes a normative framework to govern the application of
the second prong of the EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense, which
focuses on avoidable consequences principles in determining whether
the subordinate acted unreasonably. Part V then explains how the
second prong of the defense should apply in supervisory sexual
extortion cases specifically, and supervisory sexual harassment cases
more generally. Finally, Part V delineates factors that courts and factfinders should consider in assessing whether supervisory sexual
extortion and sexual harassment victims unreasonably failed to report or
avoid harm.
I.

EVOLUTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT JURISPRUDENCE

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the" Act") provides that it
"shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex.,,35 Yet, the Supreme Court did not address the
question of whether sexual harassment constitutes an unlawful form of
sex discrimination under the Act until 1986. 36 In Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, the Court concluded that it does.

A.

Sexual Harassment as a Form of Sex Discrimination

In Meritor, the Court held that sexual harassment constitutes a form of
sex discrimination when the harassment is "because of the subordinate's
sex.,,37 In defining "sexual harassment," the Court deferred to the
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex (the "Guidelines") issued

42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2 (2005).
Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.s. 57, 59 (1986).
37
[d. at 64 (quoting L.A. Oep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.s. 702, 707 n.13
(1978».
35
36
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by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC,,).38
The Guidelines define "sexual harassment" as conduct including
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.,,39 Moreover, the Court
embraced the distinction made by the EEOC and lower courts between
40
quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims.
With respect to the standard of employer liability for supervisory
sexual harassment, the Court in Meritor was less clear. The Court
rejected the negligence approach taken by the district court, as well as
41
Instead, the
the strict liability approach taken by the D.C. Circuit.
Court agreed with the EEOC's position that agency principles should
42
govern employer liability in the supervisory sexual harassment context.
Nevertheless, based on the "abstract" state of the factual record
regarding employer liability, the Court declined to issue a definitive
43
employer liability standard. Instead, the Court stated that "Congress
wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area." 44
The Court explained that the language of Title VII evinced "Congress'[s]
. . . intent to place some limits on the acts of emplolees for which
employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.,,4 Based on the
applicable agency principles, the Court concluded that "employers are
[not] always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisors" and an "absence of notice to an employer does not

38 [d. at 65. The EEOC is the administrative agency charged with enforcing the Act and
promulgating the procedural regulations and guidelines thereunder. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (noting that EEOC is agency responsible for
enforcement of Title VII, and further noting that EEOC's interpretation of Title VII is
entitled to deference).
39
Meritor, 477 U.s. at 65. The Court acknowledged that although the EEOC's
interpretation of the Act was not controlling upon the federal courts, the Guidelines
"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance." [d. (citations omitted).
40
[d. The EEOC Guidelines define "quid pro quo sexual harassment" as:

Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature ... when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individuars
employment, [or] (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual ....
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (2004).
41
Meritor, 477 U.s. at 72.
42
[d. at 72.
43
[d.
" [d.
"

[d.
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necessarily insulate that employer from liability.,,46 Not surprisingly, the
failure to establish a definitive rule, and the lack of guidance as to
whether liability depended on the category of harassment, led to
confusion among lower courts regarding the applicable employer
liability standard for supervisor harassment.
B.

Employer Liability for Supervisory Sexual Harassment

Following Meritor, lower courts turned to the agency principles set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency (the "Restatement of
Agency") to fashion employer liability standards for supervisory sexual
harassment claims. The resulting liability standards varied depending
on whether the claim was labeled as either hostile work environment or
quid pro quo.
1.

Hostile Work Environment

In the hostile work environment context, federal courts attempted to
grapple with the agency principles set forth in section 219 of the

Restatement of Agency. As a result, they adopted varied and often
47
conflicting approaches to employer liability for supervisor harassment.
For example, many courts required that the plaintiff demonstrate both
vicarious and direct liability for the supervisor's harassment, even
though agency principles dictated that either of the two was sufficient to
48
impose liability on an employer for injuries suffered by its employees.
Consequently, courts often required plaintiffs to demonstrate the
employer's vicarious liability by proving that the supervisor either acted
46 ld. In Justice Marshall's concurring opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Blackrnun,
and Stevens joined, Justice Marshall concluded that the employer liability issue was
properly before the Court and stated that he would adopt the rule historically followed by
courts and the EEOC. ld. The rule states that an employer is strictly liable for a supervisor
or agent who violates Title VII regardless of whether the employer knew or should have
known of the unlawful conduct or "any other mitigating factor.'" ld. at 75 (citing 45 Fed.
Reg. 74,676 (Nov. 10, 1980». The focus of Justice Marshall's argument was that the
supervisor's power in the workplace enables him to commit the violation, regardless of
whether the violation results in tangible job detriment or an abusive or hostile working
environment. ld. at 76-77; see infra Part 1V.A.1 (explaining that Second Circuit has
essentially followed this reasoning and concluded that employee who submits to
supervisor's sexual extortion demands has suffered tangible employment action because
supervisor abuses his power in coercing employee's submission).
" See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII
Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L.
REv. 66, 131-40 (1995) (discussing and critiquing various pre-Ellerth/Faragher approaches to
employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment based on agency principles).
" ld. at 131-36.
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within the scope of his employment or misused his authority when he
engaged in the sexual harassment. 49 These courts also required plaintiffs
to further demonstrate the employer's direct liability by proving that the
employer was either negligent or reckless in failing to prevent or
respond to the sexual harassment. 50 As a result of these varied
approaches, the state of the law regarding employer liability for a hostile
work environment created by a supervisor's conduct was uncertain.
2.

Quid Pro Quo

The quid pro quo label suffered from a different lack of certainty.
Because the quid pro quo label was synonymous with strict liability,S!
plaintiffs creatively pleaded sexual harassment claims as quid pro quo
claims, which resulted in pressure to expand the definition of "quid pro
quO.',S2 In tum, this expansive pressure led to varied definitions of "quid
49
Id.; see also id. at 136-40 (discussing courts' other varied approaches to employer
liability based on agency principles).
50 Id.
51
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742, 753 (1998) ("If the plaintiff
established a quid pro quo claim, the Courts of Appeal held, the employer was subject to
vicarious liability."); see also Meritor, 477 U.s. at 76 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[Elvery Court
of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that sexual harassment by supervisory
personnel is automatically imputed to the employer when the harassment results in
tangible job detriment to the subordinate employee.").
" In Ellerth, the Court acknowledged the incentive for plaintiffs to state their claims as
quid pro quo claims due to the equivalence of the quid pro quo label with vicarious
liability. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753. For a detailed discussion regarding the tortured evolution
of quid pro quo sexual harassment and the elements of the claim prior to the Court's
opinions in Ellerth and Faragher, see Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual
Harassment, 21 HARV. J.1. & PUB. POL'y 307 (1998). In his article, Scalia traced the history of
qUid pro quo sexual harassment and concluded that that the quid pro quo label is
"functionally meaningless," "analytically useless and cumbersome," and "should be
eliminated as a functional category of discrimination." Id. at 308. Scalia argued, consistent
with the position advanced in this Article, that discrimination on the basis of sex should fall
into one of two categories: first, disparate treatment, where an employee suffers an
"adverse job action" on a discriminatory basis, including cases where the employee suffers
an adverse job action for refusing her supervisor's advances; and second, harassment,
including hostile work environment cases, submission cases where an employee submits to
a supervisor's unwelcome sexual demands and thus avoids any adverse job action, and
unfulfilled threat cases where the supervisor makes unwelcome sexual demands and
threatens the employee with adverse job action, but the employee refuses and the
supervisor does not follow through on the threat. Id. at 308-19. In the context of these two
categories, Scalia concluded that a submission case is not actionable as an adverse job
action case but should instead be evaluated as a hostile environment claim. Id. at 312, 316.
As discussed in Part II infra, the Court implicitly adopted Scalia's approach in Ellerth
and Faragher when it distinguished between tangible employment action claims, for which
employers are strictly liable, and all other hostile environment sexual harassment claims,
for which an employer is vicariously liable but may assert and prove the two-prong
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pro quo" among the circuits. 53
In its most restrictive form, the quid pro quo definition included only
those circumstances in which the employee suffered some form of
tangible job detriment, such as termination, in retaliation for refusing to
54
This Article
submit to a supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances.
refers to these circumstances as "fulfilled threat" cases. In its more
expansive form, the quid pro quo definition also included circumstances
in which the employee submitted to the supervisor's unwelcome sexual
55
advances and thereby avoided the threatened reprisals. This Article
refers to such scenarios as "submission" cases. 56 The policy behind
including submission cases in the quid pro quo definition and holding
employers strictly liable for such conduct is to avoid punishing plaintiffs

affirmative defense. Moreover, as discussed in Part IV.A.1 infra, the tangible employment
action standard incorporates the "adverse" component of adverse job action. Ironically,
although the Court intended the tangible employment action standard to resolve the
expansive pressure experienced by the quid pro quo label for purposes of imposing strict
liability, the tangible employment action standard is experiencing the same expansive
pressure (for the same reasons). The question now is whether successful supervisory
sexual extortion constitutes a tangible employment action for which an employer is strictly
liable. See infra Part IV (discussing whether submission case constitutes tangible
employment action for which employer is strictly liable).
53 See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 499 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per
curiam) ("Defining an actionable quid pro quo, of course, is central to the liability
standard."), affd sub nom. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742 ..
54 See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that
plaintiff had viable quid pro quo claim because she suffered tangible job detriment, in form
of unfair suspension, based on her refusal to acquiesce to her supervisor's repeated
demands that she engage in sex with him); cf Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (holding that plaintiff who endured her supervisor's sexual advances, groping, and
rape as result of her supervisor's threats of adverse job consequences if she did not submit
to such conduct was unable to allege viable quid pro quo claim because she did not suffer
requisite tangible job detriment as supervisor never carried out any of his threats).
55 See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that employer is
always strictly liable for supervisor's quid pro quo sexual harassment because supervisor's
use of his "actual or apparent authority" gives rise to respondeat superior liability, and
concluding that plaintiff had established prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual
harassment based on allegations that her supervisor coerced her into submitting to his
unwelcome sexual advances and performing numerous acts of oral sex on him by tying her
continued employment and receipt of job-related benefits, such as appropriate performance
reviews and leave time, to her submission to his sexual demands); Karibian v. Columbia
Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that pertinent inquiry in quid pro quo
case is "whether the supervisor has linked tangible job benefits to the [plaintiff's]
acceptance or rejection of sexual advances," and not whether employee can show economic
or other tangible job detriment, and thus concluding that plaintiff alleged viable quid pro
quo claim where her supervisor coerced her into having "violent sexual relationship" with
him by tying conditions of her employment to her acquiescence to his sexual demands).
,. See, e.g., Nichols, 42 F.3d at 514 (describing facts of case which exemplify submission
case); Karibian, 14 F.3d at 776-78.
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who lacked the capacity to resist their supervisor's threats of job
57
detriment and risk incurring economic harm.
Finally, the most expansive, and ultimately the most controversial
definition of "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, included not only
fulfilled threat and submission cases, but also those cases in which the
supervisor threatened job detriment if the subordinate did not submit to
the supervisor's sexual demands and yet the threat remained unfulfilled
58
even though the subordinate refused to submit. This Article refers to
these cases as "unfulfilled threat" cases.
The policy behind including unfulfilled threats in the quid pro quo
definition and holding employers strictly liable for such conduct was
59
articulated in Jansen v. Packaging Corporation of America. In Jansen, the
Seventh Circuit recognized that "[e]mployees who have the wherewithal
to call the supervisor's 'bluff' and suffer emotionally as a consequence
should not have to go uncompensated, nor should a 'bluff' so likely to
cause harm go unrecognized by the law.,,60 The extension of the quid
pro quo definition to the unfulfilled threat circumstances in Jansen would
later serve as a catalyst for the creation of the new framework in
61
62
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton for
addressing supervisory sexual harassment claims.
C.

Expansion of Quid Pro Quo as a Catalyst for Change

In Jansen, the Seventh Circuit en banc held in a sharply divided
opinion that an employer is strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment
"even if the supervisor's threat does not result in a company act," such
63
as termination.
Jansen involved two plaintiffs, Alice Jansen and
Kimberly Ellerth, who alleged quid pro quo claims against their
64
respective employers.
Because both cases involved an employer's
liability for quid pro quo harassment and both were reargued en bane on
Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778.
.. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 500; see also Robinson v. City of PittSburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1297 (3d

57

Cir. 1997) (holding that quid pro quo violation occurs when supervisor either (1) explicitly
or implicitly conditions term, condition, or privilege of employment on employee's
response to supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances, regardless of whether employee
submits or whether threats are carried out, or (2) makes decisions regarding employee'S
compensation, etc., based on employee'S response to unwelcome sexual advances).
59
123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
60
[d. at 500.
61
524 U.s. 742 (1998).
62
524 U.s. 775 (1998).
6' Jansen, 123 F.3d at 495.
64
[d. at 492.
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the same day, the Seventh Circuit consolidated the cases for decision.
Alice Jansen claimed that her supervisor engaged in quid pro quo
harassment when he conditioned certain terms, conditions, and
privileges of her employment on her submission to his unwelcome
66
sexual advances. Jansen alleged that her supervisor intimated that he
would withhold her raise if she refused to submit to his sexual
67
advances.
Additionally, Jansen alleged that her supervisor said, "I
haven't forgotten your [performance] review, it's on my desk," while at
68
the same time patting his crotch.
Based on these allegations, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the supervisor implicitly conditioned a
favorable performance review, and thus a raise, on the plaintiff's
69
submission to his sexual advances. Accordingly, the court held that
Jansen demonstrated a triable issue of fact regarding whether the threat
7o
alone constituted quid pro quo harassment.
Similarly, Kimberly Ellerth claimed that her supervisor's supervisor
subjected her to unwelcome sexual advances over a year-long period.
She claimed this supervisor implicitly threatened that her employment
with the company would not progress unless she submitted to his
71
advances.
Ellerth alleged that this supervisor once ogled her and
threatened, "[Y]ou know, Kim, I could make your life [with the
company] very hard or very easy."n On a subsequent occasion, when
Ellerth requested permission to undertake a special project, the same
supervisor said, "I don't have time for you right now, ... unless you tell
me what you're wearing.,,73 On yet another occasion, the supervisor
denied her request to undertake a special project and then asked her if
she would start wearing shorter skirts because "that would make her job
'a whole heck of a lot easier.",74 Finally, during an interview for Ellerth's
promotion, the same supervisor rubbed her knee and said he had
reservations about promoting her because she was not "loose enough for
him. ,,75 Notwithstanding these implicit threats and Ellerth's refusal to
ld .
.. ld. at 493 .
• 7 ld.
Although Jansen's supervisor initially withheld her raise because she rebuffed
his advances, Jansen ultimately received her raise, and it was made retroactive. ld .
.. ld. at 503.
69 ld.
70 ld. at 495.
7I
ld. at 493.
n ld. at 503.
73
ld.
" ld.
7S ld.
.5
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engage in the demanded sexual activity, Ellerth subsequently received a
•
76
promotion.
Although Ellerth's supervisor's threats remained unfulfilled, the
Seventh Circuit found that a reasonable jury could conclude that these
unfulfilled threats "condition[ed] or threaten[ed] to base the 'terms and
conditions' of Ellerth's employment on [her] catering to [the alleged
harasser's] sexual desires.,,77
The court concluded that Ellerth
demonstrated a triable issue of fact regarding whether she was subjected
to quid pro ~uo sexual harassment for which her employer would be
strictly liable. S Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the Seventh Circuit's judgment, it affirmed on very different
grounds.
II.

EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISORY SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER
ELLERTH AND FARAGHER

When the Supreme Court issued its companion decisions in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth79 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,SO the quid pro

76 ld. at n.13.
Ellerth ultimately quit her employment as a result of her supervisor's
harassment. Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd,
102 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Jansen, 123 F.3d 490, affd sub
nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742 (1998). She subsequently filed an action
against her employer alleging that she had been sexually harassed and subjected to a
hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and that the harassment resulted in her
constructive discharge. Ellerth, 912 F. Supp. at 1105; see infra Part I1I.S (discussing Court's
opinion in Suders, in which Court addressed whether constructive discharge constitutes
tangible employment action).
n Jansen, 123 F.3d at 503.
" ld. A minority of the en banc panel in Jansen, including Chief Judge Posner and
Judges Manion and Kanne, concluded that an "adverse job consequence" or "company act"
was necessary to impose strict liability on an employer for quid pro quo sexual harassment.
ld. at 499,505,513-15,559-60. Thus, under this approach, strict liability should be imposed
only in what this Article refers to as "fulfilled threat" cases - circumstances where the
employee rebuffs the supervisor's advances and the supervisor then retaliates and "fires
her, or denies her a promotion, or blocks a scheduled raise, or demotes her, or transfers her
to a less desirable job location, or refuses to give her the training that the company's rules
entitle her to receive." ld. at 512. In doing so, the supervisor is using the authority
delegated to him by the employer to take a "company act." ld. Under this approach, strict
liability should not be imposed under circumstances lacking a "company act," such as
where the employee submits to the sexual extortion threats, the supervisor was merely
"bluff[ing]," or the employee reports the harassment before the supervisor can effectuate
the quid pro quo threat. ld. at 499. See infra Part I1.C (discussing Court's opinions in Ellerth
and Faragher where Court adopts this "company act" standard for purposes of imposing
strict liability on employers for supervisory sexual harassment).
'" 524 U.s. 742 (1998).
80 524 U.s. 775 (1998).
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quo strict liability landscape appeared to change dramatically, although
S
the extent of that change has been the subject of much debate. ! Ellerth
and Faragher represented a paradigm shift from employer strict liability
for sexual harassment claims labeled as quid pro quo to employer strict
liability for sexual harassment claims labeled as tangible employment
actions. Although only Ellerth involved a discussion of quid pro quo
sexual harassment and the "promise of vicarious liability for all quid pro
quo claims" that then existed under case law}2 both cases addressed in
detail the principles of, and policy reasons underlying, employer
vicarious liability for supervisory sexual harassment.
A.

Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Work Environment Labels

In Ellerth, the Court first addressed the quid pro quo and hostile work
environment labels and their impact, if any, on an employer's vicarious
liability for a supervisor's misconduct. The Court acknowledged that the
quid pro quo label had become synonymous with vicarious liability.83 It
also explained that this relationship created an incentive for plaintiffs to
84
state their claims as quid pro quo harassment. The pressure to plead
sexual harassment claims as quid pro quo claims is illustrated by the
question presented for certiorari in Ellerth, which does not reference an
employer's vicarious liability, but instead focuses exclusively on whether
85
certain conduct falls within the quid pro quo rubric.
Although the question presented focused on whether the plaintiff
would succeed in labeling her unfulfilled threat claim as quid pro quo,
the Court reframed the issue. It determined that, notwithstanding the
label, the "issue of real concern to the parties is whether [the employer]
has vicarious liability for [its supervisor's] alleged misconduct, rather
than liability for its own negligence.,,86 The Court explained that,
although the terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" are
"helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in
which threats are carried out and those where they are not or are absent
altogether," they are of "limited utility" beyond this demarcation as they

63

See infra text accompanying notes 134, 349-50.
Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 765.
[d. at 753.

84

[d.

81

82

" [d. ("Whether a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment may be stated under Title VII
. . . where the plaintiff employee has neither submitted to the sexual advances of the
alleged harasser nor suffered any tangible effects on the compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment as a consequence of a refusal to submit to those advances?").
56

[d.
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have no bearing on an employer's liability for supervisory sexual
harassment. 87
Because Ellerth's claim involved only unfulfilled threats, the Court
ss
It
characterized her claim as a hostile work environment claim.
accepted the district court's finding that the alleged conduct was severe
89
and pervasive and thus actionable under Title VII. The question that
remained unanswered, however, was whether Ellerth's employer was
vicariously liable for the hostile work environment. The Court would
ultimately resolve this question together with the hostile work
environment claim alleged in Faragher.
Faragher involved allegations of a supervisor-created, sexually hostile
work environment that did not involve any threat of tangible
9o
employment detriment. Beth Ann Faragher alleged that while working
as a city lifeguard, her immediate supervisor and next successively
higher supervisor subjected her and other female lifeguards to boorish
91
and offensive sexual comments and touching.
Although Faragher
alleged that she endured this conduct for approximately five years, she

87 [d. at 751-52.
The Court explained that the terms served a "specific and limited
purpose" in Meritor where they were used to distinguish between discrimination based on
explicit alterations in the terms or conditions of employment - the quid pro quo situation
where a supervisor either subjects a subordinate to a tangible job detriment for refusing his
sexual advances or demands sexual favors in return for a job benefit - and discrimination
based on constructive alterations in the terms or conditions of employment - the hostile
environment situation where an employee is subjected to sexually demeaning behavior. [d.
at 752. Regarding the distinction between fulfilled and unfulfilled threat cases, the Court
stated:

When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a
refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that the
employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of
employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any sexual harassment
preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must
be severe or pervasive.
[d. at 753-54. In his dissent, Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority'S characterization

of the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment as relevant to whether
discrimination occurred in the first instance. [d. at 770 n.3 (Thomas, L dissenting). Justice
Thomas clarified that fulfilled threat claims, where the supervisor "carries out his threat
and causes the plaintiff a job detriment," are essentially disparate treatment claims for
which employers are always strictly liable under Title VII, while unfulfilled threat claims
should be analyzed as hostile work environment cases only. [d. (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing Scalia, supra note 52, at 309-14).
8S
[d. at 754.
89

[d.

90

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780, 785 (1998).

9!

[d. at 782.
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92
did not report the conduct and eventually resigned. In a seven-to-five
opinion, the Eleventh Circuit en banc concluded that the City was not
93
vicariously liable for the supervisors' conduct for three reasons. First,
the conduct fell outside the scope of the supervisor's employment.
Second, the agency relation did not aid the supervisors in their
harassment because they did not threaten to fire or demote Faragher.
94
Finally, the City lacked constructive knowledge of the harassment.
Subsequently, the Court granted review to determine the scope of and
standard for an employer's vicarious liability for hostile environment
95
harassment perpetrated by supervisory employees.
In an effort to
answer the vicarious liability questions posed in Ellerth and Faragher, and
to establish the "uniform and predictable standard" deemed necessary
for employer vicarious liability, the Court returned to traditional agency
principles as it directed lower courts to use twelve years earlier in
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.%

B.

Agency Principles

In Ellerth and Faragher, the Court focused its agency analysis on section
219(2) of the Restatement of Agency.97 The pertinent provision of section
219(2) provides that "[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts of
his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless ... the
servant ... was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.,,98 The Court concluded that because most supervisory
sexual harassment claims are premised on the supervisor's misuse of
delegated authority, the appropriate analytical starting point is the
99
Restatement's "aided in the agency relation" analysis.
92 ld. at 780, 782.
" ld. at 784.
94 ld.
95 ld. at 780.

.. 477 U.s. 57 (1986); see Faragher, 524 U.s. at 785-86; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.s. 742,754 (1998).
" Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-806; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756-64. In Faragher, the Court noted
that federal courts had been unanimous in holding employers vicariously liable for a
supervisor's "discriminatory employment actions with tangible results, like hiring, firing,
promotion, compensation, and work assignment." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790. Although it
ultimately rejected certain approaches to vicarious liability previously used by federal
courts, such as scope of employment, the Court in Faragher nevertheless approved of
imposing vicarious liability under such circumstances based on applicable agency
principles. ld. at 791 (noting that "the soundness of the results" of earlier cases remained
viable "in light of basic agency principles").
.. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758.
99 Faragher, 524 U.s. at 802; Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 759-60.
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Although the aided in the agency relation standard provided the
Court with the analytical starting point, its "malleable terminology"
presented a threshold issue of how broadly the standard should be
lOO
construed.
At first blush, there was a certain appeal to an expansive
interpretation of the stanq.ard whereby an employer would be held
vicariously liable under any circumstance in which a supervisor abused
his or her authority.lOl This appeal stemmed primarily from the fact that,
in one sense, the agency relation always aids a supervisor because the
power and authority granted by the employer cloaks the supervisor's
harassing conduct with "a particular threatening character."lo2 In
addition to the supervisor's power to influence subordinates in subtle yet
discriminatory ways, an equally compelling reason for imposing
vicarious liability for all acts of supervisor harassment is the employer'S
opportunity and incentive to prevent supervisor harassment in the first
instance through arpropriate screening, hiring, training, and monitoring
lo
of its supervisors.
Notwithstanding the laudable reasons for equating the standard with
vicarious liability for all acts of supervisor harassment, the Court was
constrained by Meritor's holding that an "employer is not 'automatically'
liable for harassment by a supervisor who creates the requisite degree of
discrimination."l04 Thus, to avoid automatic liability, something more
than the mere "aid" provided by the supervisory relationship itself is
necessary. lOS The Faragher Court identified two alternatives to automatic
liability: (1) impose vicarious liability on the employer only upon a
showing of an affirmative use of supervisory authority, or (2) impose
Ellerth, 524 u.s. at 763.
Id.
102
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802; Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 763 ("[lIt is precisely because the
supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer's authority that he is able to
impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates." (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring))).
103 Faragher, 524 U.s. at 803; see also infra Part V.B (discussing employers' efforts to
implement antiharassment policies and monitor workplace compliance and how such
efforts are potentially relevant in decreasing incidence of workplace harassment and
increasing likelihood that sexual harassment victims will report).
104
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804; see Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 763. The Court also acknowledged
that because "most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing their tortious
objective by the existence of the agency relation," vicarious liability based solely on the
aided in the agency relation standard would be virtually limitless. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
Further, if the proximity and regular contact afforded by the employment relationship
were sufficient to impose liability, employers would be vicariously liable for not only all
supervisor harassment but all coworker harassment as well, a result inconsistent with the
position of the EEOC and the federal appellate courts. Id.
105
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804.
100
101
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vicarious liability on the employer for actionable sexual harassment, but
permit the employer to raise an affirmative defense under certain
.
t ances. 106
Clrcums
With respect to the first alternative, the Court acknowledged that there
was authority for requiring an affirmative, as opposed to implicit,
misuse of supervisory authority as a condition precedent to imposing
liability.l07 This authority stemmed from cases holding employers liable
for a supervisor's discrimination that led to tangible employment-related
los
results, such as terminations, promotions, and the like.
Notwithstanding such authority, the Court rejected the affirmative use
109
alternative.
In doing so, the Court expressed concern that a rule that
imposed liability only upon a showing of affirmative, as opposed to
implicit, uses of power would enable employers to avoid liability
entirely for the more subtle harms inherent in harassing conduct by
supervisors. 110 Furthermore, such a rule would be unworkable in
•
III Th C
practice.
e ourt reasone d :
Neat examples illustrating the line between the affirmative and
merely implicit uses of power are not easy to come by in
considering management behavior. . .. How far from the course of
ostensible supervisory behavior would a company officer have to
step before his orders would not reasonably be seen as actively
using authority? Judgment calls would often be close, the results
would often seem disparate even if not demonstrably contradictory,
1l2
and the temptation to litigate would be hard to resist.
Thus, the Court was left with the second alternative, which held an
employer vicariously liable for all actionable supervisor harassment, but
recognized an employer's ability to raise an affirmative defense to
liability or damages under certain circumstances. If the Court adopted
this alternative, however, what circumstances would preclude the
employer from raising the affirmative defense? Furthermore, if the
employer could raise such a defense, what would it consist of?

106

ld.

107

Id.

109

[d. at 804-05.
Id. at 805.

110

[d.

111

[d.

112

[d.; see also infra notes 328-32 and accompanying text.
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New Employer Liability Standards

With respect to the circumstances under which an employer would be
strictly liable, and thus precluded from raising the affirmative defense,
the Court endeavored to draw a bright line. In doing so, it took a
formalist approach. The Court concluded that the "something more"
necessary to avoid automatic liability in all sexual harassment cases was
satisfied where a supervisor "takes a tangible employment action against
the subordinate.,,!13 The reason for this bright-line rule was simple:
when a supervisor's harassment "culminates in a tangible employment
action,,,114 "there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted
absent the agency relation.,,115
In contrast, it is less clear whether the injury resulted from the agency
relation in cases where the supervisor does not take a tangible
116
employment action against the subordinate.
In such cases, the Court
reasoned that permitting an employer to raise an affirmative defense
would give effect to Title VII's purposes if it considered the employer's
efforts to prevent and correct harassment and the employee's
corresponding duty to prevent and avoid harm as part of the liability
1I7
calculus.
For example, because one of the goals of Title VII is to
"promote conciliation rather than litigation,,,ns the Court reasoned that it
would effectuate Congress's intent to encourage employers to create and
administer effective antiharassment policies and grievance mechanisms
and to base employer liability at least in part on an evaluation of an
119
employer's efforts in these respects.
Additionally, the Court reasoned
that a rule encouraging employees to report harassing conduct before it
120
becomes actionable would serve Title VII's preventive purposes.

113
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998). Similarly, in Faragher the
Court stated: "There is nothing remarkable in the fact that claims against employers for
discriminatory employment actions with tangible results, like hiring, firing, promotion,
compensation, and work assignment, have resulted in employer liability once the
discrimination was shown." 524 U.s. at 790.
114
Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 765.
115
Id. at 761-62.
116

[d.

at 763.

Faragher, 524 U.s. at 805.
Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 764. But see Grossman, supra note 26, at 720 (noting Court's
emphasis on deterrence and prevention and contrasting that emphasis with Court's historic
emphasis on Title VII's "two separate, yet equally important goals: compensation and
deterrence").
119
Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 764.
120 Id. (citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.s. 352, 358 (1995)).
117
118
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In its efforts to "accommodate the agency principles of vicarious
liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as
Title VII's equally basic policies of encouraging forethought by
employers and saving actions by objecting employees," the Court
adopted the following joint holding in Ellerth and Faragher:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized

employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over
the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence ....
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
.
o therwlse. 12
.
Based on this holding, two questions remained: "what constitutes a
tangible employment action?" and "how does an employer successfully
assert the affirmative defense?"
1.

Tangible Employment Action

The Court's guidance regarding what constitutes a tangible
employment action addressed the type of power wielded by supervisors.
It also provided examples of the types of action taken against and
injuries suffered by subordinates in the tangible employment action
context. The Court explained that tangible employment actions are the

J2I
Faragher, 524 U.s. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Elsewhere in the Faragher opinion,
the Court indicated that there are still other means by which an employer may be directly
liable for supervisory sexual harassment. Examples include situations where the employer
had actual knowledge of the harassment and did nothing to stop it or where the supervisor
is sufficiently high up in the organization's hierarchical structure such that the supervisor
is considered a "proxy" for the employer. 524 U.S. at 789; see, e.g., Ackel v. Nat'!
Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 384 (5th Cir. 2003) (concluding that triable issue of fact
existed as to whether president and general manager of corporation who was also
stockholder and member of board of directors was corporation's proxy, making
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense unavailable to employer); see also B. Glenn George, If
You're Not Part of the Solution, You're Part of the Problem: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133 (2001) (discussing employer's direct liability for
known superviSOry sexual harassment based on negligence principles after Ellerth and
Faragher, and arguing that Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense applies only when employer
was unaware of supervisor's conduct).
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"means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the
enterprise to bear on subordinates," and thus a "tangible emplo~ment
decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act."l The
Court stated that a tangible employment action "constitutes a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities,,,l23 "demotion,
or undesirable reassignment,,,l24or a "decision causing a significant
change in benefits."l25
Additionally, as to the type of injury suffered by the subordinate, the
Court explained that "in most cases, a tangible employment action will
inflict 'direct economic harm,'" which the Court noted is the type of
injury that "only a supervisor, or other person acting with the authority
l26
of the company" can cause.
Moreover, because tangible employment
decisions require an "official act of the enterprise" or "company act," the
Court posited that such decisions will, in most cases, be documented or
otherwise reflected in official company records and will often be subject
127
Finally, consistent with the
to review by the harasser's superiors.
company act requirement, the Court noted that the nature of a tangible
employment action is such that the "supervisor often must obtain the
imprimatur of the enterprise and use its internal processes."l28
2.

Affirmative Defense

For those situations in which a harassing supervisor does not take a
tangible employment action against the subordinate employee, but
where the harassing conduct is nevertheless severe or pervasive, the
Court attempted to provide guidance regarding the manner in which an
employer might satisfy its burden of proof under each of the "two
l29
necessary elements" of the affirmative defense.
With respect to the
employer's obligations under prong one, the Court indicated that
although an antiharassment policy and accompanying complaint

Ellerth, 524 u.s. at 762.
Id. at 761. In the context of Ellerth, the Court noted that a tangible employment
action "would have taken the form of a denial of [either] a raise or a promotion." Id.
122
123

124

[d. at 765.

125

Id. at 76l.

126

[d. at 762.

127

[d.

128

[d.

See infra text accompanying note 354 (discussing courts that have concluded that
only one of two elements must be met for employers to avoid liability under certain
circumstances).
129
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procedure are not necessary as a matter of law, courts nevertheless
should consider the need for such a policy and related procedures in
130
assessing whether the employer has satisfied its burden.
Regarding
the employee's corresponding burden under prong two, the Court
explained that the second prong incorporates the principles underlying
the avoidable consequences doctrine from tort law,l3J and thus imposes
an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to avoid or otherwise mitigate
132
harm.
The Court stated that an employer's proof that the plaintiff
unreasonably failed to avail herself of the employer's complaint
procedure will "normally suffice" to satisfy the employer's burden under
133
prong twO.
The Court then applied the newly minted vicarious
liability standards and the accompanying affirmative defense to the facts
l34
of Ellerth and Faragher.
In Ellerth, the Court noted that Ellerth had focused her efforts on
proving that her claim fell within the quid pro quo category given the
"promise of vicarious liability for all quid pro quo claims" under existing
case law.135 Because the quid pro quo and hostile work environment
labels no longer control an employer's liability for a supervisor's
harassing acts, the Court concluded that Ellerth should have an
136
opportunity on remand to prove that her employer was liable. In this

130

Ellerth, 524 u.s. at 765.

131

[d.

at 764.

132
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775,806-07 (1998) (citing Ford Motor Co. v.
EEOC, 458 U.s. 219, 232 n.15 (1982»; see infra Part V.B (discussing applicable avoidable
consequences principles in context of second prong of affirmative defense).
133 Faragher, 524 U.s. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 765.
134 In his dissent in Ellerth, Justice Thomas lamented that the Court had provided
"shockingly little guidance about how employers can actually avoid vicarious liability
[under the affirmative defense]" and instead "issue[d] only Delphic pronouncements and
le[ft] the dirty work to the lower courts" because the meaning of those pronouncements
"remains a mystery." 524 U.s. at 773 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas predicted
that under the affirmative defense, vicarious liability will be the rule, rather than the
exception, because even an employer who acted reasonably will be held liable "so long as
the plaintiff in question fulfilled her duty of reasonable care to avoid harm." Id.; see infra
text accompanying notes 349-50, 353-54 (demonstrating that Justice Thomas's predictions
have not come to fruition given pro-employer trend regarding application of affirmative
defense and, in particular, second prong).
135
Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 765.
136
Id. at 765-66. In this respect, Ellerth would need to show that the acts to which she
was subjected were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.
Id. at 752. Notwithstanding the fact that Ellerth's complaint alleged that she had been
constructively discharged, the Court stated that she had "not alleged she suffered a
tangible employment action at the hands of [the harassing supervisor]." Id. at 766; see infra
text accompanying note 231 (regarding how this foreshadowed Court's holding regarding
constructive discharge cases in Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom.
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respect, the Court indicated that Ellerth's employer was vicariously
liable for the actions of its supervisor, but Ellerth's employer would have
137
an opportunity on remand to assert and prove the affirmative defense.
The result in Faragher differed dramatically. Because the harassing
acts of Faragher's supervisor did not include a tangible employment
action taken against Faragher, the Court stated that the City would have
had an opportunity to raise the two-prong affirmative defense "if there
were any serious prospect of its presenting one . . . . ,,138 The Court
concluded, however, that the facts of the case foreclosed any possibility
139
of the City presenting the affirmative defense. Although the City had a
sexual harassment policy, it had completely failed to distribute its policy
l40
to the plaintiff and her colleagues at the city beach. Moreover, the City
officials made no effort to oversee or otherwise keep track of its
141
supervisors' conduct.
Additionally, the City's sexual harassment
policy did not include any mechanism or assurance that a subordinate
142
could bypass a haraSSing supervisor when registering a complaint.
Based on these facts, the Court held, as a matter of law, that the City
could not satisfy the first prong of the affirmative defense because no
reasonable jury could conclude that the City exercised reasonable care to
.
h arassmen.
t 143
prevent supervlsory
III.

THE PROGENY OF ELLERTH AND FARAGHER
145

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth l44 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
clarified the vicarious liability standards for unfulfilled and fulfilled
threat cases. In an unfulfilled threat case such as Ellerth, the employer
was vicariously liable but would have an opportunity to establish the
l46
two-prong Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.
By comparison, an
employer in a fulfilled threat case was strictly liable, and thus would not
have an opportunity to raise the two-prong affirmative defense. What

Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.s. 129 (2004».
137
Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 766.
138
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
139

ld.

140

[d.

141

[d.

142

[d.

143

[d.

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.
146
The same would be true if the action threatened and taken by the supervisor did not
amount to a tangible employment action.
144

145
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remained unclear, however, was how submission and constructive
discharge claims fit into the newly minted Ellerth/Furagher tangible
employment action, fulfilled/ unfulfilled threat paradigm.
A.

Submission Claims

Following Ellerth and Faragher, it was unclear whether a submission
case constituted a tangible employment action for which an employer
would be strictly liable or an unfulfilled threat case in which an
employer could assert and prove the two-prong affirmative defense.
Some courts construed submission claims as tangible employment
actions, while others construed such claims as aggravated hostile
environment claims to which the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
147
appIie d .

147
Following Ellerth and Faragher, the EEOC issued Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious
Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors ("Enforcement Guidance") and took
the position that an employee who submits to a supervisor's sexual demands and obtains a
tangible job benefit has experienced a tangible employment action for which her employer
is strictly liable. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR
UNLAWFUL
HARASSMENT
BY SUPERVISORS
Gune
18,
1999), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov I policy I docs/harassment.html. In Enforcement Guidance, the EEOC
included as examples of tangible employment actions both "hiring and firing" and
"promotion and failure to promote." Id. The EEOC explained as follows:

If a supervisor undertakes or recommends a tangible job action based on a

subordinate's response to unwelcome sexual demands, the employer is liable
and cannot raise the affirmative defense. The result is the same whether the
employee rejects the demands and is subjected to an adverse tangible
employment action or submits to the demands and consequently obtains a
tangible job benefit. Such harassment previously would have been characterized
as "quid pro quo." It would be a perverse result if the employer is foreclosed
from raising the affirmative defense if its supervisor denies a tangible job benefit
based on an employee's rejection of unwelcome sexual demands, but can raise
the defense if its supervisor grants a tangible job benefit based on submission to
such demands. The Commission rejects such an analysis. In both those
situations the supervisor undertakes a tangible employment action on a
discriminatory basis. The Supreme Court stated that there must be a significant
change in employment status; it did not require that the change be adverse in
order to qualify as tangible.

Id. The EEOC did not clarify whether obtaining a "tangible job benefit" included only
those circumstances where the employee obtained a job benefit to which the employee was
not otherwise entitled or also included those circumstances where the employee was
performing satisfactorily and retained her job solely because she submitted to her
supervisor's sexual demands. Grossman, supra note 26, at 682-83 (noting that EEOC did
not address circumstances where employee "submits to avoid harm rather than obtain a
benefit"). Although the EEOC would likely contend that the job-retention scenario is also
included in "tangible job benefit," an employee under such circumstances has not
experienced the requisite "significant change in employment status" under Ellerth. See
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Tangible Employment Action

In 2002, four years after Ellerth and Faragher, the Second Circuit
addressed whether an employee experiences a tangible employment
action when, instead of refusing her supervisor's sexual extortion
demands, she submits to the demanded conduct. In fin v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance CO.,I48 the Second Circuit took a realist approach to
employer liability for sexual extortion. It concluded that a submission
plaintiff experiences a tangible employment action where her supervisor
requires her to repeatedly submit to sexual abuse under explicit threats
of termination if she does not accede to his demands.149
The circumstances in fin were particularly egregious. After working
successfully for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife") for
approximately four years, Jin encountered a new colleague who began a
150
thirteen-month campaign of egregious conduct toward her.
Six
months into his campaign, the colleague became Jin's supervisor. 151 The
conduct included:
(a) making numerous crude sexual remarks to her, both in the office
and by calling her at home; (b) offensively touching Jin's buttocks,
breasts, and legs on numerous occasions at the office, including
when she was making sales calls at her desk and walking clients to
the elevator; (c) requiring Jin ... to attend weekly Thursday night
private meetings in Uin's supervisor's] locked office during which
he would threaten her with a baseball bat, kiss, lick, bite and fondle
her, attempt to undress her, physically force her to unzip his pants
and fondle him, push against her with his penis exposed, and
ejaculate on her; and (d) repeatedly threatening to fire Jin if she did
not accede to his sexual demands, as well as threatening her with
. I h arm. 152
Ph YSlca
Jin alleged that she endured the weekly sexual abuse out of fear of losing
. b .153
h erJo

discussion infra Part IV.A. Moreover, as discussed in Part IV.A.1 infra, the EEOC's position
that the change in employment status need not be adverse is inconsistent with Ellerth and

Faragher.
148

14'
150

151
152

153

310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002).
See id. at 94.
Id. at 88.
[d.
[d. at 88-89.
Id. at 89.
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154
Ultimately, Jin filed a sexual harassment action against MetLife.
Although the jury concluded that Jin had been subjected to an actionable
hostile environment, Jin did not prevail on her claim because she had not
155
suffered the requisite tangible adverse action.
On appeal, Jin argued that her submission to her supervisor's sexual
abuse became an added job requirement necessary to keep her job, and
156
thus, constituted a tangible employment action.
The Second Circuit
concluded that Jin had suffered a tangible employment action,157
reasoning that the agency relation aided Jin's supervisor in his sexual
extortion efforts because MetLife empowered him to make economic
15
decisions impacting his subordinates. Furthermore, the power MetLife
bestowed upon Jin's supervisor to make such decisions enabled him to
compel Jin to report to him and remain in his office while he harassed
159
her.
Additionally, the Second Circuit agreed with the EEOC's position that
a tangible employment action occurs when an employee submits to a
supervisor's unwelcome sexual demands and "obtains a job benefit.,,160
It concluded that the pre-Ellerth strict liability approach to submission
claims is "sound even under the Supreme Court's new liability
analysis.,,161 The Second Circuit reasoned that the proper focus for
imposing liability on an employer is on the supervisor's decision to
either retain or terminate the subordinate based on the subordinate's
162
reaction to his sexual demands.
Based on this reasoning, the court
concluded that Jin had presented evidence of a tangible employment
action because her supervisor required her to submit to his sexual
demands and used her "submission as a basis for granting her a job
benefit (her continued employment)."I63

154

155

ld. at 87-88.
ld. at 90. The court instructed the jury that to hold Jin's employer strictly liable on a

tangible employment action theory, Jin had to show that her supervisor subjected her to a
"tangible adverse action." ld. (emphasis added).
156
157

[d. at 94.

ld.
ld.

158
The court explained that a coworker could not have "compelled Jin's
acquiescence because a mere co-worker lacked the authority to either terminate or retain
Jin based on her response to sexual demands." ld. But see infra text accompanying note

244.
159
160
161

162
163

ld.
ld. at 94-95 (citing EEOC, supra note 147).
ld. at 96.
ld.
ld. at 97. The lin court also concluded that the Supreme Court in Ellerth expressly

recognized the inherent difference between a submission case and an unfulfilled threat case
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Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that submission
claims lack the "official act of the enterprise" or "company act" required
l64
for a tangible employment action.
The court concluded that Jin's
supervisor's actions constituted an act of Jin's employer because the
supervisor "brought 'the official power of the enterprise to bear' on [her]
by explicitly threatening to fire her if she did not submit, and then
allowing her to retain her job based on her submission."l65 The court
reasoned:
It would be anomalous to find an employer liable when an

employee was able to stand up to a supervisor's sexual demands,
and therefore provoke an action such as termination, but to find no
liability when the employee was unable to refuse and was actually
subjected to sexual abuse. Such a rule would punish employees
who submit because, for example, they desperately need the income
to make house payments... or because a sick spouse or child
166
depends on their health benefits.
Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that Title VII should not
shield employers from liability when a subordinate cannot refuse a
167
supervisor's sexual demands.
Subsequently, in Holly D. v. California Institute of Technoiogy,l68 the
Ninth Circuit joined the Second Circuit in taking a realist approach to

because the question for review made it clear that Ellerth consisted of circumstances
involving an unfulfilled threat as opposed to a plaintiff's "submission" or a plaintiff's
suffering "tangible effects" for refusing to submit. ld.
164 ld. at 98.
165 ld. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998»; see also
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775, 790 (1998) ("When a supervisor requires
sexual favors as a quid pro quo for job benefits, the supervisor, by definition, acts as the
company." (quoting Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.
1989))).
166 lin, 310 F.3d at 99 (citing Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1994»; see also
Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (O.R.1. 1991) (describing
supervisor's threat to take away benefits if Showalter refused to engage in requested sexual
acts). The court also relied upon the EEOC's guidelines and noted the "perverse result" if
cases where the employee avoids tangible job detriment by submitting do not constitute
tangible employment actions, but cases where the employee receives a job benefit by
submitting do constitute tangible employment actions. lin, 310 F.3d at 99 n.ll (quoting
EEOC, supra note 147, at *5).
167 Cf. Kelly Collins Woodford & Harry A. Rissetto, Tangible Employment Action: What
Did the Supreme Court Really Mean in Faragher and Ellerth?, 19 LAB. LAW. 63, 76-78 (2003)
(discussing Second Circuit's opinion in lin, and concluding that court's analysis was
inconsistent with Ellerth and Faragher because Second Circuit incorrectly construed facts as
alleging viable tangible employment action claim).
168 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).
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submission claims. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a subordinate
states a tangible employment action claim when she alleges that her
supervisor coerced her into performing unwelcome sex acts by either
169
explicitly or implicitly threatening her with termination if she refused.
Holly D. alleged that her new supervisor leered at her breasts and
buttocks, commented on his preferred sexual activities, and showed her
17o
pornographic websites. Although her supervisor ceased this behavior
when she informed him that she was not interested, he subsequently
criticized her work and threatened to extend her six-month probationary
period indefinitely.J71 Notwithstanding the threat, he did not extend her
172
probationary period.
Two months after her probationary period ended, however, she
received a negative performance rating that she believed resulted from
173
her prior refusal to engage in sexual conversations with her supervisor.
She ultimately concluded that if her supervisor made sexual demands of
174
her, she had to acquiesce to the demands to keep her job. One month
after receiving the negative performance rating, Holly D.'s supervisor
visited her office, engaged her in a sexual conversation, and then
175
sexually propositioned her. Based on her subjective belief that she had
176
to engage in the conduct to keep her job, she submitted.
For the next
year, Holly D. and her supervisor engaged in numerous sex acts during
work hours, including intercourse and oral sex.177 At the end of the oneyear period, she received her second performance review, which she
characterized as excellent. After an unsuccessful attempt to transfer to
another office, she filed a sexual harassment action in which she alleged
178
that her submission constituted a tangible employment action.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Holly D. Like the Second Circuit in lin,
the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the malleable nature of the aided in
the agency relation standard discussed in Ellerth and Faragher to
conclude that a submission case constitutes a tangible employment

169

ld. at 1162.
ld. at 1163.
171
ld.
m ld.
173
ld.
'" ld.
175
ld. at 1164.
176
ld.
177
ld.
178
ld.
170
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l79
action.
The Ninth Circuit first noted that if Holly D.'s supervisor
terminated her employment as a result of her resistance to his alleged
threats, her termination would have constituted the requisite tangible
lso
employment action for which her employer would be strictly liable.
The court reasoned that a successful extortion or submission case
implicates the "same abuse of supervisorial authority - the power, for
example, to hire and fire" that renders a termination a tangible
employment action. lSI In both cases, the supervisor "successfully brings
to bear the weight of the employer's enterprise in order to achieve the
IS2
unlawfu1 purpose.//
To fit the submission case within the tangible employment action
rubric, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the supervisor makes the "initial
conditional decision" to discharge the employee unless his sexual
l83
demands are met.
Once the plaintiff acquiesces to his demands, he
makes the "subsequent final decision to retain the employee in her
position."I84 In this sense, the subordinate's "participation in unwanted
sexual acts becomes a condition of the employee's employment - a
critical condition that effects a substantial change in the terms of that
employment."IBS
Moreover, in addressing the El/erth/Faragher
requirement that tangible employment actions require "some form of
sufficiently concrete employment action," the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that the threat in a submission case is "not unfulfilled or inchoate, but is
implemented when the supervisor actually coerces sex by abusing the
employer's authority, and thus makes concrete the condition of
employment he has imposed. In short, the threat culminates in a
I86
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
tangible employment action.//
concluded that the El/erth/Faragher affirmative defense is unavailable to
an employer when a "supervisor who abuses his supervisorial authority

119

ld. at 1167.
ld.
181
ld. at 1168.
182
ld.
183
ld. at 1169.
184
ld.
185
ld.
186 ld. at 1170. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the examples of tangible
employment actions provided by the Court in Ellerth and Faragher - hiring, firing, failing
to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing
a significant change in benefits - constituted further support for the conclusion that
successful superviSOry sexual extortion constitutes a tangible employment action. ld.
180
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succeeds in coercing an employee to engage in sexual acts by threats of
discharge." 187
2.

Aggravated Hostile Environment

In April 2004, a federal district court in Florida issued its opinion in
l88

Speaks v. City of Lakeland. In contrast to the realist approach adopted in
lin and Holly D., the district court adopted a formalist approach and held
that a submission claim is simply an aggravated hostile environment
187
ld. at 1173. Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's holding regarding submission
cases, the court concluded that the plaintiff's employer would be permitted an opportunity
to assert the EUerth/Faragher affirmative defense because the plaintiff was unable to
provide any evidence "connecting any discussion of her job duties [or other job-related
matters] with [her supervisor's] requests that she engage in sex acts with him," much less
prove either an explicit or implicit threat. ld. at 1175-76. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff's employer established both prongs of the affirmative defense
by demonstrating that: (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed
to take advantage of the employer's complaint mechanisms by failing to seek relief through
any of the numerous avenues proVided by her employer until after she endured a full year
of unwelcome sexual activity and two years from the date of the first sexual incident. ld. at
1177-79.
Notwithstanding the plaintiff's documented financial and psychological
disabilities, the plaintiff did not contend that either her depression or her financial
circumstances contributed to her decision to forego reporting. ld. at 1179 n.24. For a
discussion of how a victim's financial circumstances should be considered in assessing
whether the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avoid harm under the second prong of the
affirmative defense, see infra Part V.B.
There are additional cases implicitly approving of the lin and Holly D. courts'
tangible employment action approach to submission cases. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d
432, 458-59 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating in dicta that circumstance where plaintiff who submits to
supervisor's demands for sexual favors in return for "job benefits, such as continued
employment," constitutes tangible employment action even though such circumstances are
void of any "official company act"), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129
(2004); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(suggesting in dicta that tangible employment action might exist where plaintiff's
supervisor uses '''supervisory authority' to ... demand sex in return for job promotion"),
affd, 347 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2003); Bennett v. ProgreSSive Corp., 225 F. Supp. 2d 190, 204
(N.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating in dicta that supervisor takes tangible employment action when he
grants tangible job benefit based on subordinate's submission to sexual demands); Lewis v.
Forest Pharms., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 638, 655 n.8 (D. Md. 2002) (stating in dicta that "[a]n
employer is liable for sexual harassment both when an employee garners tangible job
benefit because the employee submitted to supervisor's sexual advances and when an
employee suffers tangible job detriment because the employee rebuffed sexual advances");
Perrigo v. Harveys Iowa Mgmt. Co., No. CIV. 1-99-CV-I0003, 2000 WL 33363252, at '6 (S.D.
Iowa Mar. 14, 2000) (implicitly holding that plaintiff's submission to her supervisor's
sexual advances constitutes tangible employment action where submission was based on
supervisor's express or implied promise to change plaintiff's work hours and plaintiff's
belief that she would suffer reprisals if she refused his advances); infra text accompanying
note 340.
188
315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
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claim to which the EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense applies.
Speaks worked in one of the four police squads in the City of
189
Lakeland's police department.
Approximately two and one-half years
into her tenure with the City, a police sergeant began making
190
unwelcome sexual advances toward her.
Speaks alleged that she
submitted to and did not report the sergeant's sexual demands because
191
she feared that he would harm, transfer, or fire her if she refused.
Approximately one year after Speaks's sexual relationship with the
sergeant began, the sergeant threatened to transfer her to a different
192
193
squad. Speaks then told her husband about the sergeant's behavior.
Shortly thereafter, Speaks's husband reported the sergeant's alleged
194
misconduct.
Speaks subsequently filed an action for sexual
harassment in violation of Title VII.195
The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Speaks
did not suffer a tangible employment action and that the City satisfied
l96
both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. Speaks argued,
however, that the EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense was unavailable to
the City on her quid pro quo claim because she suffered a tangible
employment action when the harassing sergeant "used his supervisory
authority (including threats of termination or transfer) to obtain
[Speaks's] consent to engage in sexual activities.,,197 Speaks analogized
her submission situation to the circumstances in Suders v. Easton, in
which the Third Circuit held that an employee suffers a tangible
employment action when she is constructively discharged as a result of a
198
supervisor's repeated episodes of sexually harassing behavior.
The district court found Speaks's tangible employment action
argument problematic for two reasons: (1) it was inconsistent with Ellerth
and Faragher and appeared to be a "return to the pre-FaragherlEllerth

Id. at 1220 n.3.
Id. at 1220.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 1221.
195
Id. at 1222.
196
Id. at 1223.
197
Id. at 1224.
198
Id. Speaks analogized her situation to Suders even though more than three months
prior to the City filing for summary judgment, the Court had granted certiorari on the
constructive discharge issue presented in Suders. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir.
2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.s. 129 (2004). See infra Part Ill.B for
a discussion of the Court's opinion in Suders, in which the Court reversed the Third Circuit.
189

190

566

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 39:529

state of sexual harassment law where the category of harassment
determined vicarious liability; and (2) it undermine[d] the concept of an
employee having a coordinate duty to avoid harm."l99 In rejecting
Speaks's argument, the district court first noted that, following Ellerth
and Faragher, the label quid pro quo was no longer controlling regarding
employer liability.20o Thus, to permit Speaks to use the quid pro quo
label as a subterfuge to avoid the tangible employment action
201 Moreover, the district
requirement would be inconsistent with Ellerth.
court explicitly disagreed with Jin. It reasoned that "maintenance of the
status quo" where an employee "continu[es] to work with the same job,
pay, benefits, and responsibilities is not a change in status and is not
analogous to any of the [tangible employment action] examples
provided by the Court in Ellerth or Faragher.,,202
The district court then explained how Speaks's tangible employment
action argument was inconsistent with the employee's duty under Ellerth
203
and Faragher to avoid harm.
It reasoned that, by holding that an
employee's submission in Jin or constructive discharge in Suders
constitutes a tangible employment action, the Second and Third Circuits
undermined the avoidable consequences principles underpinning the
204
second prong. According to the district court, such an approach leads
to the anomalous result whereby an employee who submits to a
supervisor's demands in the Second Circuit or an employee who quits as
a result of a supervisor's sexual harassment in the Third Circuit "fares
better by submitting ... [or] quitting[, respectively,] than by immediately
reporting the misconduct.,,205
Finally, the district court reasoned that this approach "encourages
Plaintiffs' counsel to bring and fit facts into certain types or categories of
harassment claims" in an effort to impose strict liability.206 This is
precisely the type of semantics that the Supreme Court sought to avoid
in Ellerth and Faragher.

Speaks, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
[d. at 1223, 1225.
201 [d. at 1225. Additionally, given the Court's explicit statement in Ellerth that the quid
pro quo label is not controlling for purposes of an employer's vicarious liability for sexual
harassment, the district court rejected the argument that a different vicarious liability
standard applies in a quid pro quo submission case as compared to the unfulfilled threat
quid pro quo case presented in Ellerth. [d. at 1225 n.20.
202
Speaks, 315 F.Supp.2d at 1225.
203 [d.
204 Id. at 1226.
199

200

205

[d.

206

[d. at 1226 n.22.
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For these reasons, the district court concluded that the Second Circuit's
approach to submission in lin and the Third Circuit's approach to
constructive discharge in Suders were inconsistent with the vicarious
liability and harm avoidance balance struck by the Court in Ellerth and
Fa ragher. 207 Accordingly, the district court held that Speaks had not
suffered a tangible employment action and that the City could assert the
2oB
EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense.

207

[d.

208 [d.
The court then concluded that the employer satisfied both prongs of the
E/lerth/Faragher affirmative defense. [d. at 1229. With respect to the second prong, the
court concluded that Speaks's outright failure to report the harassment, and the fact that
her husband did not report the harassment until it had been ongoing for over one year, was
unreasonable as it was based solely on Speaks's subjective fear of reprisals. [d.
Furthermore, Speaks could have avoided "[mlost, if not all, of the harm" if she had simply
reported the sergeant's behavior at the beginning of the harassment. [d.; see infra Part V.B
(discussing factors courts should consider under prong two of affirmative defense in
determining whether subordinate's submission to her supervisor's demands was
unreasonable under circumstances).
Additional cases have concluded that a subordinate's submission to her supervisor's
sexual demands does not constitute a tangible employment action. See Coker v. Ball Janitor
Serv., Inc., No. 99-5099, 2000 WL 305487, at *4 (10th Cir. Mar. 24, 2000) (holding that
plaintiff who submitted to sexual acts with her supervisor based on subjective fear that she
would be terminated if she resisted did not suffer tangible employment action based on
submission); Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (concluding
that plaintiff's "submission" to her supervisor's sexual comments, touching, and sexual
advances did not constitute tangible employment action but rather amounted only to
"unfulfilled threats" in absence of "detrimental" employment action taken against her
(citing Newton v. Cadwell Labs., 156 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 1998))); Samedi v. Miami-Dade
County, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1219 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that plaintiff did not allege
tangible employment action based on her allegations that she submitted to unwelcome
sexual intercourse and other sex acts with her superiors because they threatened her with
termination if she did not do so, and concluding that such facts constitute severe hostile
environment claim to which E/lerth/Faragher affirmative defense applies); Hetreed v.
Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96 C 2021, 1999 WL 311728, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 1999) (holding
that plaintiff did not suffer tangible employment action when she submitted to "repeated,
coerced sexual encounters" with her supervisor "in return for 'reasonably appropriate
future evaluations, compensation (including bonuses and pay raises), responsibilities, and
other job-related treatment''' because "harassment itself does not constitute tangible
employment action" and she "did not suffer any sort of negative repercussions ... as a
result of the harassment"), affd, No. 00-1787,2001 WL 427785, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 16,2001)
(stating that plaintiff's contention that "sexual relations are 'tangible employment actions'
is at variance with the definition given in Faragher and E/lerth," and further stating that "a
supervisor's sexual activity is not attributed to the firm unless it fails to take preventive or
responsive steps within its power"); Johnson v. Brown, No. 94 C 6530, 1998 WL 483521, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 1998) (granting judgment in favor of employer following bench trial,
and concluding that plaintiff had not alleged tangible employment action where plaintiff's
supervisor subjected her to crude and "offensive" behavior and engaged in threatening and
intimidating behavior, which ultimately coerced plaintiff to engage in unwanted sexual
intercourse with him out of fear that she would be terminated if she rejected his advances),
rev'd on other grounds, Johnson v. West, 218 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2000); Grozdanich v. Leisure
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Constructive Discharge Claims

Two months after Speaks, the Supreme Court issued its long-awaited
opinion in the constructive discharge case of Pennsylvania State Police v.
2rB
Suders. Contrary to the Third Circuit's conclusion, the Court held that
a constructive discharge caused by a supervisor's sexual harassment of a
subordinate does not constitute a tangible employment action, except in
limited circumstances. Because submission and constructive discharge
claims are analogous for the purposes of the tangible employment action
analysis - in each instance it is the employee who takes action in
response to the supervisor's conduct - the Court's opinion in Suders
provides useful guidance regarding whether submission cases constitute
tangible employment actions.
Suders involved a situation where an employee's supervisors subjected
her to what the Court referred to as a '" wors [t] case' harassment
210
scenario, harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point."
Commencing with Suders's employment with the Pennsylvania State
Police (the "PSP"), her three supervisors subjected her to a campaign of
sexual harassment that stopped only when she quit her employment less
2l1
than six months later.
The conduct included repeated obscene
gestures, vulgar comments, and frequent discussions regarding
bestiality.212 In addition, Suders's supervisors subjected her to other
harassment, which included twice unfairly accusing Suders of work213
related misconduct.
Suders subsequently filed a Title VII action based upon her
supervisors' sexual harassment, which caused her to resign.214 Because
Suders did not label her claim as one of constructive discharge, the
district court did not consider whether her allegations constituted a
constructive discharge. Instead, it granted summary judgment in favor
of the PSP because Suders unreasonably failed to report her supervisors'
215
harassment. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded on the grounds
Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 968-69 (D. Minn. 1998) (concluding that plaintiff
stated "unfulfilled threat" claim to which EUerth/Faragher affirmative defense applies
where she alleged that she retained her employment only because she "passively
submit[tedl" to her supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances in form of inappropriate
touching and groping).
209 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
210
[d. at 147-48.
2JI
[d. at 134-35.
212
[d. at 134-37.
213
[d. at 136-37.
214
[d.
215
[d. at 137.
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that, inter alia, the district court erred in failing to construe Suders's
allegations as a constructive discharge claim. The Third Circuit held
that, if proven, a constructive discharge claim constitutes a tangible
employment action claim that deprives the employer of the
216
EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense.
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit in Suders took a realist
approach. It focused on the harm suffered by employees who are forced
to resign as a result of supervisory sexual harassment, and concluded
that an official act was not necessary for the resignation to constitute a
217
tangible employment action.
In doing so, the Third Circuit analogized
constructive discharge cases to submission cases and relied on the
reasoning in fin:
[S]ome of the most permcIOus forms of workplace harassment,
clearly amounting to tangible employment actions, are often not
accompanied by official company acts. This is especially true in quid
pro quo cases where a victimized employee submits to a supervisor's
demands for sexual favors in return for job benefits, such as
continued employment. In these cases, it is rare that a supervisor's
demands for sexual liberties, and the corresponding threat of
adverse consequences for failure to submit, will be documented
anywhere in company records. Therefore, a rule requiring a
victimized employee who submits to a supervisor's indecent
demand for sexual favors to prove an official company act in order
to establish a tangible employment action strains common sense. As
the Second Circuit has held, the more sensible approach in the quid
pro quo context is to recognize that, by his or her actions, a
supervisor invokes the official authority of the enterprise. . .. This
rationale is equally applicable in the context of constructive
· h arge. 218
d ISC
Based on this reasoning, the Third Circuit concluded that a plaintiff who
alleges that she was constructively discharged as a result of her
supervisor's sexual harassment is not required to show an official
219
company act to prove a tangible employment action.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted review to resolve the
question of whether "a constructive discharge brought about by
Id. at 138-39.
Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 459 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.s. 129 (2004); see Chamallas, supra note 11, at 331 (noting that Third Circuit
took realist approach to constructive discharge based on "actual effects").
218
Suders, 325 F.3d at 458-59.
219
Id. at 459.
216

217
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supervisor harassment ranks as a tangible employment action.,,220 In an
eight-to-one opinion, it reversed the Third Circuit and concluded that a
constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action only
when a "supervisor's official act precipitates the constructive
discharge.,,221 The Court further noted that in the absence of a tangible
employment action, the employer could assert the two-prong affirmative
222
defense.
The Court began its analysis by noting that the companion opinions of
Ellerth and Faragher distinguished between "supervisor harassment
unaccompanied by an adverse official act," to which employers may
assert the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, and supervisor
harassment attended by a tangible employment action, for which an
employer is strictly liable.223 It reaffirmed the aided in the agency
relation analysis set forth in Ellerth and Faragher and, in doing so,
explained that a tangible employment action is "in essential character,
'an official act of the enterprise, a company act.",224 Thus, the Court
focused its analysis on whether an official act was necessary for a
constructive discharge to constitute a tangible employment action when
225
the discharge resulted solely from supervisory sexual harassment.
In Suders, the Court disagreed with the Third Circuit's realist approach
and reaffirmed the Ellerth and Faragher formalist approach to strict
liability. It reasoned that, unlike an actual termination, which can only
be achieved through a supervisor's official act, the intolerable conditions
that result in a constructive discharge "may be effected through coworker conduct, unofficial supervisory conduct, or official company
acts.,,226 "A constructive discharge involves both an employee's decision
to leave and precipitating conduct: [t]he former involves no official
action; the latter, like a harassment claim without any constructive
discharge assertion, mayor may not involve official action.,,227 Thus, in
the absence of an "'official act of the enterprise' ... as the last straw, the
employer ordinarily would have no particular reason to suspect that a
Suders, 542 U.S. at 139.
221 [d. at 140-4l.
222
ld.
223
[d. at 137 (emphasis added).
224 [d. at 145-46 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998».
225 The
Court focused on the "official act" requirement presumably because a
constructive discharge results in a "significant change in employment status" by ending the
employment relationship and it constitutes the legal equivalent of an actual discharge in
damages enhancing respects. [d. at 140,148.
226
ld. at 148.
220

227

[d.
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resignation is not the typical kind daily occurring in the work force.,,22s
In contrast, a circumstance where "an official act [is] reflected in
company records - a demotion or a reduction in compensation, for
example - shows 'beyond question' that the supervisor has used his
managerial or controlling position to the employee's disadvantage.,,229
The Court also reasoned that it was logically inconsistent to construe
all constructive discharges as tangible employment actions.
By
dispensing with the official act requirement, the Third Circuit created the
anomalous result whereby "the graver claim of hostile-environment
constructive discharge [is] easier to prove than its lesser included
component, hostile work environment.,,23Q Accordingly, the Court
concluded that, in the absence of an official act, an employer could assert
the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to a constructive discharge claim
231
based on supervisory harassment.
Finally, in an effort to provide guidance to lower courts as to how the
official act requirement applies in the constructive discharge context, the
Court approved of the First and Seventh Circuit's respective approaches
to constructive discharge in Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc.232 and
Robinson v. Sappington.233 In Reed, the First Circuit concluded that a
supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate, accompanied by threats
to discharge her if she reported, were "exceedingly unofficial and
involved no direct exercise of company authority" and constituted
"exactly the kind of wholly unauthorized conduct for which the
affirmative defense was designed.,,234 In Robinson, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the requisite official act was present when a plaintiff who
had been sexually harassed resigned after being transferred to another
supervisor and being told that her new position "probably would be

228

[d.

[d. (quoting Ellerth, 524 u.s. at 760).
[d. at 149. Thus, the Court implicitly rejected the Third Circuit's concern that
"removing constructive discharge from the category of tangible employment actions could
have the perverse effect of discouraging an employer from actively pursuing remedial
measures and of possibly encouraging intensified harassment" to cause the employee to
quit. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 461 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. 542 U.s. 129 (2004).
231
Suders, 542 U.s. at 148-49. The Suders Court noted that the omission of "constructive
discharge" from the examples of tangible employment actions included in Ellerth and
Faragher was conspicuous, and equally telling was the Court's conclusion that Ellerth had
not alleged that she suffered a tangible employment action. [d. at 148.
232 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003).
233 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004); Suders, 542 U.s. at 14950.
234 Suders, 542 U.s. at 149-50 (citing Reed, 333 F.3d at 33).
229

230
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235

'hell'" and that she should consider resigning.
According to the Suders Court, the First and Seventh Circuits in Reed
and Robinson "properly recognized that Ellerth and Faragher, which
divided the universe of supervisor harassment claims according to the
presence or absence of an official act, mark the path that constructive
discharge claims based on harassing conduct must follow.,,236 Because
the Third Circuit failed to consider whether the requisite "official act"
preceded Suders's alleged constructive discharge, the Court reversed
237
and remanded the judgment for further proceedings.
The Court's opinion in Suders helped resolve any uncertainty
regard~ whether submission cases constitute tangible employment
actions.
As explained below, because submission cases do not
constitute tangible employment actions, an employer should be
permitted to assert and prove the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF SUBMISSION CLAIMS UNDER ELLERTH AND FARAGHER
239

Nearly eight years after Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,240 the problem the Supreme Court
attempted to remedy - namely, the expansive pressure to label and
construe sexual harassment claims as quid pro quo claims for purposes
of holding an employer strictly liable - still exists in submission cases.
The only difference is that the label has changed.
Instead of
characterizing submission claims as quid pro quo claims, plaintiffs now
plead such claims as tangible employment actions, knowing that the
tangible employment action label is synonymous with strict liability.
There is an additional reason why plaintiffs are attempting to expand the
tangible employment action definition to include submission cases district courts have demonstrated a tendency to grant summary
judgment in favor of defendant employers in hostile environment claims
not involving a tangible employment action on the grounds that the
employers have satisfied both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative

235

[d. (citing Robinson, 351 F.3d at 324).

236

[d.

[d. at 151-52.
23B But see generally Michael Starr & Adam J. Heft, Employment Law, Sexual Harassment,
26 NAT'L 1.J. 18 (2004) (noting contrasting approaches to submission claims in Jin and
Speaks, and further noting that Court's decision in Suders may shed some light on whether
submission claims constitute tangible employment action, but concluding that result is
"still unclear" even after Suders).
239 524 U.s. 742 (1998).
"" 524 U.s. 775 (1998).
237
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241

defense. In addition to plaintiffs' efforts to creatively plead submission
cases, certain courts have misconstrued and misinterpreted the tangible
employment action principles provided in Ellerth and Faragher and
instead equated classic quid pro quo scenarios with an employer's strict
liability. Perhaps the egregious circumstances presented in cases such as
242
lin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance CO. and Holly D. v. California Institute of
Technology243 fueled this result.
The opinions in lin and Holly D. are compelling. From a realist
perspective, it seems unjust to permit an employer to assert the
EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense under circumstances where a
supervisor successfully coerces an employee's repeated submission to
unwelcome sexual acts. Indeed, a supervisor's ability to extort sexual
acts from a subordinate is perhaps the quintessential example of the
aided in the agency relation standard.
Unlike a typical hostile
environment scenario where a coworker and supervisor may be equally
capable of inflicting harm, there are few scenarios where sexual extortion
could occur absent the agency relation and the supervisor's use of
244
power. It is precisely because "successful coercion... depends on the
same abuse of supervisorial authority - the power to hire and fire that ... renders a discharge a 'tangible employment action'" that some
courts have equated submission claims with tangible employment
•
245
actions.
While a supervisor's abuse of power alone may be sufficient reason to
hold an employer vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual extortion, the
Court in Ellerth and Faragher took a formalist approach to employer
liability. In doing so, it required something more than the supervisor's
unique ability to sexually harass subordinates before holding an
employer strictly liable for a supervisor's misconduct. Rather, to impose
strict liability on an employer, a plaintiff must show that she suffered a
241
See infra text accompanying note 349 (regarding lower courts' pro-employer trend in
granting summary judgment on affirmative defense).
242 310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004).
243 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).
244
Ironically, the circumstances in Tin are one example of a scenario where sexual
extortion was accomplished by a coworker, given that the perpetrator in Tin did not become
her supervisor until approximately six months into his campaign of harassment
accompanied by threats of physical harm. See Tin, 310 F.3d at 88 (stating that perpetrator
began working in Jin's branch in May 1993 and "by at least January 1994" he became her
manager and supervisor), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004); see also Jansen v. Packaging Corp.
of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 513 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam) (Posner, c.J., concurrirlg and
dissenting) (positing that coworker might threaten to steal employee'S work tools if she did
not submit to him), affd sub nom. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742.
245
Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1168.
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tangible employment action. To do so, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that she experienced a significant change in employment status that was
brought about by an "official act of the enterprise, a company act." As
explained in Part IV.A.I below, the change in employment status must
be adverse.
This Part articulates the reasons why submission cases do not satisfy
the formal requirements of a tangible employment action and why
construing submission cases as tangible employment actions is
inconsistent with the policies underlying Ellerth and Faragher. For
discussion purposes, it is necessary to break submission cases into two
subsets.
The first subset involves circumstances where the subordinate submits
to the supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances because the supervisor
threatens to impose a tangible job detriment or deny the subordinate
tangible job benefits to which she is entitled. In such a scenario, the
subordinate avoids the tangible job detriment or continues to enjoy the
job benefits to which she was otherwise entitled by submitting to the
supervisor's demands. Thus, this Article refers to the first subset as an
"avoided-job-detriment" case.
The second subset involves circumstances where the subordinate
submits to the supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances because the
supervisor promises her a job benefit to which she is not otherwise
entitled. In such a scenario, the subordinate receives the unwarranted
job benefit by submitting to the supervisor's sexual demands. This
Article refers to the second subset as a "received-job-benefit" case.
As explained in this Part, both subsets of submission cases lack the
formal requirements of a tangible employment action. The avoided-jobdetriment cases lack the requisite significant change in employment
status. Moreover, both the avoided-job-detriment and received-jobbenefit cases lack the necessary adverse change required under Ellerth
and Faragher. Further, the avoided-job-detriment cases lack the requisite
official act necessary to hold the employer strictly liable for the
supervisor's sexual extortion. Thus, these claims amount to mere
unfulfilled threat cases to which the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
applies. In addition to lacking the formal requirements of a tangible
employment action, construing submission cases as tangible
employment actions is inconsistent with the policies underlying the
Court's opinions in Ellerth and Faragher.
Such a conclusion is
inconsistent with the bright line the Court endeavored to draw in Ellerth
and Faragher, and leads to the same expansive pressure that previously
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existed whereby plaintiffs sought to label claims as quid pro quo to
impose strict liability.

A.

Significant Change in Employment Status

In an attempt to bring avoided-job-detriment claims within the
definition of a "tangible employment action," the fin and Holly D. courts
reasoned that an avoided-job-detriment plaintiff experiences a significant
change in employment status in the form of a significant change in her
246
job requirements.
The premise is that an avoided-job-detriment
plaintiff experiences a significant change in job requirements when
retention of her job becomes conditioned upon her engaging in
247
unwelcome sexual conduct.
Although there is some appeal to the
change-in-responsibilities approach, this approach ultimately fails as it
necessarily encompasses circumstances where a hostile work
environment plaintiff claims that she too was forced to endure her
supervisor's sexual comments, innuendo, inappropriate touching, and
the like.
The plaintiffs in both the submission and hostile environment cases
claim that enduring the supervisor's abusive behavior effectively became
an additional job requirement or, alternatively, resulted in a constructive
reduction in pay. Indeed, it is precisely because actionable sexual
harassment, regardless of the label, "alter[s] [the] terms or conditions of
[the victim's] employment" that the Court concluded that such
48
harassment violates Title VIe Nevertheless, because all hostile work
environments created by a supervisor necessarily impose this additional
job requirement, or the corresponding constructive reduction in pay,
construing submission cases as imposirig an additional job requirement
tantamount to a significant change in status would eviscerate the
distinction the Court drew between hostile work environment cases and
249
those involving tangible employment actions.
For this reason alone,
construing the subordinate's submission in an avoided-job-detriment
case as a change in job responsibilities equal to a significant change in
250
employment status is inconsistent with Ellerth and Faragher.
Id. at 1169.
Id. Because the supervisor imposes this new job requirement and yet the
subordinate continues to receive the same rate of pay, such a scenario might alternatively
be viewed as a constructive yet significant reduction in pay.
248 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 752.
249
See Lewis v. Forest Pharms., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 638, 655 n.8 (D. Md. 2002) (stating
that creation of hostile work environment does not constitute tangible employment action).
250 For this same reason, the constructive yet significant reduction in pay does not
246

247
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Additionally, the Court's examples of what constitutes a significant
change in employment status suggest that this change in status must be a
material action or omission beyond the change in job requirements
251
experienced by an employee subjected to supervisor harassment. Such
significant changes in employment status include material actions "such
as hiring, firing,
reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits," as
well as "demotion, or undesirable reassignment" and certain material
omissions, such as a "failure to promote.,,252 The fact that official

constitute the requisite "decision causing a significant change in benefits" for a tangible
employment action under Ellerth.
251
For an example of how the Ellerth/Faragher tangible employment action standard
differs from the pre-Ellerth/Faragher "tangible job detriment" standard and thus leads to
different outcomes regarding employer liability, compare the pre-Ellerth result in Reinhold
v. Virginia, 135 F.3d 920, 931-33 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that tangible job detriment is
necessary element for quid pro quo claim, and concluding that plaintiff established prima
facie case of quid pro quo harassment by demonstrating that, following plaintiff's rejection
of her supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances, she suffered tangible job detriment in
form of extra and inappropriate work assignments and being denied opportunity to attend
valuable professional conference), with the post-Ellerth result in Reinhold v. Virginia, 151
F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding upon reconsideration following Court's decisions in
Ellerth and Faragher that aSSignment of extra work does not amount to tangible
employment action for which employer is strictly liable because increased workload does
not amount to "change in her employment status akin to a demotion or a reassignment
entailing significantly different job responsibilities"). See also Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d
505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that employee does not experience requiSite "change in
employment status" when employer changes her work schedule, expands her duties, and
requires her to check with her supervisor before taking breaks); Durham Life Ins. Co. v.
Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff suffered tangible
employment action when employer deprived plaintiff of negotiated conditions of plaintiff's
employment and further deprived plaintiff of client files, which resulted in 50% decrease in
her earnings); cf Susan Grover, After Ellerth: The Tangible Employment Action in Sexual
Harassment Analysis, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 809, 839 (2002) (discussing courts' narrow
interpretation of tangible employment action, arguing that focus of tangible employment
action analysis is "not so much the dimension of the action taken against the subordinate,
but the source of the power the supervisor uses to take that action," and concluding that
"[i)f that power is derived from the authority the supervisor derives from his relationship
with the employer, the action taken is a [tangible employment action), regardless of
whether it alters the subordinate's status in any ultimate sense").
252 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761, 765.
Given the Court's use of the phrase "such as" when
listing actions that constitute a Significant change in status and the Court's subsequent
decision in Suders in which the Court held that a significant change in employment status
not specifically included in the illustrative list - a constructive discharge preceded by an
official act - may constitute a tangible employment action, the Jin court was correct in its
conclusion that the list of possible tangible employment actions was not exhaustive. See Jin
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 94, 97 n.8 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004).
Although the list was not exhaustive, submission cases nevertheless do not constitute
tangible employment actions because the circumstances lack the prerequisites of an
adverse significant change in employment status brought about by an official act for the
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company records will reflect most of these actions further supports the
material nature of the actions and omissions contemplated by the Court
253
in Ellerth.
Because an avoided-job-detriment plaintiff maintains the status quo,
she cannot demonstrate the requisite change in employment status,
much less the requisite significant change. This was essentially the
conclusion reached in Speaks v. City of Lakeland,254 in which the district
court concluded that an employee who simply maintains the status quo
has not experienced the requisite change in status. Nevertheless, this
conclusion must be reconciled with the significant change in
employment status that occurs where a plaintiff, who is entitled to a
promotion, is not promoted because she resisted her supervisor's
advances and thus maintains the status quo.
To reconcile the differing results in the failure to terminate and failure
to promote scenarios, one need only look at the categories into which the
significant change in employment status examples provided by the
Court fall. With the sole exception of hiring, as discussed more fully
below, the examples of a significant change in employment status fall
into one of two categories: either an unwarranted detrimental job action,
such as a termination or a demotion, or an unwarranted failure to carry
out a beneficial job action under circumstances where the employee was
255
entitled to the action, such as a failure to promote.
Thus, when a
supervisor fails to promote a subordinate who is otherwise entitled to a
promotion because the subordinate refused his unwelcome sexual
advances, the subordinate continues to work with the same job, pay,
benefits, and responsibilities and thus maintains the status quo. Yet,
such a failure to promote would constitute the requisite change in
employment status precisely because the supervisor prevented the
employee from receiving something to which the employee was entitled.
reasons discussed more fully in Part IV.
253 Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762; see Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under
Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41, 75 (1999)
(arguing that "critical consideration [in determining what constitutes a tangible
employment action] should be whether the discriminating supervisor has recorded or
reported his discriminatory action ... so that it is readily available for review").
254 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
255 The "significant change in employment status" examples provided by the Court
appear at first blush to contemplate three types of results: (1) actions and omissions with
negative consequences such as "firing, failure to promote," "demotion, or undesirable
reaSSignment," (2) actions that may have positive, neutral, or negative consequences such as
"reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits," and (3) actions with positive consequences such as "hiring."
Nevertheless, as explained more fully in Part V.A.l, the change must be adverse.
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Applying the same reasoning to an avoided-job-detriment case, the
analysis collapses because the supervisor has not deprived the employee
of anything to which she was entitled, and thus, the employee has not
experienced a change in employment status, much less a significant
change. For this reason, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the
significant change in employment status examples necessarily include
256
their opposites - firing necessarily implies failing to fire
is
incorrect, at least with respect to circumstances where the employee who
submits maintains the status quo to which she is otherwise entitled.
To better understand these differences, it is helpful to employ a spatial
construct composed of trajectories that represent an employee's standing
and progress within the employer's organization. In this example, the
construct consists of three employees with corresponding trajectories:
Employee A, who is performing well, entitled to a promotion, and on an
upward trajectory within the organization; Employee B, who is
performing satisfactorily, entitled to retain her position, and on a flat
trajectory within the organization; and Employee C, who is performing
poorly, subject to termination, and on a downward trajectory within the
organization. Employee A, who is entitled to a promotion but who does
not receive it because she spurned her supervisor's advances, effectively
experiences a change in her employment status as her trajectory shifts
from upward to flat. Employee B, who retains her job either because she
submitted to her supervisor's advances or because she refused but then
suffered no job detriment, does not experience a change in her
employment status as her trajectory remains flat. Finally, Employee C,
who is performing poorly and is subject to termination but is not
terminated because she submitted to her supervisor's advances,
experiences a change in her employment status as her trajectory shifts
from downward to flat.
In the scenarios described above, Employees A and C are the only
employees who experience the requisite change contemplated in
257
Ellerth.
Whether a court labels Employee B's situation as an avoided-

256 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003); see text
accompanying note 147 (noting EEOC includes both promotion and failure to promote as
examples of tangible employment actions).
157
The Ninth Circuit concluded:

When a supervisor [1] hires or promotes an employee because she complies with
his sexual demands - or when he [2] fires or passes her over for promotion
because she refuses to comply - he has abused his authority as the employer's
agent and has taken a 'tangible employment action.' The same is true when a
supervisor determines that the retention of an employee in the employer'S
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job-detriment claim or, as the Second and Ninth Circuit concluded, the
"receipt of a job benefit" in the form of continued employment,2S8 the
result is the same - Employee B's trajectory remains unchanged. Thus,
Employee B's employment status has not changed significantly as
required under Ellerth. Moreover, as discussed in Part IV.A.I below,
because the Court's decision in Ellerth suggests that the change in
trajectory must be downward or negative, Employee B has not
experienced the requisite adverse change under Ellerth.
Although Employee C's trajectory has changed, she faces a similar
hurdle. Employee C received a benefit to which she was not otherwise
entitled, and her trajectory shifted from downward to flat precisely
because she submitted to her supervisor's advances. Because the Court
included the positive action of hiring as one of the examples of a
significant change in employment status, Employee C's retention of
employment under circumstances where she was not otherwise entitled
to do so may constitute a change in employment status akin to the
change experienced by someone who is fired or not promoted because
she refused a supervisor's sexual demands. Nevertheless, because the
shift in trajectory must be downward or negative, Employee C, like
Employee B, has not experienced the adverse change required under
Ellerth.
employ will depend on her participation in sexual acts, and then either [3] fires
her because she does not participate or [4] retains her in her position because she
does.

Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1171. While the Ninth Circuit is correct that the "supervisor has
abused his authority as the employer's agent" in each of the four scenarios and the
employees in categories 1, 2, and 3 have experienced the requisite change in status, the
employee in category 4 has not experienced the requisite "change in status" for the reasons
explained above. Moreover, although the employees in categories 1, 2, and 3 have
experienced the requisite change in status to constitute a tangible employment action, the
employee in category 1 lacks the requisite adverse change, and thus has not experienced a
tangible employment action, as explained more fully below.
258
Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1169; see also Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir.
2002) (noting that tangible employment actions do not require economic harm), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 52 (2004). Presumably the reason the Second and Ninth Circuits characterized
the avoided-job-detriment scenario as the subordinate's receipt of a "benefit" in the form of
continued employment was because the characterization appears analytically closer to
Ellerth's required Significant change in employment status or benefits. Additionally, by
characterizing the avoided-job-detriment case in this fashion, both courts were likely trying
to bring the circumstances within the EEOC's definition of a "tangible employment action."
See EEOC, supra note 147. Notwithstanding the characterization, the fact remains that the
avoided-job-detriment plaintiff has not experienced the requisite change in status as
discussed above. Moreover, even if the avoided-job-detriment scenario is characterized as
a "benefit" received, such a characterization raises a separate issue: the plaintiff lacks the
requisite adverse change. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
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Adverse Change Requirement

Notwithstanding the Court's inclusion of the term "hiring" in its
illustrative list of significant changes in employment status, these
examples must be interpreted in light of the Ellerth opinion as a whole,
259
which indicates that the change in employment status must be adverse.
Indeed, the significant change in employment status concept stems from
Chief Judge Posner's opinion in Jansen v. Packaging Corporation of
60
Americi where he coined the phrase "company act." Chief Judge
Posner defined a "company act" as a "significant alteration in the terms
or conditions of [the] victim's employment" under circumstances where
a supervisor engages in any of the following adverse actions or
omissions: "fires her, or denies her a promotion, or blocks a scheduled
raise, or demotes her, or transfers her to a less desirable job location, or
refuses to give her the training that the company rules entitle her to
receive.,,261 The adverse nature of these actions is further supported by
Chief Judge Posner's statement that strict liability should attach when a
262
subordinate is terminated or otherwise injured in this manner.

259
Indeed, when illustrating the distinction between actions that are sufficient to
constitute a tangible employment action and those that are not, the Court cited disparate
treatment cases. In doing so, it suggested that tangible employment actions are those
comprised of a "material adverse change" as compared with those actions that implicate a
slight imposition or inconvenience. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761
(1998) (comparing Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)
("A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a
demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material
loss of benefits, significantly diminished responsibilities, or other indices that might be
unique to a particular situation.") (emphasis added), with Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt. Inc.,
97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that demotion without change in pay, benefits,
duties, or prestige is insufficient to constitute tangible employment action), and Harlston v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding reassignment to more
inconvenient job insufficient)). Additionally, the Court later suggested in its joint holding
in Ellerth and Faragher that any reassignment must be adverse: "No affirmative defense is
available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible
employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reaSSignment." Pa. State
Police v. Suders, 542 US. 129, 137-38 (2004) (quoting same) (emphasis added); Ellerth, 524
US. at 765 (emphasis added); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998)
(emphasis added).
260
123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
261
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per
curiam) (Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting), affd sub nom. Ellerth, 524 US. 742.
262
Id.; see id. at 499 (Flaum, J., concurring) (acknowledging Chief Judge Posner's
position that "adverse job consequence is necessary to succeed on quid pro quo claim," and
noting that "adverse job consequence" "takes the guise of [aJ 'company act' in Chief Judge
Posner's opinion").
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Moreover, the Court's repeated use of the terms "threat," "injury,"
"harm," and "inflicted" in Ellerth suggests that it contemplated that
tangible employment actions would encompass only adverse actions and
263
omissions.
For example, the Court distinguished between
circumstances where a supervisor's "threats are carried out and those
where they are not or are absent altogether .... ,,264 The Court did not
mention "promises of job benefits made and fulfilled." Furthermore,
with respect to the "injury inflicted" upon the plaintiff when a
supervisor takes a tangible employment action, the Court explained:
When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is
assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency
relation. A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct
economic harm. As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or
other person actinJ with the authority of the company, can cause
this sort of injury.z
In addition to the term "injury," the Court also used the term "harm"
when describing the tangible effect of the supervisor's abuse of
authority. For example, the Court referred to the "direct economic harm"
266
caused by most tangible employment actions.
It also referred to the
"harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority" and the subordinate's
coordinate duty to "avoid harm."z67 In each of these instances, the Court
used the terms "threat," "injury," "harm," and "inflicted" to denote the
negative job-related consequences suffered by a subordinate as a result
of the adverSe action or omission.
While both an avoided-job-detriment and a received-job-benefit
plaintiff may suffer psychological injury or harm, the Court's efforts to
distinguish psychological injuries from the job-related injury uniquely
caused by a supervisor's official adverse action or omission further
compels the conclusion that tangible employment actions must be
adverse. In this respect, the Court stated:
A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic
harm. As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person
acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury.
A co-worker can break a co-worker's arm as easily as a supervisor,
263
See Woodford & Rissetto, supra note 167, at 79-80 (noting that terms "threat,"
"against," "injury," and "harm" denote adverse actions).
264
Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 751.
265 [d. at 761-62 (emphasis added).
266
[d. at 762 (emphasis added).
267 [d. at 764-65 (emphasis added).
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and anyone who has regular contact with an employee can inflict
psychological injuries by his or her offensive conduct. But one coworker (absent some elaborate scheme) cannot dock another's pay,
268
nor can one co-worker demote another.
To illustrate the distinction between the type of injuries resulting from a
supervisor's adverse action or omission and those resulting from
nonadverse actions or omissions, recall the injuries suffered by
Employees A, B, and C in the hypothetical discussed above. Employee A
suffers job-related, although not necessarily economic, injury when her
supervisor fails to promote her because she did not submit to his sexual
demands. In contrast, the injuries suffered by the employees who
submit to the supervisor's sexual demands - B, the avoided-jobdetriment case, and C, the received-job-benefit case
are
269
.1
psychI
0 oglca .
All three employees suffered injuries that the supervisor had the
unique ability to inflict, but the types of injury they suffered differ in
legally significant ways. The job-related injury suffered by Employee A
is uniquely within the supervisor's ability to inflict. The injuries suffered
by Employees Band C, however, are exclusively psychological. Thus,
they are the same type of injury suffered by a plaintiff who endures
sexual harassment in the form of offensive behavior by either a coworker
or supervisor.
Accordingly, the Court's distinction between
psychological injuries and the types of job-related injuries uniquely
inflicted by a supervisor's adverse action or omission is yet another
reason supporting the conclusion that the Court intended to include only
adverse actions or omissions in the tangible employment action
definition.
Additionally, the Court's use of the phrase "taken against a
subordinate" when referring to the phrase "tangible employment action"
further bolsters the conclusion that tangible employment actions include
only adverse actions or omissions with job-related negative
consequences:
At the outset, we can identify a class of cases where, beyond
question, more than the mere existence of the employment relation
aids in commission of harassment: when a supervisor takes a tangible
employment action against the subordinate. . .. Whatever the exact
contours of the aided in the agency relation standard, its
ld. at 762 (citations omitted) (emphasiS added).
Admittedly, such injuries are as "tangible as an injury can be." Holly D. v. Cal. Inst.
of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003).
268

2b9
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requirements will always be met when a supervisor takes a tangible
employment action against a subordinate.,,27o
If the Court intended tangible employment actions to also include

positive or neutral actions and omissions, it could have easily used the
phrase "takes a tangible employment action regarding or with respect to a
subordinate."
Finally, the Court's opinion in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders271
further supports the conclusion that tangible employment actions
encompass only adverse actions and omissions. In Suders, the Court
noted that Ellerth and Faragher "distinguished between supervisor
harassment unaccompanied by an adverse official act and supervisor
harassment attended by a 'tangible employment action.,,,272
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-63 (emphasis added).
542 U.s. 129 (2004).
2n Suders, 542 U.s. at 137-38 (quoting ElIerth, 524 U.S. at 765) (emphasis added). In
light of the Court's repeated references to changes in employment status that are adverse in
nature, the Court's reference to the "hiring" context in Ellerth should be construed as a
reference to a "failure to hire" where the applicant was otherwise qualified but was not
hired because she did not submit to the supervisor's advances.
Certain cases have concluded that a tangible employment must be adverse. See
Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1280-81 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting
language employed in Frederick v. Sprint/llnited Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir.
2001», cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1714 (2004); Frederick, 246 F.3d at 1311 (requiring tangible
employment action be adverse to impose strict liability); Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245
F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that Ellerth Court "suggested that some kind of
significantly adverse employment action is necessary to prove an employer's Title VII
liability" for sexual harassment); Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating
that tangible employment action must cause '"a substantial detriment to plaintiff's
employment relationship"') (quoting Savino v. c.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 139, 932, n. 8 (7th
Cir. 1999»; Savino, 199 F.3d at 932 n.8 (stating that tangible employment action must cause
"a substantial detriment to the plaintiff's employment relationship" and is "akin to an
adverse employment action"); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating
that tangible employment action must be adverse, but not addressing whether tangible
employment action is synonymous with "adverse employment action" for purposes of
Title VII retaliation claim); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999)
(stating employer is strictly liable when subordinate suffers tangible adverse employment
action); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that
tangible employment action exists when sexual harassment culminates in adverse
employment decision); Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 1999)
(Barkett, J., concurring specially) (stating that Court in Ellerth "differentiated between cases
in which an employee suffers an adverse 'tangible employment action' as a result of sexual
harassment and those cases in which an employee suffers the intangible harm of the
indignity and humiliation caused by hostile work environment sexual harassment");
Wilbur v. Corr. Servs. Corp., No. 5:02CV220-0C10GRJ, 2003 WL 23009901, at '4 (M.D. Fla.
2003) (concluding that "adverse employment action" and tangible employment action are
synonymous); Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (noting
that Eighth Circuit has taken position that "absent a tangible job detriment, no 'tangible
employment action' can be shown"); Gonzalez v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 262 F. Supp. 2d 342,
270
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For all of these reasons, submission cases do not constitute the
requisite significant change in employment status. The avoided-jobdetriment plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the requisite change in status,
even where the circumstances are characterized as a received-job-benefit
case. Moreover, neither avoided-job-detriment nor received-job-benefit
cases encompass the necessary adverse action or omission contemplated
by the Court in Ellerth. Accordingly, submission cases do not constitute
the tangible employment action necessary to impose strict liability on an
employer under Ellerth. Furthermore, avoided-job-detriment cases suffer
from an additional fatal flaw: they lack the requisite official act under
Ellerth.

351-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (construing tangible employment action to mean "improperly
motivated conduct by supervisors that brings 'the official power of the enterprise to bear
on subordinates,' negatively impacting the worker's employment status in a significant, but
not necessarily materially adverse, way") (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762»; Crosson v.
Caremark, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 875, 882 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that Seventh Circuit
construes tangible employment action as adverse action and thus looks to "adverse
employment action" cases to determine whether plaintiff has suffered tangible
employment action); see also Chamallas, supra note 11, at 346 (noting that, notwithstanding
Second Circuit's conclusion in Tin that adverse action is not required, other courts will
likely require plaintiff to show that she "suffered an adverse change in employment
status"); Nancy R. Mansfield & Joan T.A. Gabel, An Analysis of the Burlington and Faragher
Affirmative Defense: When Are Employers Liable?, 19 LAB. LAW. 107, 115-16 (2003) (suggesting
that tangible employment action must be adverse); David F. McCann, Supervisory Sexual

Harassment and Employer Liability: The Third Circuit Sheds Light on Vicarious Liability and
Affirmative Defenses, 45 VILL. L. REV. 767 (2000) (using phrase "adverse tangible
employment action" throughout when describing Ellerth tangible employment action
standard); Woodford & Rissetto, supra note 167, at 79-81 (concluding that Ellerth Court's
language "implies that the Court was thinking solely of adverse actions").
For cases concluding that a tangible employment action need not be adverse, see
supra Part III.A.1 and the discussion of Tin and Holly D. See supra Part I1I.B for a discussion
of the Third Circuit's approach to constructive discharge in Suders, which was reversed by
the Court, and see infra text accompanying notes 340, 342. A number of additional cases
have concluded that a tangible employment action need not be adverse. See Brown v.
Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir. 1999) (implying that receipt of promotion may constitute
tangible employment action); Lewis v. Forest Pharms., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 638, 655 n.8 (D.
Md. 2002) ("Tangible employment actions . . . need not be adverse."); see supra text
accompanying note 147 (describing EEOC's position); see also Rebecca Hanner White, De
Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1160 (1998) (arguing that tangible employment
action under Ellerth "need not be ultimate nor materially adverse, but it must involve an act
'within the special province of the supervisor"'); Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making,
61 LA. L. REV. 495, 537 n.237 (2001) (stating that "[w]hether a tangible employment action
must be materially adverse is debatable").
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Official Act Requirement

Notwithstanding Ellerth's requirement of "an official act of the
enterprise, a company act,',273 certain courts faced with avoided-job274
detriment cases and certain courts faced with constructive discharge
cases have dispensed with the official act requirement. They have done
so by either explicitly stating it does not apply to submission cases or
implicitly concluding it does not apply in such cases by engaging in the
somewhat circular reasoning that the plaintiff satisfied the official act
requirement because the supervisor "invoke[ed] the official authority of
275
the enterprise" in causing the resulting harm.
Although these
overlapping approaches may be superficially appealing, neither is
consistent with the Court's tangible employment action jurisprudence,
particularly in light of the Court's recent constructive discharge decision
276
in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders.
Dispensing with the official act requirement is inconsistent with the
277
plain language of Ellerth, which unequivocally requires an official act.
Although certain courts appear inclined to treat submission cases as
unique and thus dispense with the official act requirement, the Suders
Court specifically reaffirmed Ellerth's official act requirement in the
analogous constructive discharge context. In doing so, the Court
explicitly stated that Ellerth and Faragher "divided the universe of
supervisor-harassment claims according to the presence or absence of an
official act. ,,278
Prior to Suders, the Third Circuit dispensed with the official act
requirement in the constructive discharge context by analogizing
constructive discharge claims to submission claims in reliance on the
reasoning in Jin.279 According to the Third Circuit, the better approach
for both claims was to simply dispense with the official act requirement
and recognize that a supervisor who either "creates a hostile work
environment so severe than an employee has no alternative but to

Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762.
Part IV.A.2.a addresses only avoided-job-detriment cases because the "official act"
requirement is met in received-job-benefit cases - the supervisor's official act in bestowing
the unwarranted benefit suffices.
27S
Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 459 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
310 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004», vacated sub nom. Pa. State
Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
276
542 U.S. 129 (2004).
2n Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762.
278
Suders, 542 U.s. at 149-50.
2" See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
273
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resign" or extorts sexual acts from subordinates "brings the official
280
power of the enterprise to bear" on the victimized subordinate.
The
Court in Suders drew the line differently and in a way that contradicts
the reasoning and conclusions in Jin and Holly D. The Court reversed the
Third Circuit and required that a plaintiff who is constructively
discharged, and thus experiences the requisite significant change in
employment status solely as a result of supervisory sexual harassment,
must still prove that an official act precipitated the constructive
discharge. In doing so, the Court noted that a constructive discharge
involves both an employee's decision to leave and the conduct that
precipitated the resignation. It reasoned that an employee's resignation
obviously involves no official action, while the precipitating conduct
may. Accordingly, the Court held that a constructive discharge
constitutes a tangible employment action only when precipitated by an
281
official act of the enterprise.
The same rationale applies in the
submission context.
Like a constructive discharge situation, where an employee decides
that she has no choice but to resign to avoid the harm, a submission
situation involves an employee's decision to avoid the threatened harm
by engaging in the unwelcome conduct. And like the employee's
unilateral decision to resign in the constructive discharge context, the
282
employee's unilateral decision to submit involves no official action.
For this reason alone, a submission plaintiff must prove an official act.
Moreover, as in the constructive discharge context, dispensing with
the official act requirement in the avoided-job-detriment case would lead
to an anomalous result. A subordinate who submits to a supervisor's
unwelcome sexual advances to avoid the threatened termination
arguably possesses a graver claim than a subordinate who successfully
283
resists her supervisor's advances and threats but is not terminated.
Yet, in the absence of an official action requirement, the submission
plaintiff's claim is an easier claim to prove than the hostile work

Suders, 325 F.3d at 459.
Suders, 542 U.S. at 148; see supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
282
See infra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why supervisor's
threat of job detriment does not constitute requisite official action).
283
As the court in lin reCOgnized, "the employee who is coerced into satisfying a
supervisor's sexual demands to keep her job may suffer a greater injury than the employee
who is able to refuse those demands." Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 99 (2d Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004). And as Justice Reinhardt appropriately noted in
Nichols, "[nlothing is more destructive of human dignity than being forced to perform
sexual acts against one's will." Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994).
280
281
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environment claim available to the resisting employee.
For these
reasons, dispensing with the official act requirement in the submission
context is inconsistent with Ellerth, Faragher, and Suders. Thus, the
remaining question is whether an avoided-job-detriment plaintiff can
demonstrate the requisite official act. The answer to that question is
linD."

a.

Absence of Official Act

An avoided-job-detriment plaintiff may attempt to demonstrate the
presence of an official act through one of two approaches. First, the
plaintiff may show that the supervisor's purported decision to not take
the threatened action because the plaintiff submitted constitutes an
official act. Second, the plaintiff may construe the supervisor's threat of
28S
job detriment coupled with her submission as the requisite official act.
Nevertheless, both approaches fail because an avoided-job-detriment
plaintiff cannot show the requisite "change in employment status."
Under the first approach, the Ninth Circuit characterized the plaintiff's
submission as the catalyst for a final decision, or official act, taken by the
employer after the submission occurred. In doing so, it created a
construct whereby the supervisor's threat to terminate an employee is
286
deemed to be a conditional decision to terminate.
The Ninth Circuit
then treated the supervisor's decision to retain the employee once she
submitted as essentially rescinding the earlier conditional decision and
287
making a further purported final determination to retain the employee.
Based on this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "determining
not to fire an employee who has been threatened with discharge
constitutes a 'tangible employment action,' at least where the reason for

28' Moreover, unlike a constructive discharge plaintiff, a submission plaintiff does not
bear the burden of meeting a high liability threshold that requires proof of objectively
intolerable working conditions.
285 Because the Court in Ellerth concluded that Ellerth's resignation did not constitute a
tangible employment action, it necessarily follows that Ellerth's supervisor's threats to
deny her tangible job benefits did not constitute the official act necessary to transform
Ellerth's resignation into a tangible employment action constructive discharge. For the
same reasons, the Court implicitly rejected the argument that a supervisor's refusal to
provide guidance or permission to complete a job-related task constitutes the official act
necessary to transform a forced resignation into a tangible employment action constructive
discharge. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742, 748 (1998) (noting that
Ellerth's supervisor had refused to provide permission to insert customer's logo on fabric
sample when he stated: "I don't have time for you right now, Kim ... - unless you tell me
what you're wearing.").
286 Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1169 (9th Cir. 2003).
287 Id.
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the change in the employment decision is that the employee has
submitted to the coercive sexual demands.,,288 In essence, treating a
submission case as a series of three actions, as opposed to the two actions
consisting of the supervisor's threat followed by the employee's
submission, shifts the focus of the last action from that of the employee
to the supervisor's "nonaction" or fictional decision to retain the
employee. By shifting the focus, the Ninth Circuit attempted to show
that the last action in the series was the supervisor's official act in
.. th e emp Ioyee. 289
retammg
Although the Ninth Circuit's approach is analytically innovative, it
does not satisfy the official act requirement. The only way to shift the
focus from the employee to the supervisor in the avoided-job-detriment
scenario is to employ the fiction that once the employee submitted, the
supervisor decided to retain the employee. A tangible employment
action, however, requires an adverse change in status brought about by
an official act, not merely a change in decision. That adverse change in
status only occurs once the supervisor takes a concrete action or makes a
290
concrete and final decision in the form of an official act. In the absence
of such an adverse change in employment status, it is impossible to
know whether the supervisor initially decided to terminate the employee
or whether he was merely bluffing.
Additionally, the Court's subsequent opinion in Suders rejected an
analogous focus-shifting argument in the constructive discharge context.
In Suders, various amici curiae argued that a constructive discharge
satisfies the official act requirement because the "official nature of the
discharge is reinforced by the employer's receipt, acceptance, processing
and recording of the employee'S letter or other notice of resignation.,,291

[d.
289
As discussed more fully in Part IV.B infra, this is essentially a return to the preEUerth/Faragher state of the law regarding quid pro quo in which an employer was held
strictly liable for a supervisor's "unwelcome sexual conduct" when the supervisor used the
victim's reaction to that conduct "as the basis for decisions affecting the compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of her employment." Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d
773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994). The focus is now on whether the plaintiff suffered a tangible
employment action in the form of an adverse Significant change in status brought about by
a supervisor's official act.
m See, e.x., Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 588 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding
in Title VII retaliation context, which requires that plaintiff prove that she suffered
"adverse employment action," that "a proposed action that is corrected as soon as the
proper official is made aware of it before it goes into effect, so that the employee does not
actually suffer any consequence, is not 'adverse"').
291
Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. at 23, Suders v.
Easton 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-95).
288
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Essentially, this argument analyzes a constructive discharge as
consisting of a series of three acts: the supervisor's harassment of the
subordinate, the subordinate's resignation, and the employer's receipt
and processing of the subordinate's resignation. By characterizing a
constructive discharge in this manner, the amici curiae essentially
construed the third act in the series - the employer's processing of the
discharge - as the official act. Nevertheless, the Court in Suders held
that a constructive discharge is only a tangible employment action when
an official act precedes the resignation. Because the Court rejected this
focus-shifting analysis in the analogous constructive discharge context, it
implicitly rejected the same analysis in the submission context.
The second approach is to construe the supervisor's threat coupled
with the employee'S action in submitting as the official act. This
approach fails, however, because the Court in Suders implicitly rejected
this approach when it approved of the First Circuit's ap~roach to
2
constructive discharge in Reed v. MBNA Marketing System, Inc. 2 In Reed,
the plaintiff's supervisor subjected her to inappropriate sexual touching,
comments, and assaults, which prompted the plaintiff to resign.293
Following her resignation, she alleged that her employer was strictly
liable for her supervisor's actions because she had been constructively
294
discharged.
She argued that she satisfied Ellerth's official action
requirement because she refrained from reporting the verbal harassment
and sexual assault due to her supervisor's threats to fire her if she
295
reported the harassment.
The First Circuit concluded that the
circumstances lacked the requisite official action to render a constructive
discharge a tangible employment action, even though the plaintiff
refrained from reporting the harassment and assault because of her
296
supervisor's threatening statements.
Subsequently, the Suders Court
expressly approved of the First Circuit's conclusion that the supervisor's
behavior did not involve any official act, that the conduct was
exceedingly unofficial and involved no direct exercise of company
authority,'" and that it was IIlexactly the kind of wholly unauthorized
conduct for which the affirmative defense was designed.",297
III

2"
293
294
295
296

Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys. Inc., 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003).
ld. at 30-31.
[d. at 33.
Id. at 37.
[d. at 33-34.

'J97
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.s. 129,150 (2004) (citing Reed, 333 F.3d at 33). This
conclusion could not have come as much of a surprise for two reasons. First, the Court had
foreshadowed this result in Ellerth. See supra text accompanying note 285. Second, because
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Accordingly, the employer in Reed could assert the EllerthlFaragher
affirmative defense.
Under the reasoning in Reed, as approved by Suders, there may be
circumstances in which a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate,
threatens to discharge her if she reports, and perhaps even increases the
intensity of the sexual harassment to cause her to quit. The Third Circuit
in Suders even acknowledged that "[s]ome employers might wish for an
employee to quit voluntarily[, while] others might even tacitly approve
298
of increased harassment to achieve that result.//
Nevertheless, even
when a constructively discharged plaintiff refrains from reporting
supervisor harassment precisely because her supervisor explicitly
threatened her with discharge, as in Reed, the supervisor's threat coupled
with the employee's submission does not constitute the official act
necessary to hold the employer strictly liable.
The reasoning of Reed applies equally to submission cases. Just as a
supervisor's explicit threats of discharge that cause a plaintiff to refrain
from acting involve no official action, a supervisor's explicit threats of
discharge that cause a plaintiff to act and submit to sexual demands
299
involve no official action.
Accordingly, an avoided-job-detriment case
simply falls on the wrong side of the bright line that the Court sought to
draw between official act-tangible employment actions for which an
employer is strictly liable and all other cases to which the
3QO
EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense applies.

the "official act" concept was coined by Chief Judge Posner in Jansen, Chief Judge Posner's
conclusion that a mere threat does not constitute an "official act," even when the threat is
successful, foreshadows a similar result:
Strict liability is inappropriate ... when the supervisor merely makes threats,
even if the threats are effective. This is why it is important to distinguish
between the type of quid pro quo harassment in which the supervisor actually
alters the terms and conditions of his victim's employment and the type of
harassment in which he merely threatens to do so, whether or not the victim
yields to the threats. Suppose the supervisor threatens to fire a subordinate
unless she'll have sex with him, and she agrees - or refuses and he does not
carry out his threat. In either case, because he has not used his delegated
authority to commit a company act, there is no way in which a system for vetting
such acts would catch him out.
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 513 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam)
(Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting), affd sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.s. 742 (1998).
298 Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 461 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.s. 129 (2004).
299 See supra text accompanying note 297.
300 Suders, 542 U.s. at 149-50 (stating that Ellerth and Faragher classified such claims
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Absence of Fulfilled Threat

To compensate for the lack of a significant change in employment
status and the lack of an official act in the avoided-job-detriment case,
the Ninth Circuit in Holly D. attempted to construe the circumstances as
a fulfilled threat case where the threat itself gives rise to a tangible
301
employment action.
Notwithstanding the Ellerth Court's conclusion
that the quid pro quo label does not control vicarious liability, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that in the classic quid pro quo avoided-job-detriment
scenario, the "threat does not simply remain unfulfilled or inchoate, but
rather results in a concrete consequence. The supervisor accomplishes
the objective of the threat - the coercion of the sexual act - by bringing
to bear the authority to make critical employment determinations on
behalf of his employer.,,302
The fundamental problem with the Ninth Circuit's approach is that
Ellerth requires something more than the supervisor "bringing to bear
the authority to make critical employment determinations on behalf of
his employer" to impose strict liability on an employer. If the
supervisor's abuse of authority was sufficient, the Court would have
retained the quid pro quo category of harassment as a proxy for strict
liability instead of creating the tangible employment action standard.
Indeed, if abuse of authority alone was sufficient, a supervisor's
reassignment of a subordinate who spurned his advances to a more
inconvenient job would constitute a tangible employment action.
Nevertheless, the Court in Ellerth explicitly rejected this conclusion when
it excluded reassignment to a more inconvenient job from the list of
303
tangible employment actions.
Moreover, if the supervisor's successful coercion of sexual acts is
sufficient to constitute a fulfilled threat for which an employer is strictly

"according to the presence or absence of an official act").
301
Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003).
302 Id. at 1169. For a similar argument in the context of a constructive discharge claim
based on allegations of quid pro quo harassment, see Christy M. Hanley, Comment, A

"Constructive" Compromise: Using the Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Work Environment
Classifications to Adjudicate Constructive Discharge Sexual Harassment Cases, 73 U. ON. 1. REV.
259, 284-86 (2004) (arguing that constructive discharges resulting from quid pro quo
harassment constitute tangible employment actions because "the supervisor brings the
'official power of the enterprise ... to bear' on the employee when he or she directly
threatens or shows an intent to discharge or demote the subordinate if sexual requests are
rejected").
303
Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742, 761 (1998) (citing Harlston v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting "reaSSignment to more
inconvenient job insufficient")).
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liable, then the Suders Court would have concluded that a supervisor's
success in causing an employee to quit by increasing the level of
harassment constitutes a fulfilled threat case. In fact, various amici
curiae made this argument when they urged that the official act is the
creation of workplace conditions so intolerable that the harassed
employee had no choice but to resign.304 In concluding that an official act
must precede a constructive discharge, the Suders Court implicitly
rejected this fulfilled threat argument.
Additionally, if successful coercion constitutes a fulfilled threat, then it
is irrelevant in a received-job-benefit case whether the supervisor
actually confers the benefit that results in the "nonadverse" yet
significant change in employment status. In both the avoided-jobdetriment and received-job-benefit scenarios, the supervisor coerces sex
from the subordinate by "bringing to bear the authority to make critical
employment determinations on behalf of his employer.,,305 Based on this
successful coercion theory, however, the only difference between an
avoided-job-detriment case and a received-job-benefit case is the type of
306
recoverable damages.
Given the Court's requirement that a
subordinate suffer an adverse, significant change in employment status
brought about by an official act, imposing strict liability on an employer
solely because a supervisor succeeded in his unlawful goal would
undermine the balance struck in Ellerth.
Construing an avoided-job-detriment scenario as a fulfilled threat case
is also inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Ellerth and
Faragher. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that strict liability "attaches
only if a quid pro quo threat is implemented by some form of sufficiently
concrete employment action.,,307 While the supervisor accomplishes the

304

Brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al., supra note 291, at

23.
Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1169.
If the subordinate engaged in the demanded sexual acts but did not receive the
promised promotion, she would have a viable tangible employment action claim for which
her employer would be strictly liable. She would then likely attempt to recover emotional
distress damages to compensate her for her having given the quid - engaging in the
sexual acts - without receiving the quo - the promotion. In contrast, even if the
subordinate received the bargained-for promotion, she would have a viable tangible
employment action claim for which her employer would be strictly liable. She would then
likely attempt to recover emotional distress damages to compensate her for her
supervisor's abuse of authority, although it seems unlikely that a jury would award
anything more than nominal damages under such circumstances. Under either scenario,
the subordinate would be entitled to recover her attorney's fees under Title VII. See 42
U.S.c. § 1988 (2000).
,.., Holly D., 339 F.3d at 1170 (emphasis added).
305
306
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objective of the threat when the subordinate submits, the circumstances
amount to nothing more than an unfulfilled threat case. The threat of
discharge is not fulfilled precisely because the subordinate submitted.
This conclusion is consistent with the Ellerth Court's interpretation of
"unfulfilled threat," where the Court embraced Chief Judge Posner's
terminology in Jansen: "[i]n the emergent terminology, an unfulfilled
quid pro quo is a mere threat to do a company act rather than the act
30B
itself." Chief Judge Posner's words in Jansen, upon which the company
act concept is based, further demonstrate that an avoided-job-detriment
case constitutes an unfulfilled threat case:
[T]he term 'company act' signifies an act that significantly alters the
terms or conditions of employment of the victim of sexual
harassment and 'noncompany act' signifies . .. the kind of quid pro quo
harassment that involves only unfulfilled threats (either because the victim
submits or because she calls the supervisor's blujf), so that no company act
309
is committed.
An additional problem with construing submission cases as fulfilled
threat cases is that in a submission case, the subordinate takes the
affirmative step that inflicts the harm. In other words, the threat is
fulfilled because the subordinate submits. Such a result is inconsistent
with Ellerth and Faragher, which impose strict liability on an employer
only when the supervisor brought about the threatened harm. Indeed,
the Court's joint holding specifically provides that an employer is strictly
liable for a supervisor's harassment only "when a supervisor takes a
tangible employment action against the subordinate." 310 This is yet
another reason why tangible employment actions require an official act.
Finally, Suders, through its approval of Reed, demonstrates that even
where a supervisor abuses his power by subjecting a subordinate to
unwanted sexual harassment and intentionally intensifies the
harassment to coerce her resignation, the supervisor's success in
accomplishing his goal does not transform a hostile work environment
claim into a tangible employment action claim. Moreover, even though
the Reed court characterized the plaintiff's failure to report as submission
to the supervisor's discharge threat,311 it nevertheless concluded that the
supervisor's threat, coupled with the employee's submission, was

308 Ellerth, 524 u.S. at 750-51 (citing Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 515
(7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam) (Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting».
309 Jansen, 123 F.3d at 515 (Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added).
310 See supra notes 113, 121 and accompanying text.
311
Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2003).

594

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 39:529

insufficient to render the circumstances a fulfilled threat case precisely
because the discharge threat was not fulfilled. Suders confirms that an
official act is required in both cases.
The reasoning in Suders and Reed applies equally to the avoided-jobdetriment scenario. Where the supervisor threatens an employee with
discharge unless she submits to his sexual advances and the employee
submits in response to the threat, the threat remains unfulfilled because
the discharge did not occur. Thus, notwithstanding the supervisor's
successful abuse of authority, the avoided-job-detriment scenario
constitutes an unfulfilled threat case to which the Ellerth/Faragher
'
. d e fense app l'les. 312
a fflrmative
B.

Policy Considerations

In addition to the above deficiencies in submission claims, construing
such claims as tangible employment actions represents a return to the
pre-Ellerth/Faragher state of the law regarding quid pro quo. This is
inconsistent with the broader vicarious liability and harm avoidance
principles set forth in Ellerth and Faragher. By expanding strict liability to
include submission cases, it necessarily follows that the only classic quid
pro quo circumstances for which an employer would not be strictly liable
are those where the supervisor threatens but does not take a detrimental
job action. That was not the balance struck in Ellerth and Faragher.
Instead, the Court in Ellerth and Faragher created the tangible
employment action standard and accompanying affirmative defense
which, as the Third Circuit in Suders acknowledged, "reflects an intricate
balance incorporated into a complex rule of law with multiple
313
components."
312
In addition, because an avoided-job-detriment case lacks the requisite significant
change in employment status and official act, the circumstances also lack any
"document[ation] in official company records," and thus the decision is not subject to
review by higher level supervisors. Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 762. For the same reasons, the
supervisor does not obtain the imprimatur of the enterprise, nor does the supervisor use
the employer's internal processes. Moreover, as discussed in Part IV.A.1, neither an
avoided-job-detriment plaintiff nor a received-job-benefit plaintiff suffers any economic
harm. Because the Court in Ellerth used the permissive terms "most," "may," and "often,"
respectively, with respect to these tangible employment action indicia, these deficiencies
alone are not fatal to the submission-as-tangible-employment-action argument. [d.
Nevertheless, the collective absence of any of these indicia in the submission context particularly in the avoided-job-detriment scenario - is simply further support for the
conclusion that submission cases do not constitute tangible employment actions.
313 Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 451 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Pa. State Police v.
Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). If that was the result the Court envisioned, the Court could
have responded "no" to the question presented for certiorari in Ellerth: "Whether a claim
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Additionally, imposing strict liability in submission cases improperly
bases the employer's liability on the employee's reaction to either the
supervisor's threat in the avoided-job-detriment case or the supervisor's
promise in the received-job-benefit case. Although the Second Circuit
rejected this argument in fin, it relied on the reasoning and definition of
"quid pro quo" from its pre-EllerthlFaragher opinion in Karibian v.
Columbia University.314 It thus concluded that quid pro quo "liability
results from the supervisor's use of the employee's reaction to the
supervisor's unwelcome sexual conduct as the basis for decisions affectin§
the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of her employment.,,31
Again, the problem is that employing this standard constitutes a return
316
to the pre-Ellerth/Faragher state of the law regarding quid pro quO.
Moreover, the reasoning in Karibian leads to perverse results when
applied to submission claims. As discussed in Part IV.A.2.a, the only

of quid pro quo sexual harassment may be stated under Title Vll ... where the plaintiff
employee has neither submitted to the sexual advances of the alleged harasser nor suffered
any tangible effects on the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment as
a consequence of a refusal to submit to those advances?" Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 753.
314
Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994).
315 Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 97 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Karibian, 14 F.3d at
777), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52 (2004). To bolster its conclusion that Karibian was still viable
after Ellerth and Faragher, the fin Court noted that the Faragher Court, as part of its
illustrative list of cases setting forth the various bases upon which federal courts had held
employers vicariously liable for supervisory sexual harassment, cited Nichols, where the
plaintiff alleged a viable quid pro quo claim based on her allegations that she avoided
tangible job detriment by submitting to her supervisor's demands that she perform oral sex
on him. fin, 310 F.3d at 96 n.7; see supra text accompanying note 97 (discussing various
approaches to vicarious liability prior to Ellerth and Faragher). The fin court concluded that
the Faragher Court's reference to Nichols demonstrated that the Court intended that
submission cases constituted tangible employment actions for which an employer is strictly
liable. Such an assertion is incorrect - the important distinction is between vicarious
liability and strict liability. The Court's reference to Nichols and the quid pro quo and
agency principles discussed therein simply indicates that the Court found it appropriate to
hold the employer vicariously liable for such conduct. Under Ellerth and Faragher, even if an
employer is held vicariously liable for the supervisor's conduct, the employer is permitted
to assert and prove the affirmative defense to liability or damages unless the subordinate
suffered a tangible employment action for which the employer is strictly liable. Thus, as
discussed in this Part, the pertinent question is whether a submission case constitutes a
tangible employment action.
316 The EEOC acknowledged as much in its 1999 Enforcement Guidance
See supra note
147 and accompanying text (defining tangible employment action, and noting that "such
harassment previously would have been characterized as 'quid pro quo.'" (emphasis added».
Although EEOC regulatiOns and guidance are entitled to deference, they are not persuasive
when, as in these circumstances, they are contrary to existing law. See Sutton v. United
Airlines, Inc., 527 U.s. 471, 482-84 (1999) (invalidating EEOC regulations regarding
Americans with Disabilities Act on grounds that regulations were inconsistent with intent
and policies underlying Act).
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way to shift the focus from the employee to the supervisor in the
avoided-job-detriment case under Karibian is to employ the fiction that
once the employee submits, the supervisor decides to retain the
317
employee.
In the absence of an official act or change in employment
status, it is impossible to know whether the supervisor actually makes
such a decision or whether the decision is a mere fiction because the
supervisor was only bluffing. Imposing strict liability based on a mere
fiction is inappropriate.
The received-job-benefit scenario presents an easier case for why an
employer should not be strictly liable. Although the supervisor grants
the unwarranted job benefit, he would not have done so but for the
employee's decision to submit to his unwelcome sexual advances. Thus,
it is wholly inappropriate to hold an employer strictly liable for the
employee's bargained-for job benefit.
Under both of the above scenarios, the imposition of strict liability
turns not on the supervisor's conduct but instead on whether the
employee either successfully resisted the threat of an unwarranted job
detriment or refused the promise of an unwarranted job benefit. In both
scenarios, the supervisor's conduct alone warrants the imposition of
strict liability. Furthermore, the conduct most worthy of deterrence in
the first instance is the supervisor's initial threat or promise. Thus, a
more appropriate result would be to hold an employer strictly liable for
all circumstances where a supervisor abuses his authority by attempting
to extort sexual favors through either threatening an unwarranted job
detriment or promising an unwarranted job benefit. Indeed, this is
precisely the result reached by the Seventh Circuit en banc in Jansen.
Nevertheless, in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court rejected this result as
inconsistent with Meritor's holding that employers are not always strictly
liable for supervisory sexual harassment. The Court required something
more than the supervisor's threats or fictional decision to retain the
subordinate to impose strict liability on an employer. That something
more is a tangible employment action, which is lacking in the sexual
extortion context.
Additionally, by dispensing with the formal requirements and
construing submission cases as tangible employment actions, employers
will be strictly liable for actions of which they likely had no notice. This
is counter to the desired deterrent effect of the tangible employment

317 The Ninth Circuit employed a similar construct when analyzing whether an
avoided-job-detriment plaintiff could prove the requisite "official act." See supra Part
IV.A.2.a (discussing why this construct fails in light of Court's opinion in Suders).
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action standard. As Chief Judge Posner reasoned in Jansen, strict liability
is appropriate when a plaintiff suffers the tangible job detriment that
follows from a tangible employment action because strict liability "is
likely to deter this kind of sexual harassment.,,318 The deterrent effect
stems from the knowledge that strict liability looms in the background
for adverse job-related actions. This knowledge provides an incentive
for employers to review adverse decisions of which they have notice,
such as where an employee is terminated or receives an undesirable
319
reassignment.
In contrast, in the avoided-job-detriment case, there is
nothing to review, and thus, there is no notice. To the outside observer,
the subordinate simply maintains the status quo.
Moreover, even in the context of a supervisor-subordinate
relationship, there is no reason to suspect that a subordinate's continued
employment is out of the ordinary, as the difference between a
consensual as opposed to a coercive relationship is subtle, if discemable
at all:
The words, the gestures, the other behaviors that differentiate the
fully consensual relationship from the coercive relationship will
often be invisible to the supervisor's superiors. The yielding to a
threat will look no different from yielding to a lawful proposal. It is
only when the threat is carried out that the abusive supervisor does
something, such as firing the supervised employee, that the
32o
employer will know about and should monitor.

318 Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per
curiam) (Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting), affd sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742 (1998).
319 As Chief Judge Posner stated in Jansen:

In well-managed companies, decisions having such consequences are subject to
rules, and to review by higher-ups in the company - the industrial equivalent of
appellate review. The rules will be more carefully formulated and the
supervisor's compliance with them in firing or otherwise hurting a subordinate
more carefully reviewed by the supervisor's superiors if the employer is strictly
liable for the supervisor's use of his delegated powers to harass subordinates.

Id. at 512-13. He then applied the above reasoning to the avoided-job-detriment scenario:
But if [the supervisor) doesn't propose to fire her, whether because she has
submitted to his sexual extortion or called his bluff, there will be no proposed
action to review. It will be no more feasible for the company to determine what
is going on than it would be if the harasser were a coworker who had threatened
to steal the victim's work tools if she didn't submit to him.

Id. at 513.
320 Id.
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Further complicating matters is the fact that some romantic
relationships between supervisors and subordinates "start well and tum
ugly and engender charges of sexual harassment that sometimes have
and sometimes lack merit.,,321 In the absence of the notice provided by
either the adverse change in employment status inherent in a tangible
employment action or by a complaint from the subordinate, it is virtually
322
impossible for an employer to detect such unlawful conduct.
For this
reason, vicarious liability, as opposed to strict liability, is the appropriate
standard where engaging in sexual acts or submitting to offensive sexual
conduct is the basis for the subordinate's claim.
Equally compelling is the fact that construing submission cases as
tangible employment actions undermines Title VII's policy of
encouraging plaintiffs to avoid harm by promptly reporting sexually
harassing conduct. As the Speaks court noted, such an interpretation
would lead to the anomalous result that an employee who submits to a
supervisor's demands "fares better [from a liability perspective] by
submitting" than an employee who does not immediately complain
323
about the supervisor's conduct.
As the Speaks court correctly
concluded, such a result "seem[s] contrary to the balance sought by the
Supreme Court. ,,324
Although the harm avoidance principles apply equally to both
avoided-job-detriment and received-job-benefit scenarios, the receivedjob-benefit scenario is even more troubling from a harm avoidance
standpoint. In a received-job-benefit scenario, the plaintiff submits and
receives a job benefit to which she was not otherwise entitled. While it is
wholly inappropriate for a supervisor to engage in sexual extortion, an
employer should not be strictly liable for what essentially amounts to a
325
fully performed contract between the supervisor and subordinate.

321 Id.; see Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510-11 (9th Cir. 1994) (,,[EJven the question of
what constitutes the most blatant form of sexual harassment - quid pro quo harassment is not always answered easily. For one thing, it is frequently not clear what the facts
actually are. The parties may tell total1y conflicting stories, in the trial court and elsewhere,
and there are often no percipient witnesses.").
322 See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 855 (1991) (arguing that quid pro
quo harassment is more difficult for employer to monitor and detect than hostile work
environment harassment, as "threats and promises tied to sex are far more likely to take
place in private, whereas the hostility of the environment is often al1 too obvious and
patent").
32J Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
32. Id.
325 It is
true that the employee would not suffer any economic damages, but
psychological damages might possibly be awarded and, in any event, the subordinate
would be entitled to recover her attorney's fees. See 42 U.s.c. § 1988 (2000). Given an
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Indeed, it is unlikely that the Court in Ellerth and Faragher envisioned
such a result.
Finally, if a supervisor's misuse of authority coupled with the
plaintiff's submission is sufficient to hold an employer strictly liable for
the supervisor's conduct, then there is no realistic end to the supervisory
conduct for which an employer will be strictly liable. This potentially
endless expansion of liability stems from the fine line between a
supervisor's affirmative, as opposed to implicit, use of power and the
malleability of the term "submission," which can be interpreted to either
expand or contract liability.
With respect to a supervisor's use of power, consider a typical hostile
environment sexual harassment case. The supervisor does not use or
even attempt to use his supervisory authority but instead "uses
unwanted terms of endearment; ... fondles or rubs up against [the]
victim; ... displays sex toys or tells dirty jokes; ... brags about his sexual
skills; ... proposes marriage; ... threatens to kill himself; ... or rapes
[his subordinate].,,326 Even in the absence of any affirmative misuse of
authority, a subordinate is more likely to submit to, rather than complain
about, the supervisor's offensive conduct because the supervisor has the
· to hire an d f'ire. 327
auth onty
Additionally, in many cases, the line between a hostile work
environment and quid pro quo harassment is virtually indiscernible:
[SJexual harassment does not sort itself into tidy categories ....
When [aJ supervisor bombards an unwilling subordinate with
unwanted sexual images, touching, vulgar words, or denigrating
comments, only the most committed formalist would feel confident
in saying when those actions cross the imaginary line from "hostile
328
environment" harassment to "quid pro quo" harassment.

employee's duty to avoid harm, a received-job-benefit plaintiff would also likely fail under
the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, as it is likely unreasonable for
her to bargain for a job benefit to which she is not otherwise entitled by offering sex. See
infra Part V.S (discussing relevant factors to consider in determining whether subordinate's
submission was unreasonable).
326 Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490,511-12 (7th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (per
curiam) (Posner, c.J., concurring and dissenting), affd sub nom. Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742 (1998).
327 Id. at 512.
328
Jansen, 123 F.3d at 567; see also Chamallas, supra note 11, at 3; Estrich, supra note 322,
at 834 (noting that distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual
harassment "takes the form of a continuum rather than a divide," and thus, even in hostile
environment context, which lacks "manifest threat" but where "boss propositions a female
daily or, when in order to do her job, a woman must endure a range of physical and
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This is particularly true given that "sexual asides and insinuations are
the well-worn tools of a sexual harasser.,,329
Thus, if a tangible employment action does not require tangible job
detriment but can instead be based on a threat coupled with a
subordinate's submission, at what point does a supervisor's conduct
cross the hostile work environment/tangible employment action
threshold?330 How clear must the threat be to justify the employee's
submission and hold the employer strictly liable?331 These are simply
variations of the same types of questions that plagued courts regarding
what constituted quid pro quo harassment prior to Ellerth and Faragher.
The varied answers to these questions in the submission context would
lead to precisely the type of uncertainty, contradictory outcomes, and
332
temptation to litigate that Ellerth and Faragher sought to avoid.
In addition to the fine line between a supervisor's affirmative, as
opposed to implicit, use of power, consider the distinction between a
supervisor's attempts to use unofficial as compared to official power.
For example, on a daily basis a supervisor "kiss[es], lick[s], bite[s land
fondle[s] [a subordinate], and attempt[s] to undress" her.333 In addition,
the supervisor "physically force[s] her to unzip his pants and fondle
emotional abuse," results are same as in quid pro quo situation because "victim will
submit, quit, or end up being fired"); Scalia, supra note 52, at 323 ("[I)t is a fiction that the
quid pro quo harasser acts with more authority - actual or apparent - than the boss who
takes without asking in the environmental discrimination case."); J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice
Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. 1. REV. 273, 275-76 (1995) (noting
similarities between hostile environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment, and stating
that "it is thus quite puzzling that the law of employment discrimination treats these
categories of sexual harassment so differently").
329
Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001)
(discussing supervisor's claim that he was only joking when he suggested to plaintiff that
they go to Holiday Inn to negotiate her raise (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.s. 17,
19 (1993»).
330 See Estrich, supra note 322, at 855 (arguing that quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment are essentially same regarding supervisor's use of power
as, "[i)n both cases, the supervisor is abusing the power that has been entrusted to him, ...
is acting for his own reasons and not the employer's, ... [and) his threats carry weight and
his insults must be tolerated precisely because he is the supervisor, this is a workplace, and
most women need their jobs").
331
See supra text accompanying note 187 (discussing circumstances in Holly D., and
ultimately concluding that plaintiff was unable to show either implicit threat of job
detriment or any causal connection between her job duties and her supervisor's requests
that she engage in sex with him). In Eller/h, the Court declined to express an opinion
regarding whether a "Single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to constitute discrimination in
the terms or conditions of employment." 524 U.S. at 754.
332
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775, 804-05 (1998).
333 Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 52
(2004).
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him" and subsequently 'gush[es] against her with his penis exposed,
and ejaculate[s] on her.,,3 At the same time, the supervisor wields a
baseball bat and threatens the subordinate with physical harm if she
335
does not accede to his sexual demands. In the absence of any attempt
to misuse official supervisory authority, the supervisor's conduct is even
less "official" than the supervisor's sexual assault and accompanying
verbal harassment in Reed, which the Court described as "exceedingly
unofficial" and "exactly the kind of wholly unauthorized conduct for
which the affirmative defense was designed.",336
Suppose that, in addition to the egregious facts and threat of physical
harm described above, the facts also include the supervisor's explicit
threat to discharge the subordinate if she does not accede to his demands
- essentially the facts upon which the Second Circuit imposed strict
337
liability in lin.
Under these circumstances, if the subordinate submits
to the supervisor's sexual conduct, she does so out of a fear of either
termination or being bludgeoned with a baseball bat, or a combination of
both. Because the threat of physical harm is "exceedingly unofficial" and
thus insufficient to impose liability, and the threat of discharge would
constitute a misuse of official authority under lin and Holly D., must a
reviewing court determine which threat, or combination of threats,
compelled the plaintiff's submission before imposing strict liability? Is
the mere presence of a job-related threat enough even if the threat was
not a factor, much less a motivating factor, in the plaintiff's submission?
Under the above scenario, requiring a reviewing court to determine
the extent to which either or both of the two threats compelled the
subordinate's submission leads to the lack of clarity and certainty that
the Court sought to resolve in Ellerth. The desire for clarity and certainty
motivated the Ellerth Court to essentially ignore the quid pro quo label
for vicarious liability purposes, create the tangible employment action
standard, and conclude that the threat alone, job-related or otherwise, is
insufficient to impose strict liability in the absence of a tangible
employment action. Nevertheless, under lin and Holly D., the discharge
threat, coupled with the plaintiff's statement that she was cowed by the
threat, is sufficient to impose strict liability on the employer.
Taking the reasoning of lin and Holly D. even further shows how such
reasoning turns Ellerth on its head. Consider essentially the same

334

335
336
337

Id.
Id. at 88-89.
See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
fin, 310 F.3d at 88-89.
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egregious circumstances as those above but omit the threat of physical
harm. Suppose further that the job-related threat does not implicate a
tangible employment action such as discharge, but is instead a threat to
reassign the subordinate to a more inconvenient job. Because Ellerth
specifically excluded reassigning an employee to a more inconvenient
job from the tangible employment action examples, an employer whose
supervisor subjects a subordinate to such an action to retaliate for
spumed sexual advances is not strictly liable for the supervisor's
conduct. Nevertheless, under the reasoning in lin and Holly D., the
supervisor misused his authority in making the job-related threat of a
nontangible employment action and the employer would be strictly
338
liable if the threat was successful at coercing sex.
If this reasoning is taken to its logical extreme, virtually any job-related
threat or promise would be sufficient to impose strict liability if it
accomplished the supervisor's goal of coercing a subordinate's
submission to any sexually offensive conduct. This is true regardless of
whether actually taking the threatened action constitutes a tangible
employment action, particularly given the potentially expansive nature
of the term "submission." Submission can be construed narrowly to
include only circumstances where a subordinate "submits" to the
supervisor's threats or promises by acting - engaging in sexual acts or broadly to include all circumstances where a subordinate "submits" to
the supervisor's threats or promises by refraining from acting passively tolerating the conduct and refraining from reporting.
To understand the potential breadth of the term "submission" and the
corresponding strict liability imposed on employers for such claims,
consider the facts presented in Ellerth.
A supervisor subjects a
subordinate to unwelcome sexual comments and touching coupled with
threats to deny the subordinate tangible job benefits to which she is
entitled. As in Ellerth, the subordinate does not complain, but instead
endures the conduct and is ultimately promoted. Because the supervisor
misused his authority in making the threats, the employee's failure to
complain could be construed as the subordinate submitting to the
sexually offensive conduct. Moreover, the supervisor's failure to
terminate or otherwise take any detrimental job action against the
subordinate, as well as the subsequent promotion, may be viewed as the
338
Cf Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 989 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (concluding
that supervisor's refusal to provide necessary job-related infonnation to his subordinate
unless subordinate responded favorably to his sexual advances was not tangible
employment action because supervisor's conduct lacked requisite "official act of the
enterprise" (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998))).
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benefit received by the subordinate for submitting to the unwelcome
conduct. Under lin and Holly D., these facts could constitute a
submission claim for which an employer is strictly liable. Nevertheless,
the Ellerth Court rejected such a strict liability result, and thus implicitly
rejected this interpretation of submission, when it concluded that
Ellerth's allegations presented an unfulfilled threat case to which the
affirmative defense applied. The Suders Court's approval of Reed further
supports this conclusion. As in Reed, labeling the claim as a submission
claim does not transform a mere unfulfilled threat claim into a claim for
339
which the employer is strictly liable.
Finally, imposing strict liability in this context would contradict the
policy of encouraging employees to report harassing conduct before it
becomes unlawful. Nonetheless, at least one court has similarly
misconstrued Ellerth and Faragher by suggesting that a plaintiff's receipt
of a job benefit to which she was not entitled in exchange for not
reporting sexually harassing conduct might constitute a tangible
. 340
empI oyment action.
If submission claims are synonymous with tangible employment
actions and give rise to the accompanying strict liability, the Supreme
Court is right back where it started when it first heard Ellerth and
Faragher. Plaintiffs and their counsel have an incentive to "fit facts into
certain types or categories of harassment claims,,341 in an effort to impose

339
See Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2003) (concluding that
supervisor's threat of discharge, which prompted plaintiff to "submit" and refrain from
reporting, did not constitute requisite official act but instead amounted to unfulfilled
threat, and thus, affirmative defense applied).
"'" Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., 259 F.3d 261, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2001). _The Matvia
court stated in dicta that the El/erth/Faragher affirmative defense may not be available
when a sexually harassing supervisor grants job benefits in exchange for an employee's
silence regarding the harassing conduct. ld. at 268. Nevertheless, the court ultimately
rejected the plaintiff's claim that she experienced a tangible employment action in the form
of "a raise, promotion, and good evaluations" in exchange for her "silently suffer[ingJ" her
supervisor's sexual advances. ld. at 267. The court found that the plaintiff was unable to
demonstrate either (1) any promise of employment benefits in exchange for her tolerance of
unwelcome conduct, or (2) any connection between her "refraining from reporting the
unwelcome conduct" and her receipt of such employment benefits. ld. at 267-68. The court
reasoned that to conclude otherwise would be inconsistent with El/erth because it "would
transform any ordinary employment action," such as "an upgrade in equipment used by
the employee, a grant of sick leave, or any other mundane, non-adverse action," into a
tangible employment action "so long as sexual harassment is present." ld. at 267. But see
Fisher, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 988 ("'[Slubmission' cases, where a supervisor makes favorable
decisions that affect the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment, such as awarding
benefits or merely permitting the victim to keep her job, involve only 'unfulfilled threats'"
(citing Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953 (D. Minn. 1998))).
3" Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 n.22 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
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strict liability.342 Nearly eight years later, only the label differs. This
labeling trend ignores the bright line drawn by the Supreme Court
between cases where a tangible employment action is taken by a
supervisor and those with no tangible employment action.
Although an employee's submission to a supervisor's sexual demands
may be a reasonable alternative under certain circumstances, strict
liability should not be the rule. Rather, the employer should be
vicariously liable for the supervisor's conduct, but then be permitted to
assert the EllerthlFaragher two-prong affirmative defense. With respect
to the second prong and assessing the subordinate's submission, courts
should require the employer to prove that the employee'S submission
343
was unreasonable under the circumstances. If the employer is unable
to demonstrate that an employee's submission was unreasonable, the
employer will be liable for the supervisor's conduct. Such a result
addresses the concern that sexual extortion victims will be punished for
344
their submission.
Indeed, under the second prong correctly applied,
the rights of victims whose submission was not unreasonable under the
circumstances will be vindicated in a way that is consistent with Title
VII's interrelated goals of preventing harm, encouraging employees to
345
report unlawful behavior, and compensating victims of harassment.
'" For an example of how the tangible employment action standard is being
improperly applied and expanded to impose strict liability in the submission context,
similar to the quid pro quo label prior to Ellerth and Faragher, see Temores v. SG Cowen, 289
F. Supp. 2d 996, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (concluding that employer could be held strictly liable
in unfulfilled threat scenario in which supervisor made unwelcome sexual advances
toward subordinate and allegedly tied monetary bonus to sexual favors, even though
employee neither received bonus nor engaged in demanded sexual conduct).
34' In Suders, the Court clarified that the defendant bears the burden of pleading and
proving that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to mitigate harm. Pa. State Police v. Suders,
542 U.S. 129, 151-52 (2004). The Court held that although a plaintiff might choose to allege
facts related to mitigation in her pleadings or as part of her case in chief, she would be
doing so only in anticipation of the employer raising the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense, as she is not required to do so. Id.
344
Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778-79 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting probability
that "victims of sexual harassment who surrender to unwelcome sexual encounters" will be
punished for their submission).
'45 For an alternative approach to workplace sexual extortion whereby the supervisor is
held criminally liable for such conduct, see Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing
Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 13 LAW & INEQ. 213 (1994) (concluding that current state
criminal coercion statutes are insufficient to address all forms of quid pro quo sexual
harassment, and arguing that states should adopt criminal statutes specifically aimed at
quid pro quo sexual harassment); Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64
BROOK. 1. REV. 39 (1998) (arguing that current rape statutes should be revised to encompass
circumstances where perpetrator accomplishes sexual intercourse with his victim through
coercion, including abuses of power); Christian Jordan, Note, The Casting Couch Is More
Than Tortious: The Case for Expanded Interpretations of Rape Statutes, 13 S. CAL. REV. 1. &
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Part V addresses the manner in which courts should apply the second
prong in the submission context.
V.

THE DUTY TO AVOID HARM UNDER ELLERTH AND FARAGHER

The conclusion that a submission claim does not constitute a tangible
employment action for which an employer is strictly liable will
undoubtedly make it more difficult for a submission plaintiff to prevail
346
on her otherwise meritorious sexual harassment claim. In the absence
of a tangible employment action, a submission plaintiff will prevail only
if she can show that she was subjected to an actionable hostile work
environment and her employer fails to prove that she "unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.,,347 In addition to
these hurdles, a pro-employer trend has emerged in the lower courts'
application and analysis of both prongs of the affirmative defense, and
348
many courts are incorrectly applying the second prong.
Thus,
plaintiffs have endeavored to expand the definition of "tangible
employment action" to include submission claims and thereby avoid
application of the affirmative defense.
For example, some district courts are granting, and appellate courts
are affirming, summary judgment in favor of employers at a
disproportionately high rate on the grounds that the employer has
349
satisfied both prongs of the affirmative defense.
Additionally, some
WOMEN'S STUD. 199,214-17 (2003) (arguing that because professionals invest considerable
"education, time, money and foregone alternative employment, ... a boss who conditions
job security or chances for promotion on sex in a professional setting [creates] a high stakes
problem for a victim to confront," and arguing that modem forcible rape statutes should be
revised to hold supervisor liable for such sexual extortion based on expanded
interpretation of "force," "duress," or "menace").
346
See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Bauchner, From Pig in a Parlor to Boar in a Boardroom: Why Ellerth

Isn't Working and How Other Ideological Models Can Help Reconceptualize the Law of Sexual
Harassment, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & 1. 303, 307, 332 (1999) (noting that, by requiring tangible
job detriment to impose strict liability on employer and assessing victim's reasonableness
in all other harassment cases, many harassment victims who suffer intangible, but no less
damaging, harms will go unprotected and uncompensated); Grossman, supra note 26, at
732 (noting "employer in a submission case will typically be able to make out both prongs
of the affirmative defense and thus defeat liability").
347 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742, 765 (1998). Of course, this is in addition to the employer being able to
prove that it satisfied its burden under prong one of the affirmative defense, which has not
proved difficult under most circumstances. See infra Part V.B for a discussion of how
courts construe "file-cabinet compliance" as sufficient under prong one.
348
See infra text accompanying notes 349-50, 353-54.
349
See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 26, at 703, 708 (noting pro-employer trend in granting
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lower courts' analysis of whether the employer has satisfied its burden of
proof under each prong of the affirmative defense, and particularly the
350
second prong, is often cursory and, at times, virtually nonexistent. As
one commentator noted, even when courts analyze the second prong,
they often do so incorrectly by failing to apply the requisite avoidable
351
consequences principles dictated by Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
352
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. Instead, they apply what amounts to
contributory negligence so that a plaintiff's recovery is completely
barred due to her failure to report or her delay in doing SO.353 Moreover,

summary judgment, and further noting that courts have "significantly curtailed the scope
of Faragher and Ellerth using two techniques: (1) by construing the affirmative defense to
completely absolve the employer of liability regardless of the type of harassment; or (2) by
refusing to apply a rule of vicarious liability where the employer responds appropriately to
the plaintiffs complaint"); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and
Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 213-14 (2004) (documenting
high incidence of summary judgment in favor of employers on affirmative defense, and
concluding that affirmative defense effected little change in sexual harassment cases
because federal courts reward employers for superficial compliance with prong one of
affirmative defense, without inquiring whether employer's efforts to prevent sexual
harassment are effective at decreasing incidence of workplace harassment, and federal
courts penalize harassment victims who do not report under prong two of affirmative
defense notwithstanding fact that social science research demonstrates that common, and
thus arguably reasonable, response to supervisory sexual harassment is not reporting);
John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of "Vicarious" Liability: The Emergence

of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit
Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1401, 1404-05 (2002) (noting
pro-employer trend, and arguing that affirmative defense has become "summary judgment
safe harbor" for employers); David Sherwyn et aI., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel

Your "1-800" Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1283-89
(documenting high rate of summary judgment in favor of employers on affirmative
defense, and noting that such results are directly counter to predictions by experts that
affirmative defense would preclude summary judgment for employers in most cases).
350
See Lawton, supra note 349, at 210, 243 ("[I]n sixty-seven percent of the cases
addreSSing prong two [from January 1, 2001 through June 30, 2003], the courts improperly
interpret[ed] the employer's obligation under prong two"); Marks, supra note 349, at 1429
(noting courts' outright failure to discuss avoidable consequences and its related harmavoidance principles under second prong).
351
524 U.s. 742 (1998).
352 524 U.s. 775 (1998).
353
Marks, supra note 349, at 1429 (noting that courts are concluding that employers
satisfy second prong by showing that employees delayed reporting and that, in so doing,
courts are treating "purportedly unreasonable delays as something akin to contributory
negligence - a complete bar to recovery"). Out of the hundreds of cases addressing the
second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, fewer than 10 mention the
avoidable consequences doctrine by name, and none of those include any discussion as to
how the avoidable consequences doctrine should apply in the sexual harassment context
where the plaintiff is forced to engage in the cost-benefit analysis discussed in Part V.B
infra. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 162 (3d Cir. 1999) (Weis, J.,
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a few courts have dispensed entirely with the second prong in an effort
to avoid holding employers liable for supervisor conduct that occurs on
only one occasion, over a brief period of time, or suddenly and without
354
warning.
These courts have done so even though Ellerth and Faragher
described the dual prongs as the "two necessary elements" of the
355
defense.
Based on these post-Ellerth/Faragher trends, it is probable that these
same trends will continue in the submission context. In other words,
many courts faced with submission claims will likely either simply
ignore the second prong altogether or simply conclude with little or no
analysis that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the
employer's preventive opportunities or to avoid harm because she
submitted to the unwelcome conduct. Given these documented proemployer trends, the fact that submission cases do not constitute tangible
employment actions will likely lead to unjust results in the submission
context in the absence of guidance as to how the second prong should
apply in such circumstances.
concurring); Savino v. c.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 934-35 (7th Cir. 1999); Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Dist. of Columbia, 346 F. Supp.
2d 25, 49-52 (D.D.C. 2004); Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228-29 (M.D.
Fla. 2004); Duhe v. United States Postal Serv., No. Civ. A 03-746, 2004 WL 439890, at *5
(ED. La. Mar. 9, 2004); Akers v. Alvey, 180 F. Supp. 2d 894, 901 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
J5.I
See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that in case involving only single occasion of supervisor's sexually harassing conduct,
employer is entitled to "modified" Ellerth/ Faragher affirmative defense that dispenses with
second prong and instead focuses only on first prong and employer's efforts to prevent and
correct sexual harassment), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1088 (2005); Watkins v. Prof I Sec. Bureau,
No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 n.16 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) ("[W]e cannot conceive
that an employer that satisfies the first element of the affirmative defense and that
promptly and adequately responds to a reported incident of sexual harassment [as the
employer did here] ... would be held liable for the harassment on the basis of an inability
to satisfy the literal terms of the second element of the affirmative defense."); Indest, 164
F.3d at 265 (stating, "a case presenting only an incipient hostile environment corrected by
prompt remedial action should be distinct from a case in which a company was never
called upon to react to a supervisor's protracted or extremely severe acts that created a
hostile environment," and holding that employer is not vicariously liable in incipient
hostile environment case where plaintiff promptly complains and employer promptly
responds and stops harassment); see also Marks, supra note 349, at 1424-28 (noting courts'
inclination to interpret affirmative defense in disjunctive whereby "and" between two
prongs becomes "or").
355 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 765; see also Harrison v. Eddy Potash,
Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging and affirming Tenth Circuit's
prior rejection of Judge Jones's reasoning in Indest, and reaffirming requirement that
employer must prove both prongs of Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense); Frederick v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Both elements [of the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense] must be satisfied for the defendant-employer to avoid
liability, and the defendant bears the burden of proof on both elements.").
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To avoid this potentially unjust result, this Part proposes a normative
framework to govern the application of the second prong in the
submission context. This Part assumes the existence of an actionable
hostile work environment. The term "submission" is used in its broadest
sense and thereby includes any circumstances in which a subordinate
fails to report and either passively tolerates a supervisor's unwelcome
sexual advances and offensive sexual conduct or actively submits to a
supervisor's sexual demands and engages in the unwelcome sexual
356
acts.
As explained below, the avoidable consequences doctrine and the
related harm-avoidance principles underpinning the second prong
dictate that determining whether a submission plaintiff unreasonably
failed to report or otherwise avoid harm is generally an issue for the
jury.357 This is particularly true given that the reasonableness threshold
under the avoidable consequences doctrine is considerably lower than
that applied in the traditional negligence context when assessing
whether an individual acted reasonably.358
In making this
reasonableness determination, the jury must consider the victim's unique
circumstances.
Those circumstances include whether the plaintiff
possessed a credible fear of harm, the plaintiff's working environment,
the consequences of not submitting based on the perceived threat of
harm, and any other aspect of the circumstances that bears on whether
she was unreasonable in submitting rather than reporting the harassing
behavior. 359 By requiring a trier of fact to consider the victim's unique
circumstances, submission victims will not be punished. They will

356
The purpose of this Part is to provide guidance regarding how the second prong
should be applied in submission cases to avoid the incorrect contributory negligence
approach taken by many courts. Thus, this Part focuses on the threshold question of
whether the victim unreasonably failed to report or avoid harm, treated as one interrelated
issue, and the relevant factors the trier of fact should consider when making such a
determination in the submission context. If, after assessing the circumstances in the
manner described in this Part, the trier of fact concludes that the victim unreasonably failed
to avoid harm to some degree, the trier of fact must then consider whether the victim
unreasonably failed to avoid all harm. If so, the trier of fact may conclude that the
employer should avoid liability altogether. If the victim unreasonably failed to avoid only
some of the harm, however, the trier of fact must ascertain at what point the supervisor's
actions became actionable and then determine the extent to which the victim's damages
should be reduced for the harm she could have reasonably avoided. See Marks, supra note
349, at 1420-2l.
357 See id. at 1448-49 (noting that uniquely factual nature of inquiry under second prong
is question for jury, and thus summary judgment is rarely appropriate); George, supra note
121, at 155-56 (noting "reasonableness" standard warrants fewer summary judgments).
358 See discussion infra Part V.B.

359
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instead have their rights vindicated in a way that is consistent with Title
VII's interrelated goals of preventing harm, encouraging employees to
report unlawful behavior, and compensating victims of discrimination.

A.

The Obligation to Report

A fundamental premise underlying the second prong of the
EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense is that "sometimes inaction is
reasonable.,,360 Although the Court in Ellerth stated that a subordinate's
failure to report supervisory sexual harassment would "normally
suffice" to satisfy the employer's burden under prong two, such a failure
361
Indeed, if a failure to report was always
is not always sufficient.
sufficient, the Court would have concluded that Ellerth unreasonably
failed to report or otherwise avoid harm. Not only did Ellerth fail to
report her supervisor's harassing conduct and accompanying threats, she
also admitted that she knew about her employer's antiharassment policy
and made a conscious decision to refrain from reporting and ultimately
362
quit her employment.
Notwithstanding Ellerth's decision, the Court
remanded the case to give her an opportunity to prove a hostile work
environment claim and her employer an opportunity to establish the
363
affirmative defense. In contrast, the Court in Faragher had no difficulty
concluding that the City was unable as a matter of law to satisfy its
364
burden under prong one of the affirmative defense.
The Court's decision to remand in El/erth, instead of concluding as a
matter of law that the employer established the second prong based on
Ellerth's failure to report, demonstrates that sometimes inaction is
reasonable. The circumstances under which inaction is reasonable
remain unclear, however. The avoidable consequences principles
underpinning the second prong provide guidance for resolving this
issue.
B.

Avoidable Consequences Principles

With respect to the legal principles underlying the second prong, the
El/erth Court explained that "Title VII borrows from tort law the
avoidable consequences doctrine . . . and the considerations which

362

Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2003).
See supra note l33 and accompanying text.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.s. 742,749 (1998).

363

[d. at 766.

360

361

364 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775, 808 (1998); see supra notes l39-43 and
accompanying text (discussing deficiencies of City's actions to prevent sexual harassment).
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animate that doctrine would also support limitation of employer liability
in certain circumstances."36S The Court in Faragher elaborated further:
The requirement to show that the employee has failed in a
coordinate duty to avoid or mitigate harm reflects an equally
obvious policy imported from the general theory of damages, that a
victim has a duty "to use such means as are reasonable to avoid or
366
minimize the damages" that result from violations of the statute.
This statement of the avoidable consequences doctrine is virtually
identical to that provided in section 918 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (the "Restatement of Torts"). Section 918 explains that "one injured
by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm
that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure
after the commission of the tort. ,,367

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (citation omitted).
Faragher, 524 U.s. at 806 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.s. 219, 231 n.15
(1982)); see also MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, ch. 5, § 34, at 132 (1935) ("[W]hat the injured
person can do at moderate expense or with reasonable exertions to minimize the loss or
injury, he must do, or bear the risk of his inaction. ").
367
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(1) (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. This
provision is subject to an exception for circumstances involving intentionally or recklessly
inflicted harm:
365

366

One is not prevented from recovering damages for a particular harm resulting
from a tort if the tortfeasor intended the harm or was aware of it and was
recklessly disregardful of it, unless the injured person with knowledge of the
danger of the harm intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own interests.
ld. § 918(2). The Restatement of Torts explains:

one who intends a particular harmful result or who is aware of the result and is
recklessly indifferent to its happening, is required to pay damages for it, unless
the injured person, realizing the danger, intentionally fails to act in the protection
of his own interests or is heedlessly indifferent to them.
ld. § 918 cmt. a. In the context of intentionally or recklessly inflicted harm, "[t]he merely
careless or stupid person is thus protected from consequences that the tortfeasor intended
or was willing to have occurred while, on the other hand, the person who stubbornly
refuses to protect his own interests is given no legal redress." ld. Although the Court in
Ellerth stated that "[s]exual harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct,"
the Court's recitation of the avoidable consequences principles underlying the second
prong, and the fact that the Court's language is virtually identical to the avoidable
consequences standard for negligence claims under the Restatement of Torts, indicates that
the Court intended to apply the negligence standard when assessing an employer'S
vicarious liability under the affirmative defense. Ellerth, 524 U.s. at 756; cf. Smith v.
Henderson, 376 F.3d 529, 539 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that avoidable consequences doctrine
does not apply to intentional torts, such as disability discrimination under Americans with
Disabilities Act); Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 573-74 (6th Cir. 1998) (same).
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The Court in Faragher explained in general terms how the harmavoidance principles of the avoidable consequences doctrine apply in the
sexual harassment context:
An employer may, for example, have provided a proven, effective
mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual
harassment, available to the employee without undue risk or
expense. lf the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of the
employer's preventive or remedial apparatus, she should not
recover damages that could have been avoided if she had done so.
lf the victim could have avoided harm, no liability should be found
against the employer who had taken reasonable care, and if
damages could reasonably have been mitigated, no award against a
liable employer should reward a plaintiff for what her own efforts
368
could have avoided.
To fully understand the scope of a plaintiff's obligation to report and
avoid harm in the sexual harassment context, it is helpful to return to the
policy underlying and the harm-avoidance principles embodied in the
avoidable consequences doctrine.
The policy underlying the avoidable consequences doctrine is the
premise that "recovery for the harm [suffered] is denied because it is in
part the result of the injured person's lack of care, and public policy
requires that persons should be discouraged from wasting their
resources, both physical [and] economic.,,369 With respect to harmavoidance, the Restatement of Torts provides that an injured person is free
to choose among the available reasonable courses of action or
37o
alternatives in an effort to avoid additional harm.
So long as the
chosen alternative is reasonable, it is irrelevant whether it turned out to
371
be the best alternative in hindsight.
Additionally, the standard of

368
369

370

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 cmt. a.
In this regard, the Restatement of Torts provides:

He is required to exercise no more than reasonable judgment or fortitude; and, if
different courses of action are open to him he is not required, as a condition of
obtaining full damages, to choose the course that events later show to have been
the best. He is not barred from full recovery by the fact that it would have been
reasonable for him to make expenditures or subject himself to pain or risk; it is
only when he is unreasonable in refusing or failing to take action to prevent
further loss that his damages are curtailed.

Id. § 918 cmt. c.; see also MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 366, ch. 5, § 35, at 134.
371
RESTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 cmt. c; see also MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra
note 366, ch. 5, § 34, at 134; see also Bauchner, supra note 346, at 317 (noting potential for
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reasonableness applied in assessing the injured person's chosen
alternative is considerably less strict than that applied in determining
372
negligence liability in tort.
Thus, in attempting to avoid harm, the
injured person "cannot be expected to incur unusual, unwarranted, or
disproportionate expense," and any "inconvenience or financial
sacrifice" necessary to avoid harm may "obviously bear upon the
373
reasonableness" of the victim's chosen course.
In assessing the reasonableness of the injured person's chosen course
of action, the Restatement of Torts provides additional guidance. It states
that "it is frequently reasonable for a person threatened by further harm
from a tortious act to refuse to subject himself to pain or to a danger of a
different kind, which it would be necessary to undergo if further harm is
to be averted.,,374 Additionally, in deciding which avenue to pursue to
avoid harm, the plaintiff may engage in her own cost-benefit analysis
and, in doing so, the Restatement of Torts provides that she may take into
account her own unique circumstances. 375 Finally, the victim may
hindsight bias under second prong and how such bias may undermine victim's ability to
recover if trier of fact does not assess reasonableness of her actions from perspective of
victim at time she made her decision); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal
Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. 1. REV. 23, 48 (2000) ("When the law is
determined on a case-by-case basis after disputes arise rather than prospectively,
adjudicators' evaluations about what an individual should have done are likely to be
tainted by information about the results of the individual's actions.").
372 MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 366, ch. 5, § 34, at 134.
373 ld. at 134-35.
3" RESTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 cmt. d.
Moreover, as noted by the Seventh
Circuit, the avoidable consequences doctrine does not require a plaintiff to choose an
alternative that would "creat[el a bigger crisis ... by solving the immediate one." Lawson
v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368, 378 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that mentally ill civil rights
plaintiff who had been falsely imprisoned did not fail to avoid harm when he refused to
risk eviction and use his rent money to pay bond necessary to obtain his release from
confinement).
375 In this regard, the Restatement of Torts provides:
A person whose body has been hurt or whose things have been damaged may
not be unreasonable in refusing to expend money or effort in repairing the hurt
or preventing further harm. Whether or not he is unreasonable in refusing the
effort or expense depends upon the amount of harm that may result if he does
not do so, the chance that the harm will result if nothing is done, the amount of
money or effort required as a preventive, his ability to provide it and the
likelihood that the measures will be successful. There must also be considered
the personal situation of the plaintiff. A poor man cannot be expected to
diminish his resources by the expenditure of an amount that might be expected
from a person of greater wealth. So too, whether it is unreasonable for a slightly
injured person not to seek medical advice may depend on his ability to pay for it
without financial embarrassment.

REsTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 cmt. e.
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recover for any expense or injury incurred while takin~ the chosen
3
course of action, so long as the chosen course is reasonable. 6
To understand the harm-avoidance principles embodied in the
avoidable consequences doctrine, it is helpful to examine two
hypothetical scenarios from the Restatement of Torts. In the first scenario,
a tort victim suffers bodily injury but then fails to protect her own
interests by stubbornly refusing to promptly seek treatment for those
377
Under such circumstances, the victim may recover only for
injuries.
the harm proximately caused by the tortfeasor and not the aggravation
of the initial injuries attributable to her stubborn and thus unreasonable
failure to obtain prompt medical treatment. In this first scenario, the
victim must decide between promptly obtaining medical treatment and
delaying medical treatment. Her choice to pursue the second alternative
and delay treatment is unreasonable in the absence of any explanation
378
other than sheer stubbornness.
In a second scenario provided in the Restatement of Torts, the same tort
victim suffers the same bodily injury but is faced with additional risks
379
relevant to her decision-making process.
Although the victim in this
second scenario realizes that her injury likely requires prompt expert
treatment, seeking such treatment would require traveling ten miles over
treacherous ice-covered roads. Due to the hazards of travel, the victim
waits until the following day to go to the nearest physician. Because of
the delay, the victim suffers further injury. Under circumstances such as
these where the victim is choosing between two potentially costly or
harmful alternatives, harm-avoidance principles dictate that a trier of
fact may reasonably conclude that the victim did not act unreasonably in
380
delaying professional treatment.
If the trier of fact so concludes, the
victim can recover for the additional damages caused by the delay in
381
seeking treatment. What makes this second scenario different from the
first are the circumstances facing the victim two competing
alternatives each with a corresponding potential harm - when she is
382
deciding upon the appropriate course of action.
The potentially
different outcome in the second scenario is driven by a cost-benefit

376
377

378
379
380

MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 370, ch. 5, § 42, at 152.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 illus. 1.
Id.
This example is based on the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 367, § 918 illus. 10.
See id.

381

Id.

382

[d.
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383

analysis of the two competing alternatives. The above examples apply
equally in the sexual harassment context.
In the sexual harassment context, a plaintiff whose supervisor sexually
harasses her must choose between promptly reporting the supervisor's
behavior or continuing to endure the harassment. The viability of the
plaintiff's claim from a harm-avoidance perspective depends on whether
she is merely choosing between reporting or not, or whether she is
choosing between two competing and legally sufficient alternatives, each with a corresponding harm.
A plaintiff who fails to report without explanation or justification will
not be viewed as choosing between two reasonable, competing
alternatives.
Thus, the trier of fact is likely to consider such
circumstances as akin to the first scenario described above, in which the
victim's delay in seeking medical treatment is unreasonable. In contrast,
when the plaintiff possesses a credible belief that reporting would result
in harm to her, the cost-benefit analysis may yield a different result
depending on the victim's unique circumstances. For example, a
plaintiff who has been subjected to supervisory sexual harassment and
who is faced with a credible fear of job detriment must choose between
two competing alternatives, each with a corresponding harm. The first
option is to submit and continue to endure the supervisor's harassing
conduct, but avoid the job detriment. The second option is to report the
conduct and suffer the job detriment, but avoid the emotional harm that
would result from enduring the harassment.
To many, it may seem that the only reasonable option under such
circumstances is to promptly report the conduct. This is particularly true
where the conduct is egregious. Nevertheless, to a plaintiff in such
circumstances, reporting the conduct may be the more costly, and thus
less reasonable option, given her unique circumstances.
These
circumstances may include her financial status and her dependence on
job-related benefits, such as health care. If she chooses incorrectly and
her supervisor terminates her, she may suffer a significant financial loss
for which she can only hope to recover years later in a legal action
brought against her employer.
Thus, based on her unique
383 Under such circumstances, the cost-benefit analysis is comprised of two principle
variables:
the probability-weighted costs of seeking treatment promptly and the
probability-weighted costs of not seeking treatment promptly. The cost-benefit analysis of
the two alternatives in the second scenario requires an assessment of the circumstances the
victim faced - treacherous ice-covered roads and a distance of ten miles, as compared to
the need for prompt treatment - to determine whether the victim's ultimate decision to
delay treatment is reasonable. Thus, the trier of fact must have the opportunity to assess
the victim's choice in light of the circumstances in which it was made.
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circumstances, the victim may instead reasonably choose to submit and
thereby avoid the graver harm of termination. Depending on the
victim's financial and personal circumstances, it is neither surprising nor
unreasonable to believe that a plaintiff faced with this choice may
reasonably choose to suffer humiliation, shame, and emotional anguish,
rather than endure the end of a career or financial ruin. Regardless of
the choice, the fact-finder should have an opportunity to determine
whether the victim's decision to submit to the harassment was
unreasonable under the circumstances. 384
In this analysis, the relevant factors are interrelated and may include:
whether the victim possessed a credible fear of harm; the plaintiff's
working environment, which requires an assessment of, inter alia, the
workplace
culture,
the
terms
of
the
employer's
antiharassment/antiretaliation policy, and the employer's efforts to
implement such policies; and the perceived consequences of her refusal
385
to submit.
While some of these factors are generally assessed under
prong one of the affirmative defense, the trier of fact must also have an
386
opportunity to consider them in the context of the second prong.

384 Although not relying on avoidable consequences principles, Professor Grossman
argued that the trier of fact must consider context and the victim's perspective in
determining whether the victim's response was reasonable. Grossman, supra note 26, at
728-29. But see infra note 386 and accompanying text, where Professor Grossman argued
that because the employer's efforts to prevent sexual harassment are to be assessed under
prong one, any further inquiry regarding such efforts is unnecessary when assessing the
reasonableness of the victim's actions.
3S5 The assessment required under avoidable consequences principles is largely
consistent with considerations deemed relevant by social scientists and psychologists
regarding a victim's response to sexual harassment. Specifically, a leading researcher in
the field noted:

The way in which any individual will cope with potentially harassing situations
depends on (1) her cognitive evaluation of the situation with respect to its
significance for well-being (i.e., is it irrelevant, benign, or threatening) and (2) the
options that are realistically available, their costs and benefits, and what is at
stake. Such evaluations are part of a complex, reflexive process that changes
over time as the situation unfolds. Additional influences on response include
resources and constraints, both personal and environmental; these include both
individual characteristics (e.g., assertiveness, sex role attitudes, economic and
psychological vulnerability) and also organizational ones (e.g., climate, tolerance
for harassment, etc.).
Louise F. Fitzgerald et aI., Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The Psychological and Legal
Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, 5 J. SOC. IsSUES 117, 129 (1995).
386 Professor Grossman contended that the "proper analysis of the second prong turns
exclusively on the plaintiff's conduct." Grossman, supra note 26, at 700 n.140. Her
contention, however, is based on an assumption that courts will engage in the necessary
searching inquiry under prong one regarding the employer's efforts to prevent sexual
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Credible Fear of Harm

From a harm-avoidance standpoint, it is important to ascertain
whether the plaintiff possessed a credible fear of harm at the time she
submitted. In the sexual harassment context, many scholars argue that a
victim's failure to report is per se reasonable based on empirical studies
documenting that most harassment victims subjectively fear retaliation
and, for the small percentage who report, they do in fact suffer
387
retaliation at a high rate. Based on these studies, it would be logical to
conclude that because a large majority of harassment victims fear
retaliation and thereby fail to report because of these fears, a particular
victim's failure to report based on such fears would not be unreasonable.
In this respect, the second prong seems at odds with social science
research regarding sexual harassment, as the Court indicated that a
plaintiff's failure to report will "normally suffice" to satisfy the
employer's burden under prong two. As a result of this inconsistency,
some scholars argue that the Court should revise or jettison the
388
389
affirmative defense and, in particular, the second prong. Some have

harassment by exammmg the "employer's policies, procedures, and penchant for (or
against) retaliation." ld. As Professor Grossman acknowledged, this assumption is not
supported by the courts' analysis of the first prong, which tends to be cursory at best. See
id. at 723-27; infra note 413 and accompanying text. In any event, the harm-avoidance
principles of the avoidable consequences doctrine demonstrate that it is necessary for the
trier of fact to assess the victim's unique circumstances (including her work environment
and steps taken by her employer to prevent harassment and retaliation) in determining
whether the victim's chosen course of action was reasonable.
For an example of how the second prong of the EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense
and the avoidable consequences doctrine are applied to sexual harassment claims under
California's antidiscrimination statute, see State Department of Health Services v. Superior
Court, 79 P.3d 556, 565 (Cal. 2003) (applying Ellerthl Faragher affirmative defense to
damages but not liability, and concluding that avoidable consequences principles of second
prong allows employers "to escape liability for those damages, and only those damages,
that the employee more likely than not could have prevented with reasonable effort and
without undue risk, expense, or humiliation, by taking advantage of the employer's
internal complaint procedures appropriately designed to prevent and eliminate sexual
harassment").
387 Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science

Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment,

7 WM. & MARY

J. WOMEN &

1. 273, 306-23 (2001) (discussing social science studies regarding low reporting rates among
victims of harassment and reasons for same); Grossman, supra note 26, at 723-27
(discussing empirical studies that examine myriad reasons why victims fail to report
harassment, and noting that primary reason is fear of adverse consequences and that many
victims, in fact, suffer such negative consequences); Lawton, supra note 349, at 208 (noting
that most common victim response to sexual harassment is to refrain from reporting, and
citing social science studies demonstrating same).
388 Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance:
The Final Triumph of Form Over
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S 1.J. 3, 71 (2003) (collecting and
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taken a more moderate approach and argued that the affirmative defense
should only reduce a victim's recoverable damages, instead of
permitting an employer to avoid liability.39o In June 2004, however, the
Suders Court reaffirmed the tangible employment action standard and
the two-prong affirmative defense.
Additionally, the Court in Ellerth and Faragher implicitly rejected the
argument that an employee's unsubstantiated fears of job detriment are
sufficient to excuse an employee's failure to report. As the First Circuit
noted in Reed v. MBNA Marketing System, when the Supreme Court
issued its companion decisions nearly twelve years after Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson}91 the Court undoubtedly knew that an employee
who reports a supervisor's inappropriate conduct might be
392
uncomfortable, embarrassed, frightened, or any combination of these.
Moreover, the Court was also undoubtedly aware of the various studies
that provided empirical evidence demonstrating that many plaintiffs
reasonably fear embarrassment and job detriment if they report and that
discussing empirical research regarding why sexual harassment occurs and how victims
respond, concluding that affirmative defense is "doctrinally unjustifiable," and thus calling
for "elimination of the affirmative defense, greater availability of punitive damages, and
the recognition of individual liability").
389
Beiner, supra note 387, at 330-32 (arguing that "fail to avoid harm otherwise"
language in prong two "is so vague as to be unworkable and should be eliminated
entirely," and positing that affirmative defense should not be defense to liability but to
punitive damages); Lawton, supra note 349, at 259-66; Sherwyn et al., supra note 349, at 1299
(arguing that second prong of affirmative defense should be eliminated).
390
See Grossman, supra note 26, at 735-36 (2000) (arguing that affirmative defense
should not be defense to liability but should reduce damages and that such approach
would be more consistent with Title VII's goals of compensation and deterrence, and
concluding that Congress should take action to effectuate proposed approach). This
approach essentially argues that the avoidable consequences doctrine should be applied to
sexual harassment claims in the same manner as it is applied to common law torts where,
unlike contributory negligence which may serve as a complete bar to recovery, the
avoidable consequences doctrine simply results in a reduction of the victim's damages for
those injuries the victim could have avoided with reasonable efforts. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 367, § 918 cmt. a (distinguishing contributory negligence, which precludes
recovery, from avoidable consequences, which has no bearing on existence of cause of
action but applies only to diminution of damages). Notwithstanding the traditional
application of the avoidable consequences doctrine in the common law tort context, the
Court in Faragher indicated that a plaintiff's failure to avoid harm could serve as a complete
bar to recovery under some circumstances. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.s. 775,
807 (1998) ("If the victim could have avoided harm, no liability should be found against the
employer who had taken reasonable care .... "); Savino v. c.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 935
(7th Cir. 1999) (noting that Court intended that plaintiff's failure to avoid harm would
absolve employer of liability under certain circumstances regardless of whether avoidable
consequences doctrine functions differently in common law tort context).
391
477 U.s. 57 (1986).
392
Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003).
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393

many suffer job detriment after reporting.
The Court nevertheless
"require[d] the employee in normal circumstances to make this painful
effort if the employee wants to impose vicarious liability on the employer and
collect damages under Title VII.,,394 The First Circuit reasoned:
The complaint mechanism, after all, can be used to address threats
of retaliation as well as harassment, and unless patently futile,
concerns as to whether the complaint mechanism will fail can be
tested by trying it out if failure is the only cost. But where there is a
truly credible threat of retaliation that the complaint mechanism will not
prevent, the employee's position is more hazardous and inaction more
195
east'1 y expI'
amed.
For this reason, numerous courts have properly applied Ellerth and
Faragher to conclude that a plaintiff's subjective or generalized fears of
either embarrassment or Job detriment are insufficient to excuse the
plaintiff's failure to report. 96
In contrast, as the First Circuit suggested in Reed, certain courts have
properly concluded that a victim's failure to report may not be
unreasonable when the victim possesses a credible belief that reporting
397
would either result in harm to her or otherwise be futile.
A primary
Id. at 36.
Id. at 35.
395
ld. at 36 (emphasis added).
396
See, e.g., Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1296, 1301-02 (11th Cir.
2000) (affirming summary judgment for employer, and concluding that plaintiffs' reporting
to individuals other than those designated in employer's antiharassment policy and
resulting delay in reporting to appropriate individuals was unreasonable as matter of law
where it was based on plaintiffs' generalized fear of "potential negative consequences" and
plaintiffs admitted that they understood policy and individuals to whom report should be
submitted); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter RR, 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999)
(concluding that plaintiff's failure to report her supervisor's sexual harassment was
unreasonable as matter of law because it was not based on "credible fear that her complaint
would not be taken seriously or that she would suffer some adverse employment action as
a result of filing a complaint," but was instead based on her concern regarding negative
reaction of coworkers); Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming
summary judgment for employer, and holding that plaintiff's failure to report her
supervisor's sexual harassment was unreasonable as matter of law when it was based on
plaintiff's discomfort at discussing with her employer "offensive and repulsive sexual
conduct" she endured because "an employee's subjective fears of confrontation,
unpleasantness, or retaliation do not alleviate the employer'S duty under Ellerth to alert the
employer to the allegedly hostile environment").
3'17
See infra Part V.C.l (discussing Reed, 333 F.3d 27, and Bennett v. Progressive Corp., 225
F. Supp. 2d 190 (ND.N.Y. 2002»; see also Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261
F.3d 512, 526 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming jury finding that plaintiff's eight to nine month
delay in reporting supervisor's repeated sexual advances and other sexually offensive
conduct was not unreasonable failure to complain or otherwise avoid harm where delay
393
394

2006]

Supervisory Sexual Extortion

619

factor relevant to assessing the credibility of the victim's belief is whether
398
the victim was explicitly or implicitly threatened with harm.
Moreover, as discussed more fully below, a victim's working
environment bears directly on the question of whether she possessed a
credible fear of harm. Because the employer bears the burden of proof
under prong two,399 the employer must demonstrate that it created an
environment in which reporting is encouraged, sexual harassment is
taken seriously, and retaliation is prohibited and promptly addressed.
Furthermore, the employer must show that an employee who does not
report under such circumstances acted unreasonably.
2.

Working Environment

In addition to an explicit or implicit threat of harm from the
perpetrating supervisor, the working circumstances themselves may also
40o
reinforce or evidence a credible threat of harm.
Empirical studies
stemmed from supervisor's high stature within defendant university and supervisor's
comments referring to his power in university and implicit threats of retaliation if
subordinate complained); cf. Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 128991 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff's two and one-half month delay in reporting her
supervisor's sexually offensive conduct and accompanying rape was unreasonable as
matter of law because plaintiff could have "avoided most, if not all, of the actionable
harassment by reporting" her supervisor's behavior and because delay resulted from
plaintiff's "subjective" fear of job reprisals based on her supervisor's comment that he was
"well-connected to upper management and that he could assist her in getting the
promotion" she desired and plaintiff's "subjective" fear of suffering physical harm if she
reported based on her supervisor having twice showed her his gun prior to sexually
assaulting her); Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of employer, and concluding that plaintiff's failure to report
was unreasonable notwithstanding her supervisor's admonition not to "go over his head").
398
In the oral argument in Suders, Justice Scalia acknowledged that if a subordinate is
threatened with death if she reports sexual harassment, it is "reasonable for her not to file a
grievance," but he noted that the employer should not be strictly liable for the harassment
given the unofficial nature of the conduct. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Pa. State
Police
v.
Suders,
542
U.S.
129
(2004)
(No.
03-95),
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov / oral_arguments/ argument_transcripts/03-95.pdf; see
Ann M. Henry, Comment, Employer and Employee Reasonableness Regarding Retaliation Under
the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. Ci-II. LEGAL F. 553, 583-86 (1999) (arguing
that employee should have opportunity to prove that she acted reasonably under second
prong when supervisor has made "specific threats of retaliation," such as discharge, and
suggesting that "lesser threats" may be insufficient to justify failure to report, but not
addressing avoidable consequences principles).
399 See supra text accompanying note 343.
400
See Fitzgerald et aI., supra note 385, at 122 (noting that "organizational context - that
is the organizational norms and culture" of workplace that are "powerful predictors of
sexual harassment" - is equally relevant in influenCing victim's response to such
harassment); see also Chamallas, supra note 11, at 381 ("Courts should recognize that the
informal culture of an organization is as important as the formal policies in the employee
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demonstrate that the "norms and culture" of the workplace are highly
relevant in predicting the incidence of harassment and in influencing a
401
victim's response to sexual harassment.
Thus, in assessing the
credibility of the perceived threat of harm specifically, and considering
the reasonableness of the victim's failure to report more generally, the
trier of fact must consider all relevant aspects of the victim's working
environment. Such an assessment may include a consideration of the
workplace culture, as well as the terms of the employer's antiharassment
and antiretaliation policies.
a.

Workplace Culture

Empirical studies demonstrate that sexual harassment is more likely to
occur and employees are more reluctant to report when the employer
creates or rermits an environment in which sexual harassment is
40
As one commentator suggested: "[I]f harassment is
acceptable.
tolerated, or is not properly punished, employees will receive the

handbook and should make their assessments of whether employers and employees act
reasonably against this backdrop."); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93
CAL. L. REv. 623, 650 (2005) (noting that "[eJmployers' organizational choices can both
facilitate and constrain the development of discriminatory work cultures").
401
Fitzgerald et aI., supra note 385, at 122; see Green, supra note 400, at 678 (identifying
work culture as one source of discrimination in workplace and arguing that one alternative
for remedying work culture discrimination is to require employers "to take reasonable
steps to rid their workplaces of discriminatory work cultures as part of their obligation to
exercise reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct all harassing behavior");
Grossman, supra note 388, at 53,56 (collecting and discussing empirical research regarding
relevant factors for improving victim reporting rates, and noting that reporting rates "may
be influenced by the organizational structure of the workplace," and suggesting that
reporting rates may increase if employers increase efforts toward "eliminating gender
imbalance in the workplace and maintaining tighter control over the work environment");
Grossman, supra note 26, at 726-27 (same).
402
Beiner, supra note 387, at 295-303 (relying on social science research, and stating that
victim's work environment and amount of harassment that occurs is influenced by
"general atmosphere on the job, the attitudes of supervisors, the diversity of the workforce,
as well as what behavior is tolerated or not," and noting that message communicated to
victims based on these factors bears directly on whether victim reports harassing behavior);
Grossman, supra note 26 (discussing empirical sexual harassment studies, and noting that
antiharassment policies, training, and reporting mechanisms proactively implemented by
employers may impact overall work environment and may have some positive impact on
preventing harassment and encouraging reporting, but noting that some studies undercut
this correlation); Lawton, supra note 349, at 223-28 (noting that "the more tolerant an
organization is of harassment," as evidenced by supervisors' behavior in workplace and
manner in which harassment complaints are addressed and resolved, the more likely
potential harassers will engage in harassing behavior and the less likely victims are to
report harassment, and citing empirical research supporting same).
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message that it is acceptable behavior.,,403 In contrast, where an
employer's policies and actions demonstrate its commitment to a
harassment-free workplace, harassment will be less likely to occur and
employees will be more likely to report harassment.
For example, an employer may implicitly communicate its attitude
toward sexual harassment and its related attitude toward harassment
complaints in the way it implements its antiharassment policy. While
one employer may demonstrate a casual attitude toward sexual
harassment by simply requiring new employees to view an
antiharassment· video at the commencement of their employment,
another employer may communicate a stronger antiharassment message
by having periodic training sessions that require employees to actively
participate and thoughtfully respond to difficult questions about sexual
404
harassment.
The employer may further demonstrate its commitment
to a harassment-free workplace by periodically evaluating its training
program and its supervisors' efforts to implement and adhere to the
· d practices.
.405
d eSlfe
Additionally, the way in which an employer addresses complaints and
the behavior of supervisors communicates a powerful message to
employees regarding the employer's attitude toward sexual harassment
and harassment complaints.
For example, by failing to respond
appropriately or at all to a sexual harassment complaint, an employer
may implicitly suggest that harassment is tolerated and reporting is

403
Beiner, supra note 387, at 298; see, e.g., Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 931
(5th Cir. 1999) (affirming verdict in favor of plaintiff police officer on her sexual harassment
claim based on her employer's negligence, and concluding that plaintiff's failure to report
her supervisor's sexually harassing conduct did not absolve employer of liability because
hierarchical structure of police department and unwritten code of silence effectively
forbade lodging complaint against fellow officer such that anyone who violated code of
silence "would suffer such a pattern of social ostracism and professional disapprobation
that he or she would likely sacrifice a career" and plaintiff was thus left with untenable
decision of whether to "report the harassment and lose her career, or endure the
harassment and lose her dignity").
404
Beiner, supra note 387, at 330.
405 See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of

Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 30-31 (2001) (noting that efficacy of
training programs is unclear, and thus arguing that employer training programs should not
be sufficient to avoid liability but should be designed and evaluated to ensure that they
accomplish desired goals); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The
Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 125, 142-44 (2002) (same); Grossman, supra note 26 (noting that "there
remains a significant gap" between "the empirical evidence of a training effect" and
"conclusion that training will actually reduce harassment").+
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futile.
Moreover, if higher level supervisors engage in sexually
harassing behavior, others may conclude that such behavior is acceptable
407
in the workplace and thus reporting is futile.
The implicit message to
an employee subjected to supervisor harassment under such
circumstances is that reporting sexually harassing behavior is rife with
danger and submission is the reasonable alternative under the
.
t ances. 408
ClTcums
b.

Antiharassment/ Antiretaliation Policy

In addition to evaluating the culture of the victim's working
environment, the trier of fact should ascertain whether the employer
maintained an antiharassment policy and, if so, whether the victim knew
of the employer's antiharassment policy. Although Ellerth and Faragher
do not require that an employer demonstrate that it actually distributed
or made its policy available to the victim to satisfy the first prong of the
defense, the City's outright failure to disseminate its policy in Faragher
409
proved fatal to its ability to assert the affirmative defense.
Moreover,

'06 Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts' Wake-Up Call For
Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 507 (2002) (arguing that courts should require employers to
address women's fears of retaliation by demonstrating effectiveness of their antiharassment
policies through dissemination of results of, and actions taken against harassers regarding,
prior sexual harassment complaints); see also EEOC, supra note 147, 'lI V.D.l.c. ("[AJn
employee would have a reasonable basis to believe that the complaint process is ineffective
if ... he or she was aware of instances in which co-workers' complaints failed to stop
harassment.").
"" EEOC, supra note 147, 'lI V.D.l.c.; see, e.g., Frank v. Plaza Constr. Corp., 186 F. Supp.
2d 420, 430-31 (S.DN.Y. 2002) (denying summary judgment for employer, and concluding
that triable issue of fact existed as to whether plaintiff had been unreasonable in her
outright failure to report sexually harassing conduct by chairman of board of directors and
chief executive officer when her failure was based on harasser's high rank within company
and fact that prior reports of harassment by other executive had been ignored and
"provoked heightened hostility towards her," and implying that harasser's status alone
may have been sufficient to create triable issue of fact); see also Harper, supra note 253, at 6869 (noting that in assessing whether victim is lower cost avoider under circumstances it is
necessary to consider victim's circumstances, including comparison of relative value of
supervisor and victim to employer such as, for example, relative disparity between
supervisor who is company's "leading sales producer" and victim who works as "filing
clerk"). For an alternative basis for imposing employer liability based on the conduct of a
high-level supervisor who serves as a "proxy" for the corporation, see supra text
accompanying note 12l.
"" See, e.g., Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 17 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747-48 (M.D. Tenn.
1998) (concluding that employer could not establish that employee'S failure to report was
unreasonable under second prong where employer had not provided copy of its
antiharassment policy to plaintiff and employee's work environment had "atmosphere"
where employees feared retaliation and retribution for reporting).
",. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
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the fact that the victim is either unaware of or has not seen the terms of
the policy bears on the reasonableness of the victim's response under the
410
second prong.
If the victim knew about the policy, the trier of fact
should then examine the specific terms of the policy as they bear directly
on whether a plaintiff's decision to submit was unreasonable.
Currently, the specific terms of the employer's antiharassment policy
are assessed, if at all, only under prong one.411 Nevertheless, a searching
inquiry under prong one is often lacking. Courts routinely conclude that
the employer satisfies its burden under prong one through "file-cabinet
compliance," "where the employer demonstrates that it "develop[ed]
and distribut[ed] [its] nicely worded harassment polic[y] and
procedures. ,,412 Such a conclusion is problematic in the submission
context because, in lieu of analyzing the plaintiff's conduct and whether
her failure to report is unreasonable under prong two, many courts
engage in the following flawed syllogism: if the employer's efforts to
prevent sexual harassment - file-cabinet compliance - are reasonable,
then the plaintiff's failure to follow such procedures is thus necessarily
413
unreasonable.

410
See, e.g., Boyd v. Snow, 335 F. Supp. 2d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2004) (stating that employer's
failure to provide copy of its antiharassment policy to victim and further failure to direct
her to its company website which contained information regarding employer's
antiharassment policy was relevant to assessing reasonableness of victim's response to her
supervisor's harassment).
411
See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1028 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating
that employer failed to satisfy its burden under prong one where employer failed to
provide its nonsupervisory personnel with copies of antiharassment policy, and failed to
post policy on employee bulletin boards including bulletin boards in women's changing
room, and plaintiff was neither informed of nor provided copy of policy); Grossman, supra
note 26, at 697 (stating that employer's failure to disseminate its antiharassment policy is
relevant to whether employer satisfied its burden under prong one to take reasonable steps
to prevent sexual harassment).
412
Lawton, supra note 349, at 198; see supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text
(demonstrating how "file-cabinet compliance" is inconsistent with outcome in Faragher).
413
Lawton, supra note 349, at 215, 242; Sherwyn et aI., supra note 349, at 1290 (noting
tendency of courts to conclude that, because employer took reasonable steps to prevent
sexual harassment and thus satisfied prong one, employee's failure to report was "per se
'unreasonable"'); see, e.g., Ashmore v. J.P. Thayer Co., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1372 (M.D. Ga.
2004) (reversing jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs, concluding that employer's
antiharassment policy constituted reasonable efforts to prevent harassment under prong
one, and further concluding that plaintiffs' failure to follow terms of such reasonable
policy, which required that plaintiffs report sexual harassment within 48 hours of its
occurrence, was therefore unreasonable). The flawed syllogism renders the reasonableness
assessment under the second prong superfluous. As discussed in Part V.A supra, the
Court's statement that an employee's unreasonable failure to report will "normally suffice"
indicates that a failure to comply with a reasonable complaint procedure does not always
suffice.
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Worse yet, the tendency to conclude that a victim's failure to report is
unreasonable when her employer demonstrates file-cabinet compliance
under prong one leads to a perverse result. Instead of incentivizing
employers to provide multiple formal and informal reporting avenues
for employees, employers may conclude that they may immunize
themselves from liability by implementing a cryptic policy that provides
fewer reporting avenues, and thus make it harder for an employee to
414
report sexual harassment.
Under this theory, employers will fare
better in sexual harassment cases by making it more difficult for
employees to complain by, for example, canceling their "1-800"
41s
harassment reporting lines.
Such a result is obviously counter to the
goals of Ellerth and Faragher. In any event, the more logical analysis is
that the more cryptic and difficult a policy is to follow, the more likely
the trier of fact will conclude that a subordinate's failure to follow that
416
policy was not unreasonable.
Moreover, because most employees subjectively fear retaliation and
consider this fear a factor in their decision whether to report, courts
should scrutinize the terms of the employer's antiretaliation policy, the

Sherwyn et al., supra note 349, at 1294.
[d.; see Lawton, supra note 349, at 252-53 (contending that "[b]y permitting employers
to restrict the methods by which victims can report harassment, courts make reporting
more diffiCult ... [which], in tum, ensures that fewer employees will do so," and further
arguing that this approach permits employer to avoid liability by "narrowly defining when
it obtains notice" and thus "frustrat[es] Ellerth's and Faragher's stated goal of deterrence").
416
Marks, supra note 349, at 1457 (acknowledging inverse relationship between steps
taken by employers to combat harassment and victim's reasonableness in failing to report);
EEOC, supra note 147, 'j[ V.D.l.b. ("[E]mployee's failure to use the employer's complaint
procedure would be reasonable if that failure was based on unnecessary obstacles to
complaints . . . [such as] if the process entailed undue expense by the employee,
inaccessible points of contact for making complaints, or unnecessarily intimidating or
burdensome requirements."); see, e.g., Fiscus v. Triumph Group Operations, Inc., 24 F.
Supp. 2d 1229,1240-41 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs' failure to complain of various
incidents of supervisor's sexually harassing conduct was unreasonable as matter of law
where employer had written antiharassment policy that permitted complaints through
numerous avenues, company "condemned haraSSing behavior in a public forum and
conducted antiharassment workshops/training for its supervisors," and plaintiffs' prior
complaints had been promptly addressed and resolved); cf Frederick v. Sprint/United
Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2001) (reversing summary judgment for
employer, and concluding that triable issue of facts existed as to whether plaintiff's delay of
more than one year in reporting her supervisor's sexual advances and offensive touching
constituted unreasonable failure to take advantage of preventive or corrective
opportunities or to otherwise avoid harm where plaintiff claimed that she had not received
her employer's antiharassment policy, employer's code of conduct was unclear about how
to report complaint even though it included reference to anonymous "Ethics Code Hotline"
available to employees, and when plaintiff did complain she was allegedly told not to
pursue her complaint).
414

415
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formal and informal mechanisms implemented by the employer to
prevent and remedy retaliation, and the efficacy of those mechanisms in
417
preventing retaliation.
Indeed, the EEOC's Guidelines require that an
employer not only make it clear that retaliation is not tolerated, but also
require that the employer "undertake whatever measures are necessary
to ensure that retaliation does not occur.,,418
For example, an
antiretaliation provision will appear more credible to an employee,
particularly an employee who fears job detriment, if the employer details
and then takes affirmative steps to prevent and address retaliation,
instead of simply asserting that the employer adheres to a "zero
tolerance" retaliation policy.419 One commentator suggested that courts
should require employers to follow up with the complainant some time
after the complaint to determine whether the complainant experienced
420
any form of retaliation.
If an employer maintained and implemented
an effective antiretaliation policy, employees might be encouraged to
report. In any event, the employer's efforts in this regard would be one
factor tending to show why an employee's failure to report was
unreasonable under the circumstances.
Another alternative is to provide a specific retaliation bypass
mechanism in the policy itself by mandating that a supervisor other

417
Fitzgerald et al., supra note 385, at 135 ("[If] resistance is to have any meaning,
interventions must be developed to ensure that organizations provide a safe environment
for victims to express that resistance through both formal and informal channels. Training
programs designed to teach women to be more assertive and to access organizational
complaint procedures, well-intentioned though they may be, are insufficient and
misguided, without meaningful organizational protection from stigma and retaliation.");
Harper, supra note 253, at 66-67 (arguing that, in absence of tangible employment action,
employer should be able to avoid vicarious liability for harassment under affirmative
defense "if and only if the employer has taken reasonable steps to make reporting of this
harassment seem of relatively low cost to victim, and victim has still failed to report
offending conduct"); see also MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES, supra note 366, ch. 5, § 42, at 152-55
(stating that in evaluating reasonableness of course of action, victim's recovery is not
diminished if course of action by which victim might have avoided or "lessened the injury"
is of "such debatable efficacy that a reasonable man might either have adopted it or not").
41' EEOC, supra note 147, 'lI V.D.l.b.
419
Harper, supra note 253, at 77-78 n.139 (arguing that, to prevail on second prong of
affirmative defense, employer should be required to demonstrate that it "has successfully
neutralized [the] risks [of retaliation] for a reasonable victim of harassment," and noting
that employer'S attitudes toward sexual harassment are "reflected in their actions rather
than in their words").
420 Lawton, supra note 349, at 267-68 (arguing that in evaluating prongs one and two of
affirmative defense, courts should "require employers to produce evidence of the
following: (1) complaint records; (2) a system of post-complaint follow-up; (3) employees'
evaluations of the employer's policy and procedure; and (4) a system for evaluating
managers on their compliance with the firm's antiharassment policy and procedure").
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than, or in addition to, the harassing supervisor evaluate the
complainant's work performance for a specified period, perhaps a year,
421
after any complaint.
A bypass mechanism would likely make the
antiretaliation provision more credible and would be relevant in
assessing whether the employee's failure to report was unreasonable.
Even in the absence of such a protective measure, the policy should at
least inform employees that an unreasonable failure to promptly report
harassment may preclude their ability to recover from their employer for
422
such harassment.
Given the relationship between a victim's working environment and
her willingness to report, the trier of fact should have an opportunity to
evaluate these circumstances in assessing whether the victim's chosen
course of action was unreasonable under the circumstances. Although
employers cannot control the behavior of every supervisor, they can
certainly create, and should be required to demonstrate to the trier of
fact, the existence of a working environment that communicates and
reinforces a strong antiharassment/ antiretaliation message to
supervisors and victims alike.
3.

Consequences of Harm

Finally, in determining whether the victim's decision to submit was
unreasonable, the trier of fact must consider the consequences of the
alternative courses of action available to the victim, in light of her unique
circumstances. For example, the Restatement of Torts provides that a
victim's financial resources are directly relevant to the victim's cost423
benefit analysis in determining which course of action to pursue.

421
See, e.g., Allen G. King, Resist and Report: A Policy to Deter Quid Pro Quo Sexual
Harassment, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 333, 343 (1998) (arguing pre-Ellerth/Faragher that
antiharassment policy directed at sexual extortion should include, inter alia, assurances
that "any adverse actions taken against her for a specified period will be scrutinized
carefully by higher management" and "resist and report" provision that imposes
affirmative duty on victim to resist and report quid pro quo threats and advances and
subjects victim to discipline for failing to do so). Given the courts' tendency to equate filecabinet compliance with reasonable efforts to prevent sexual harassment, and thus
conclude that a victim who failed to follow such reasonable procedures was necessarily
unreasonable, a resist and report provision would simply provide further grounds for proemployer courts to conclude that the victim's submission was unreasonable under prong
two because she breached the resist and report duty. A duty to resist and report would
pose less of a problem if courts ceased engaging in the flawed syllogism discussed above
and instead properly applied the second prong and considered the victim's unique
circumstances .
• 22 Bauchner, supra note 346, at 318 .
• 23
RESTATEMENT, supra note 367, § 918 cmt. e ("A poor man cannot be expected to
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While a trier of fact may conclude that it is unreasonable for a victim of
financial means to submit under certain circumstances, that same trier of
fact may conclude that submission on the part of a victim who lives
paycheck-to-paycheck or is in a financially precarious position is not
424
unreasonable under otherwise identical circumstances.
The same
would apply to a victim who, for example, desperately needs health
benefits for either herself or a loved one and who does not have the
425
means to secure those health benefits elsewhere.
In addition to financial consequences, the above principles relate
equally to intangible considerations, such as the negative impact of
426
For example, imagine a well
reporting on career advancement.
diminish his resources by the expenditure of an amount that might be expected from a
person of greater wealth. So too, whether it is unreasonable for a slightly injured person
not to seek medical advice may depend on his ability to pay for it without financial
embarrassment."); see supra text accompanying note 375; cf Amanda M. Jarratt, Comment,
Customizing the Reasonable-Woman Standard to Fit Emotionally and Financially Disabled
Plaintiffs Is Outside the Scope of the Civil Rights Act's Prohibition on Sex-Based Discrimination:
Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 127, 144-57
(arguing that plaintiff's financial circumstances are not relevant to whether her failure to
report was unreasonable but not considering relevant avoidable consequences principles
underlying second prong, which call for just such assessment of victim's unique
circumstances).
424
See, e.g., Hawk v. Americold Logistics, LLC, No. 02-3528,2003 WL 929221, at *9-10,
12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2003) (denying summary judgment for employer on grounds that
reasonable jury could find that, notwithstanding fact that plaintiff had attended
antiharassment training and was aware of her employer'S antiharassment policy, plaintiff's
seven to eight month delay in reporting her direct supervisor's sexually offensive conduct
was not unreasonable failure to either report or otherwise avoid harm when reason for
delay was plaintiff's fear that she would lose her job given her probationary status with
employer and her supervisor's knowledge of how important job was to plaintiff).
425 See, e.g., Aldridge v. State, No. 96-2382-JWL, 1997 WL 614323, at *3, 8 (D. Kan. Sept.
10, 1997) (concluding in pre-Ellerth quid pro quo context that plaintiff alleged viable quid
pro quo claim based on threats alone where plaintiff's supervisor implicitly threatened
plaintiff's job when he knew that plaintiff's daughter was terminally ill and, after plaintiff
again rejected his unwelcome sexual advances, he commented, "[y]ou know if you ever lost
this job, no one would ever insure [your daughter]" and further queried, "[h]ow would
you ever pay for [your daughter's surgeries] without insurance?"); Showalter v. Allison
Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (D.R.1. 1991) (holding that plaintiff stated viable
claim of qUid pro quo harassment pre-Ellerth where his supervisor coerced him to engage
in unwelcome sexual acts through supervisor's threats that he would use his extensive
connections in plaintiff's industry to ensure that plaintiff would be "blackballed from the
industry if he did not comply" and further threatened plaintiff with "loss of his medical
benefits if he failed to participate in the sexual activity" when supervisor had previously
learned from plaintiff that plaintiff's son had "heart defect and had undergone three open
heart surgeries"), affd sub nom. Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 984 F.2d 4 (1st
Cir.1993).
426
Lawton, supra note 349, at 257 (noting that empirical studies show that "victims do
not report harassment because they believe that reporting will make the situation worse,"
including beliefs that reporting will "adversely affect their careers").
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regarded female associate in a prestigious law firm who will be
considered for partnership promotion in one year's time. She has been
explicitly threatened with nonadvancement by a partner responsible for
a large portion of firm revenue. Depending on the circumstances, she
may reasonably conclude that the least costly alternative given her
situation is to submit. Indeed, under some circumstances, the power
disparity alone might be enough to create a triable issue of fact as to
whether her failure to report was unreasonable under the
•
427
Clrcumstances.
Moreover, many harassment victims have invested considerable time
and effort to achieve their current level of career success and goodwill
428
with their employer.
While a victim slowly amasses success and
goodwill in the workplace over time, it is easily lost by reporting the
harassing conduct of a superior who possesses not only the power to hire
and fire but, perhaps more importantly, the power to influence, if not
make, promotion decisions.
Furthermore, given the difficulty of
building goodwill, securing a different job that is comparable in all
respects, including goodwill, is likely to be extraordinarily difficult, if not
virtually impossible. And although Title VII may compensate the victim
for any loss of income, it is highly unlikely that the victim will be
compensated for the loss of goodwill. Thus, in some circumstances, the
victim may still be worse off for having reported the supervisor's
harassing conduct.
Furthermore, in fields such as law or medicine, where a specific career
"track" consisting of a certain number of years exists, the victim who
reports in the face of a threat of nonadvancement may end up
unofficially "off-track" with her current employer. Because no employee
is consistently perfect, the victim's employer will have no difficulty
explaining that the level of scrutiny increases as the victim progresses
toward partnership or its equivalent and that the victim's unofficial offtrack status is simply the result of the victim's failure to live up to the
employer's standards when subjected to such increased scrutiny.429

See supra text accompanying note 407.
See Jordan, supra note 345, at 214-15; see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of
Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 532-33 (1997) (discussing value of
427

42S

work and how "[wJork shapes individual identities in ways both general and particular");
Vicki Schultz, Life'S Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-92 (2000) (discussing how work in
United States "has been constitutive of citizenship, community, and even personal
identity").
429
See Estrich, supra note 322, at 835-36 (noting that proving causal element in quid pro
quo or other discrimination claim is often difficult as "an employer can always find good
reasons to fire people"); see also Grossman, supra note 26, at 724-25 (noting that
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Moreover, given the high burden for retaliation claims under Title VII
and the highly subjective nature of promotion decisions in the
professional setting, a victim may have difficulty characterizing her
unofficial off-track status as an "ultimate employment decision" or
430
"adverse employment action" required for a retaliation claim.
Under
such circumstances, a jury should be permitted to assess a victim's costbenefit analysis and determine not whether submitting was the best
alternative as revealed in hindsight, but whether it was simply a
431
reasonable alternative under the victim's unique circumstances.
Given the avoidable consequences principles and the highly factual
nature of the inquiry, courts should permit the trier of fact to consider all
relevant aspects of the victim's circumstances in determining whether
her decision to submit was unreasonable. It is only when the victim's
failure to report was patently "stubborn" or similarly without any
reasonable basis under the circumstances that an employer should
prevail on the second prong as a matter of law. While some may argue,
as the First Circuit observed in Reed, that the second prong potentially
serves as a "loophole for false or overstated claims of threat by one
hoping to reach a sympathetic jury," juries are expected to be able to
detect false claims and evaluate both the evidence and "reasonable
behavior in human situations.,,432 More importantly, the Court's
opinions in Ellerth and Faragher mandate such an assessment.

"documented consequences of reporting harassment are quite severe" and may include
monetary consequences and, "[f]or women in professional careers, such as law, medicine,
or academics, silence in the face of harassment may be a calculated measure to avoid losing
the sponsorship or mentorship of an older, more established male partner, doctor, or
tenured professor") .
• 30
See Henry, supra note 398, at 554 (arguing that high threshold for retaliation claims
under Title Vll is inconsistent with second prong's requirement that victims report because
actions such as "change in job duties" or "negative evaluation" do not constitute "ultimate
employment decisions" required for viable retaliation claim, and thus proposing more
inclusive approach to retaliation claims); Lawton, supra note 349, at 265-66 (discussing that,
because "[c]ourts are split on whether unfairly evaluating performance alone can trigger
retaliation," plaintiffs who report and receive unfair performance evaluations may be
unprotected as they may not be able to state prima facie retaliation case under Title Vll).
431 The situations discussed in this Part V.B are Simplistic accounts for illustration
purposes. The factors delineated are not intended as a comprehensive list of the relevant
factors to be considered by the jury, although such factors are likely relevant in many
situations in which harassment arises. In addition to the factors delineated in this Part, the
jury must also consider any other aspect of the circumstances that bears on whether the
plaintiff was reasonable in submitting rather than reporting the harassing behavior. See
supra text accompanying notes 359, 385.
431
Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2003).
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Illustrative Cases Applying the Second Prong

Although not expressly basing their analysis on avoidable
consequences principles, a small minority of courts have implicitly
recognized the need for the trier of fact to engage in this type of costbenefit and context analysis when determining whether a plaintiff's
failure to report or her submission to sexually harassing conduct was
unreasonable under the circumstances. A case that correctly applied the
avoidable consequences principles required under Ellerth and Faragher is
discussed below in Part V.c.l. For comparison purposes, a case that
failed to correctly apply the requisite avoidable consequences principles
is included in Part V.C.2.
1.

Second Prong Correctly Applied

In Bennett v. Progressive COrp.,433 the district court concluded that a

triable issue of fact existed regarding whether Bennett unreasonably
failed to report and instead submitted to her supervisor's eight-month
campaign of unwelcome sexual advances because she feared her
supervisor's threats of job detriment. Bennett initially ignored her
supervisor's unwelcome conduct, but the conduct became progressively
434
more severe. Nevertheless, she did not report the conduct because she
needed her job, as she was financially supporting her family, her father
was ill, her mother had lost her job, and her brother had moved in with
435
her after losing his home. She feared retaliation because her supervisor
had previously overburdened another employee who he disliked, which
ultimately caused that employee to resign.436 Moreover, when Bennett
attempted to distance herself from the supervisor, he delayed her
projects, refused to answer work-related questions, and intimated that he
437
was her "only protection" in the office.
Over the subsequent months, Bennett's supervisor's behavior
438
continued to increase in severity both in and out of the office.
Although she periodically contemplated reporting her supervisor's
conduct, she did not do so because she feared losing her job.439
Additionally, she felt insecure about complaining to her supervisor's

433

434
435
436
437

438
439

Bennet v. ProgreSSive Corp., 225 F. Supp. 2d 190 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
ld. at 197-98.
ld. at 198.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 199-200.
ld. at 199.
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440

superior because of the close personal relationship between them.
Ultimately, based on Bennett's fear of termination and her supervisor's
continued and escalating pressure to coerce her into acquiescing to his
advances, she submitted to her supervisor's sexual advances and
ultimately had sexual intercourse with him.441
When Bennett
subsequently threatened to file a complaint if he did not cease his
behavior, the supervisor told her that her career with their employer
442
would be over if she complained.
Ultimately, Bennett reported her
443
.
,
d
t
supervIsor s con uc.
Based on these facts, the court denied the employer's motion for
summary judgment and concluded that a jury could find that Bennett's
failure to report the eight-month period of harassment and her
444
submission to unwelcome sexual intercourse was not unreasonable.
The court found that Bennett's eight-month delay in reporting her
445
supervisor's conduct was not dispositive.
It reasoned that a delay of
such length is "reasonably explained by her fear of retaliatory
termination and the financial insecurity such termination would bring
't ,,446
WI'th I.

440

ld. at 197,199.
ld. at 199.
442
ld. at 200.
443
ld. at 201.
ld. at 209 .
445
ld.
446
ld. The court noted the delay in reporting might also be explained by the fact that it
is difficult for a plaintiff to determine when the harassment becomes actionable. ld. at n.5
(citing Marks, supra note 349, at 1429); see also Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 36
(1st Cir. 2003) (concluding as matter of law that plaintiff was not unreasonable in failing to
report her supervisor's verbally offensive conduct that occurred months prior to sexual
assault because plaintiff "could reasonably have regarded this low-level harassment as not
worth reporting; indeed, standing alone, it may not have triggered Title VII liability at all").
Additionally, because it is difficult to determine when harassment becomes actionable, a
victim's informal efforts to prevent harassment should be considered as evidence bearing
on the reasonableness of the victim's actions. See, e.g., Hardy v. Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 328
F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment in favor of employer, and
concluding that triable issue of fact existed as to whether plaintiff's six-week delay in
reporting her supervisor's repeated sexual advances was unreasonable given her initial
efforts to resolve situation informally through numerous requests to supervisor that he
stop behavior).
For a case in which the First Circuit engaged in a similar cost-benefit analysiS
regarding whether the plaintiff's failure to report was unreasonable, see Reed, 333 F.3d at 37
(concluding that triable issue of fact existed as to whether 17-year-old plaintiff had been
unreasonable in failing to report that her supervisor, who was twice her age, had sexually
assaulted her and expressly threatened discharge if she reported).
441
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Second Prong Incorrectly Applied

In contrast to the Bennett court's correct application of the second
prong, one of the most egregious examples of an incorrect application of
the second prong in the submission context and the unjust result that
followed is seen in Samedi v. Miami-Dade County.447 Samedi was a Haitian
448
449
native who understood and spoke only minimal English and was
450
unable to read English. She worked as a temporary county employee,
and her duties generally included picking up trash in the field and
451
performing other custodial duties in various office environments.
Shortly after she began working, two of her superiors began sexually
452
assaulting her. According to Samedi, the two superiors each forced her
to engage in numerous unwelcome sex acts with them during working
hours by telling her that she had to submit to them because they were
her superiors and by threatening to fire her if she refused. 453 During
many of the sexual assaults, she attempted to defend herself, but her
454
attacker physically overwhelmed her. These sexual assaults spanned a
five-year period and included numerous incidents of "digital vaginal
penetration, sexual intercourse, and/or oral copulation.,,455 During the
456
entire five-year period, Samedi remained a temporary employee.
Five years into Samedi's temporary employment with the county, she
had an opportunity to meet with the county's human resources officer, at
457
which time she promptly informed the officer of the sexual assaults.
The officer immediately began an investigation and, as a result of the
458
investigation, Samedi's superiors were demoted and relocated.

452

206 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
Id.
ld. at 1215.
ld.; Samedi v. Miami-Dade Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
Samedi, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
Id.

453

[d .

447
448
449

'50
'51

ld. at 1216.
455 ld. at 1216 n.4.
Other debasing conduct included one instance in which Samedi's
superior instructed one of her male coworkers to remove his clothing and ordered Samedi
to join the nude coworker. [d. at 1216. She endured numerous other instances where her
superior would refuse to take her to the restroom while she worked in the field so that she
was relegated to urinating on public streets while her superior watched her. ld .
• 56 [d. at 1217.
457
Id.
• 54

458

Id.
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Subsequently, Samedi filed suit against her employer for sexual
459
harassment.
The county moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that it satisfied both elements of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
460
defense.
Regarding the second prong, the employer alleged that
Samedi unreasonably failed to report the five-year campaign of abuse,
notwithstanding her temporary status and her allegations that her
461
superiors had repeatedly threatened her with discharge.
The district
court concluded: "[N]ot only is it totally unreasonable that the [p]laintiff
took no other action in four years to stop the alleged forcible rapes and
harassment, but it seems inconceivable.,,462 The court stated that the first
prong of the affirmative defense is satisfied by mere posting, and
considered it irrelevant that Samedi never saw the employer's
antiharassment policy, which was posted on a bulletin board at the work
463
site and written only in English.
The court noted that Samedi had
numerous complaint avenues available to her, such as her temporary
464
agency, other supervisors, the police, and fellow employees. It further
surmised that "the fact that [the plaintiff] did nothing in the face of such
extreme abuse, tends to shed some doubt on the [p ]laintiff's
allegations.,,465 The court also found it significant that Samedi previously
complained to one of her abusive superiors about a coworker who
mocked her inability to speak English and admitted that she was pleased
466
with how the situation was handled. Accordingly, the court concluded
that her "failure to do anything to prevent the harm she complains of
467
was unreasonable."

459

Id.

Id. at 1218-19.
Id. at 1222-23.
462
Id at 1223. Alternatively, the court could have concluded that the lengthy delay was
tangible evidence of the plaintiff's credible fear of job detriment.
See supra text
accompanying note 446.
463
Samedi, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1220.
464
[d. at 1223.
460
461

465

[d.

Id.
Id.; see also Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary
judgment for employer, and concluding that plaintiff, whose senior supervisor had
previously subjected her to unwelcome sexual advances and groping at work-related
conference, "utterly failed 'to avoid harm otherwise/ll at similar work-related conference
six months later because she "unnecessarily put herself in a situation that permitted
repetition of precisely the same kind of advances" when, after receiving senior supervisor's
apology for his prior conduct and his promise not to "touch her," plaintiff accepted senior
supervisor's invitations to accompany him to two bars and later to his hotel room where he
again subjected plaintiff to unwelcome sexual advances and groping).
466

467
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Based on the avoidable consequences principles underlying the second
prong of the affirmative defense, the Samedi court incorrectly applied the
second prong. It shifted the burden of proof from the employer to
Samedi by requiring her to demonstrate the reasonableness of her
actions, and then failed to consider the circumstances relevant to
whether her submission and accompanying failure to report was
unreasonable. Specifically, the court failed to consider the fact that
Samedi was a recent immigrant who worked in an English-speaking
environment, but could not read and spoke and understood very little
English. The court also did not consider it relevant that Samedi neither
saw nor read the county's sexual harassment policy. Moreover, the court
did not acknowledge the relevance of her financially precarious
temporary employment status and her related hope that she would
ultimately obtain a permanent position. The court also made no mention
of the fact that she was physically overwhelmed by her superiors when
sexually assaulted.
Instead of requiring the employer to demonstrate that it created a
working environment in which employees were made to feel
comfortable and protected when reporting harassment, the court put the
burden on Samedi to demonstrate a work environment in which
harassment was rampant and reporting was futile. The court then
excluded as irrelevant evidence of sexual harassment complaints and
disciplinary action records relating to employees other than the
468
perpetrators. Finally, the court ignored the fact that once Samedi came
into contact with a human resources officer, she promptly reported the
conduct.
Although a jury could have concluded that Samedi's submission and
failure to report was unreasonable, the circumstances represent perhaps
the quintessential example of a triable issue of fact regarding the
reasonableness of her actions. Nevertheless, the court usurped the jury's
role, shifted the burden of proof from the employer to Samedi, ignored
the pertinent circumstances in which she found herself, and concluded
that her submission and failure to report was unreasonable as a matter of
law. This outcome directly conflicts with the result mandated by Ellerth
and Faragher.

468 Such evidence had been submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to an earlier
summary judgment motion on her civil rights and Title VII sexual harassment claim.
Samedi, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-31.
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CONCLUSION

While supervisory sexual extortion is no less pernicious than it was
prior to 1998, the employer liability standards for this classic quid pro
quo scenario changed following the Court's decisions in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 469 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. 470 Instead of
holding an employer strictly liable for supervisory sexual extortion due
to the supervisor's use of official power and the deleterious effects that
the supervisor's conduct has on a submission victim, Ellerth and Faragher
focused on whether the employer's official decision-making processes
were implicated in the supervisor's conduct, as evidenced by a tangible
employment action. Under this new framework, strict liability is
appropriate only when the supervisor takes a tangible employment
action against a subordinate for refusing to submit to the supervisor's
unwelcome sexual advances.
In the submission context, a sexual extortion victim will be unable to
make the necessary showing to impose strict liability under Ellerth and
Faragher because her submission enabled her to avoid the job detriment
required for a tangible employment action. In the absence of a tangible
employment action, a submission plaintiff's circumstances must be
evaluated as a hostile environment claim. Thus, a submission plaintiff
must first demonstrate that she was subjected to an actionable hostile
environment. If she makes the necessary showing, her employer can
then assert and prove the two-prong affirmative defense. Under the
second prong as currently, and incorrectly, applied by many lower
courts, most employers would likely prevail on a summary judgment
motion regarding submission claims. This leaves submission plaintiffs
without vindication of their rights or compensation for their injuries in
circumstances where the submission was not unreasonable.
Under the approach to the second prong advanced in this Article, the
result may be dramatically different if juries are permitted to consider
the submission plantiff's unique circumstances in light of the harmavoidance principles of the avoidable consequences doctrine. While not
exhaustive, the critical factors in the harm-avoidance analysis include an
assessment of whether the victim possessed a credible fear of harm, the
victim's working environment, and the perceived consequences of the
victim's refusal to submit. Following Ellerth and Faragher, the jury
should be permitted to consider these and any other relevant factors
presented by the circumstances to determine whether the plaintiff's
469

47.

524 U.S. 742 (1998).
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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submission was unreasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.
Put in harm-avoidance terms, the jury should be given an opportunity to
assess whether the victim faced two competing harms and to further
assess the reasonableness of the submission victim's actions in light of
those competing harms.
As Judge Reinhardt aptly stated in Nichols v. Frank: "[N]othing is more
destructive of human dignity than being forced to perform sexual acts
against one's Will.,,471 While this is undoubtedly true, being forced to
perform sexual acts against one's will is even more destructive when the
employer avoids liability altogether because the jury is not permitted to
hear evidence regarding why the decision to submit was not
unreasonable under the circumstances. Under the approach to the
second prong advanced in this Article, such a result is far less likely to
occur.

471

42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994).

